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ABSTRACT
DIFFERENT ENDPOINTS AFTER EMPIRE:
EXPLAINING VARYING LEVELS OF DEMOCRACY IN
POST-COMMUNIST EASTERN EUROPE
William John Eger, Jr.
Old Dominion University, 2017
Director: Dr. Simon Serfaty

The varying levels of democracy in central and eastern Europe provide scholars with an
interesting study of democratization. Democracy grew to different levels and in varying ways in
the region since the collapse of communism. The evolution of democracy in the region offers
insight into which variables affect democracy, a test for established theories of democracy, and a
workshop for new theories and hypotheses addressing democratization. This study sought to
determine the impetus behind varying levels of post-communist democratization in the states of
the region. It explores the different theories of democratization. The work takes a regional
approach to examining the states. This approach isolates less traditional factors that contribute to
democratic quality: history, culture and geography.
Each of the factors is relevant to democracy in the region. The exploration of the
historical background explains some of the forces still at work in the region. It presents the core
causes of some of the democratic short-comings that exist. It also assists in a presentation of the
next contextual factor: how the political parties and systems evolved since 1989. Religion in the
region is especially relevant to the degree of rights and freedoms, as well. The area is very
diverse, with some countries of predominantly Catholic, some states with sizeable Islamic
segments, countries with overwhelming Eastern Orthodox majorities and states with a relevant
number of Protestant Christians. Finally, the region‟s location has a bearing of democracy. The

region represents the eastern border of western civilization. Not only does this account for their
religious diversity in many areas and ethnic diversity in others, it also helps define some of the
aspects of their democracy. The region long found itself as the battlefields of wars between those
of the west and those of the east. The predicament of being trapped between two giants continues
today.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The varying levels of democracy in central and eastern Europe provide scholars with an
interesting study of democratization. Democracy grew to different levels and in varying ways in
the region since the collapse of communism. The evolution of democracy in the region offers
insight into which variables affected democracy, a test for established theories of democracy, and
new theories in hypotheses addressing democratization in comparable areas. This work aims to
contribute to the literature by testing three hypotheses. First, a study of the region disproves
many of the established theories about democratization. Namely, the use of economic theory as a
basis for democracy falls short. Second, the region represents a “special case” in terms of
studying democracy due to its history, culture and geography, especially its proximity and
relations with Russia and the communist former Soviet Union. Very few other regions share this
variable. In this respect, it eschews many of the theories that discuss democracy in a broader
sense. Third, it challenges the notion of interconnectedness as a positive factor in geopolitics.
The concept aids in democratic development is some facets of a country‟s affairs, but causes
unintended negative consequences in others.
This work is divided into six parts. The first part is this introduction, which sets the stage
for the rest of the discussion. It presents the history of the region as well as the current political
economic and social aspects of life in central and eastern Europe. The second section of this
work is a literature review of the many theories of democratization. The third section of the work
explains the hypotheses and analytical methodology used in the subsequent case studies. Case
studies of Poland, Hungary and Bulgaria comprise the fourth section. The fifth section of the
work discusses the results and findings of an analysis of the hypotheses. The final section draws
conclusions based on this analysis and overall study.
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This introduction offers a context for the current levels of democracy. An exploration of
the historical background illustrates it relevance in the region today: re-emerged nationalisms
and ethnic tensions, for example. It presents the core causes of some of the democratic shortcomings that exist. It assists in a presentation of the next contextual factor: how the political
parties and systems evolved since 1989. These political systems, due to history and other factors,
moved and changed in different fashions in different countries. This sets the stage for an analysis
of the politics in the capitals of central and eastern Europe. Concurrently, the states of the region
moved from a command economy governed largely by Moscow to an open market. From there,
they moved to a common market and, later a union. This third change wrought a separate effect
on democracy in the central and eastern Europe. Finally, society changed a great deal since the
collapse of communism, as well. Both the pre-collapse and present day, post-collapse societies
affected the current levels of freedom, equality and rights for citizens on the region. These four
aspects of history, development and change in central and eastern European molded the resulting
democracies.
Religion in the region is especially relevant to the degree of rights and freedoms, as well.
The area is very diverse, with some countries of predominantly Catholic, others with sizeable
Islamic segments, countries with overwhelming Eastern Orthodox majorities and many states
with a relevant number of Protestant Christians. This patchwork quilt of theologies varies further
when the parish and ecclesiastical structures of Catholicism and Orthodoxy are included. The
theological beliefs of the persons of central and eastern Europe become important to democracy
when the width and breadth of religion‟s hand in legislating and politics is reviewed. While it is
important to note that the study of religion in government is in fashion in regards to other parts of
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the world, namely the Middle East, a comparable study of central and eastern Europe is equally
fruitful.
It is along this vein that we find, in many cases, the predominant religion and the
government or its policies interlaced. It also introduces a whole new field of study into the
analysis. It enables us to dissect many of the laws and attitudes particular to some of the central
and eastern European countries. Religion helps explain the Polish attitude towards abortion. The
lack of religion aids in understanding Hungary‟s attitudes towards outsiders, especially refugees.
We find that shared religion also manifests itself in church-state relationships like that of Putinist
Russia and Bulgaria. Religion matters to the quality of democracy in central and eastern Europe
despite its exclusion by established theories.
Central and Eastern Europe‟s location has a bearing on democracy. The region represents
the eastern border of western civilization. Not only does this account for their religious diversity
in many areas and ethnic diversity in others, it also defines some of the democratic aspects of
their modern governments. The region long found itself as the battlefields of wars between larger
powers of the east and west. The Turks marauded through the countries of central and eastern
Europe and fought armies from western Europe. After the Turks, the armies of Europe did much
the same. By the mid-twentieth century the area was the fault line between two nuclear
superpowers.
Despite the collapse of communism, despite the emergence of the European Union and
their membership, and despite the absence of military conflict, central and eastern Europe sits at
ground zero of the East-West Paradigm. Russia and the European Union shadow box with
economic policy, trade policy, military maneuvers and political rhetoric. Each regularly entreats
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the states of the region to pursue different interests. Simultaneously, some of the states have long
held apprehensions or deep associations with Russia. Both the paradigm and the established
relationships with Russia shade the hue of democracy and rights in central and eastern Europe.
Politics before the Iron Curtain
The history of the states of central and eastern Europe impacts their levels of democracy
in two different ways. First, it creates the context for much of what is happening today: ethnic
differences, religious animosities, traditional allies, to name just a few. Second, it helps explain their democratic and economic development. It is important to note that both World Wars began
in the region: the first in Yugoslavia and the second with the invasion of Poland. This is a
testament to the Sturm und Drang that has existed in the region for centuries. While it would be
superfluous to harken back to the time of the Goths and Vandals, it is pertinent to begin after the
First World War. This began the period of 1914 to 1945, which illustrated a complexity that
remains to this day. Since then, borders changed, communist governments collapsed, democracy
emerged, and the states forged a union. The resilient diversity of the region is undeniable and
continues in the 21st century with the added factor of immigration.
The Treaty of Versailles left many geopolitical facets of central and eastern Europe
frozen in time.1 In 1992, Vladimir Tismaneanu wrote that, “The conflicts that pre-existed
communism have not been abolished during the four decades of state socialism.”2 The region in
the early 20th century is a stark contrast to the map of 1989 or today. The early 20th century saw
an area dominated by the various empires of previous centuries. The Russian, Ottoman and
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Sharon L. Wolchik and Jane L. Curry, “Democracy, the Market, and the Return to Europe: From Communism to
the European Union and NATO,” in Central and East European Politics: from Communism to Democracy (Lanham,
MD: Rowman & Littlefield, Inc, 2011), 5.
2
Vladimir Tismaneanu, Reinventing Politics (New York: The Free Press, 1992), 2.
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Austro-Hungarian Empires controlled sizeable portions of central and eastern Europe. The
Prussians did as well. 3 The First World War and the Treaty of Versailles changed this. The
treaty was a punishing document. It sought retribution from Germany and the Austro-Hungarian
Empire by redrawing borders. It threw various different ethnic groups together in newly created
states.4 Romania was expanded. The nations of Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia were created.
Hungary was pulled away from the larger empire and shrank to one third its previous size.
Poland was reborn. 5
During the interwar years, most countries of eastern and central Europe experienced
dictatorships, monarchs or military rule. Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland had some success
in establishing a democratic government.6 Most of the new states were not truly “nation-states”.7
The new map of the region created large minorities in some countries. Some of these groups
within the same state had centuries old animosities.8 There was internal, ethnic strife and
religious tensions.9 Poor economic conditions compounded this. Life in the region in this period
was hard. Living standards were low and unemployment was high. Political extremism emerged
in places throughout central and eastern Europe. Nationalism emerged in many of the states. 10
Some saw right-wing authoritarian movements coalesce around their own brand of fascism. The
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Wolchik and Curry, “Democracy, the Market, and the Return to Europe,” 5.
Ibid., 8-9.
5
Tismaneanu, Reinventing Politics, 6-7.
6
Wolchik and Curry, “Democracy, the Market, and the Return to Europe,” 9.
7
Judy Batt, “Introduction: Defining Central and Eastern Europe,” in Developments in Central and East European
Politics, eds. Stephen White, Judy Batt and Paul G. Lews (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2003), 13.
8
Adam Bromke, “Post-communist countries: challenges and problems,” in Central and Eastern Europe: The
Challenge of Transition, ed. Regina Cowen Karp (New York: Oxford University, 1994), 21.
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Batt, “Introduction: Defining Central and Eastern Europe,” 14.
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Tismaneanu, Reinventing Politics, 8; Batt, “Introduction: Defining Central and Eastern Europe,” 14.
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Iron Guard in Romania and the Arrow Crosses in Hungary, who supported German Chancellor
Adolf Hitler, developed a following in the 1930s.11
Communist groups started in central and eastern Europe at this time, as well. One of the
seminal events of the early 20th century was the Russian Revolution. The young communist
government of the Soviet Union sought to exert influence in the region through these upstart
organizations abroad. These European communist parties tried to undermine any advancement
in democracy of the new governments. They slavishly followed the directions from the Kremlin.
They endorsed Soviet claims to territory that even placed them at odds with many of their fellow
countrymen. Their activities on behalf of Moscow led them to be banned in all central and
eastern European countries except Czechoslovakia.12 World War II temporarily halted east
European communist development.13
The dynamic between eastern Europeans, their fellow countrymen who were
communists, the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany was rather complicated. The Soviet Union
found a willing collaborator in their intentions in Adolf Hitler. 14 For this, communists in
Romania, Hungary and Yugoslavia were dispassionately pro-German.15 The Soviet Union and
Germany signed a non-aggression pact on August 23, 1939. Stalin and Hitler split central and
eastern Europe. The Soviet Union would gain eastern Poland, the Baltic States and part of
Romania. In return, Stalin agreed not to attack Germany. The Second World War began eight
days later when Germany invaded Poland.16 Hitler‟s betrayal of Stalin changed everything,
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Tismaneanu, Reinventing Politics, 9.
Ibid., 11.
13
Ibid., 16-17.
14
Williamson A. Murray “The World in Conflict,” in The Cambridge History of Warfare, ed. Geoffrey Parker (NY:
Cambridge University Press, 2005), 322.
15
Tismaneanu, Reinventing Politics, 16.
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Murray “The World in Conflict,” 322.
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including local politics. Now, many east Europeans saw communists as an alternative to the
Nazis. They embraced communism as a “cause of human freedom”.17
In retrospect, the manner in which Hitler and Stalin bargained with the fate of the
countries of central and eastern Europe was typical of the role larger countries played in the
region from the end of the First World War until 1989. The states of central and eastern Europe
served as secondary parcels to be bargained with. There was little regard for their aspirations.
There were scant attempts to pursue national interests. The end of Second World War offered an
opportunity for true self determination and possibly democracy, but the victorious Allies felt
otherwise. Winston Churchill and Joseph Stalin agreed to the futures of Romania, Bulgaria,
Hungary and Yugoslavia in five minutes on a half sheet of paper.18 Poland‟s future was
determined for them later at Yalta.19 Roosevelt himself had endorsed Soviet control of the
Baltics, though he could not make his view public.20 Roosevelt would back track the
concessions to the Soviets. He telegraphed the Kremlin on October 4, 1944 and place them on
notice that they would not have a “blank check” in Eastern Europe. This, some historians claim,
started the Cold War.21
The relationships between the Soviet satellites in the region and the Soviet Union started
before the end of the Second World War. It was a practice in long distance, inner-party power
politics. Each country‟s specific relationship with the leader of the Soviet Union shaped their
relationship with Moscow. Leaders of the communist groups in central and eastern Europe
17

Tismaneanu, Reinventing Politics, 1`8.
Churchill quoted by Joseph M. Siracusa, “The Night Stalin and Churchill Divided Europe: The View from
Washington,” The Review of Politics 43, no. 3 (July 1981): 381.
19
J.R. Thackrah, “Aspects of American and British Policy Towards Poland from Yalta to the Potsdam Conferences,
1945,” The Polish Review 21, no. 4 (1976): 6.
20
Soviet Ambassador to the United States Maxim Litvinov quoted by Anna M. Cienciala, “The United States and
Poland in World War II,” The Polish Review 54, no. 2 (2009): 183-4.
21
Albert Reis quoted by Siracusa, “The Night Stalin and Churchill Divided Europe,” 384.
18
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gambled during Kremlin power struggles like those in the party apparatus in Moscow. When
Lenin died, those who did not support Stalin‟s initial bid for power or had crossed Stalin before
were purged. He disbanded the entire communist party in Poland at one point. Stalin replaced
these leaders with more hardline, pro-Kremlin communists. 22 Tismaneanu refers to them as
“Muscovites”23. There were some communists that tried to incorporate national interest into
their brand of communism. Under Stalin, this was a crime.24
The post-war, communist states of central and eastern Europe had varying political
systems and different relationships with the Soviet government in Moscow.25 There were
different types of communists. Tismaneanu refers to their study as “comparative communism.”26
Poland allowed some private property and some free markets. The government of Romania was
less tolerant and more hardline than that of Hungary.27 Poland even had a hegemonic party
system with three parties. The dominant communist party remained in control, but aligned with
one of two non-communist parties.28 The most visible example of variety in communist rule in
the region was Josip Tito in Yugoslavia. Tito had fought the Nazis in the Second World War and
emerged as the leader of Yugoslavia after the 1938 purges of central and eastern European
communist leaders by Stalin.29 Tito rejected Stalin‟s interference in his country‟s domestic
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Michael McFaul “The Missing Variable: The `International System’ as the Link between Third and Fourth Wave
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Michael McFaul and Kathryn Stoner-Weiss (NY: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 17
26
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27
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Sten Berglund and Jan Åke Dellenbrant, “The Breakdown of Communism in Eastern Europe,” in The New
Democracies in Eastern Europe, eds. Sten Berglund and Jan Åke Dellenbrant (Brookfield, VT: Edward Elgat
Publishing Company, 1994), 9.
29
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affairs.30 Shortly after Tito‟s ideological break with Stalin, Soviets prosecuted communists for
placing national interests ahead of that of the Soviet Union or “Titoism”.31 In 1949, senior
communists from Albania, Bulgaria, Romania and Poland were placed on trial for Titoism. This
had a dual effect. First, communism in central and eastern Europe lost ardent support outside of
Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia. Second, Moscow became more selective about who led their
satellite states in central and eastern Europe. Now, professional revolutionaries trained in
Moscow led the communist parties in the region.32
Nikita Khrushchev assumed control of the Soviet Union after Stalin‟s death. Stalin‟s
policies left central and eastern Europe in economic turmoil. Khrushchev feared that there would
be uprisings and relaxed some aspects of Soviet rule over the region. This accompanied his
campaign of de-Stalinization and even reproached Tito.33 Locals saw a possibility for reform, but
the countries of central and eastern Europe that pushed for changed all eventually faced
crackdowns. This includes the use of military force in East Germany in 1953, Hungary and
Poland in 1956.34 Khrushchev was ousted in 1964. Leonid Brezhnev took over. Brezhnev
reasserted Soviet power in the region in the vein of Stalin. The region would remain quiet from
that point through the 1970s with the exception of the Prague Spring of 1968.35
All of this would change in 1985 with the ascension of Mikhail Gorbachev. He
dismantled the established system of Soviet governance over the central and Eastern European
communist states.36 He allowed these states to “go their own way”37, referred to as the Sinatra
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Doctrine.38 The Soviets slowly withdrew support for more hardline European communist leaders
like Honecker in East Germany and Ceauşescu in Romania. On June 4, 1989 Poland held its first
free elections in 40 years.39 After this, communism collapsed elsewhere in the region. Months
later the Berlin Wall fell, taking German communism with it. Czechoslovakia, Romanian and
Bulgaria soon followed.40 Sten Berglund and Jan Åke Dellenbrant describe the spread of
democracy as “reminiscent of the Domino Theory”41, but the region-wide event was neither
uniform nor synchronized.
Politics After Communism
The post-communist political systems and political parties in central and eastern Europe
grew differently as each state navigated the waters of democracy, many for the first time. Politics
and democracy in the region ventured through three different phases: immediate postcommunism, a democratic hangover, and the era of the European Union. Along this trajectory,
the political leadership and electorates became quick studies in subjects as old as traditional
European parliamentary democracy and as new as supranational statehood. These states founded
parliaments, dealt with scandal, rejoiced at new rights and privileges and contemplated
accession. Generally, speaking central and eastern Europe‟s move to democracy is a success.
Most people can vote; own property; have the right to free speech and worship how and where
they want. Their political systems are not perfect. They remain challenged by some ghosts of the
past and other specters of the future. Democracy in the region depends on how the states of the
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Ibid., 22.
39
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(Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 2009), 411.
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region will address remnants of 19th century conflicts and frictions from 21st century Union
membership.
Some central and east European states took longer than others. Once more, their
transitions took different forms. The transition in Hungary, Poland and East Germany took
months. The same transition took weeks in Bulgaria and Romania. The Czechs only took ten
days! The Baltic states remained Soviet Republics until a failed coup and the emergence of Boris
Yeltsin.42 The initial transition from communism was the first step, but in most cases it was not
the last. Poland would have “table talks” to determine the fate of their political system. East
Germany would reunify with West Germany the following year. Czechoslovakia would
eventually split into two nations, the Czech Republic and Slovakia.
The manner of these initial transitions varied, as well. Poland and Hungary had “pacted
transitions.” There were committees formed, different topics discussed. The communists were
included. In this instance, there was a collective dealing with the end of communism.
Communism in East Germany, Czechoslovakia and Romania had sudden ends fueled by public
protest. In Romania‟s case, this was accented by the show trial and summary execution of
communist leader Nicholae Ceauşescu on television. Bulgaria and Albania saw other less
oppressive pseudo-communist and communist regimes assume power. Yugoslavia had the most
heart-breaking of destinies: a long, bloody armed conflict that involved ethnic cleansing and
other war crimes. The war in Yugoslavia produced a myriad of states occupied by groups with
aspirations that date back centuries.43
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The days immediately after communism in the central and eastern European states were
difficult, tedious and wrought with peril. In short, all that was would be nevermore. The collapse
of communism left a geopolitical vacuum. Most of the countries of the region lacked basic
democratic institutions, security policies and armed forces.44 All the while, there was an
underlying fear that the Soviet s might reassert their authority with military action.45 (There were
still Soviet forces in East Germany.46 ) The states needed to move to market economies. Stateowned assets needed to be sold and privatized. They needed new trading patterns. Their
governments needed to establish relationships with international financial institutions.47 There
were questions about reconciliation over crimes of the communist era and treatment of
minorities. The leadership of these states faced the challenge of bringing their countries into the
20th century quickly, but in a manner that would not tear their countries apart.
The history of political parties following the collapse of communism in the region begins
with a very pessimistic tone. Political parties as an institution were understandably unpopular.
The parties that the citizens of central and eastern Europe were accustomed to “tended to
resemble organized crime”48 not the political parties their neighbors to the west knew. The new
liberal parties in the region were not parties in neither the traditional sense or in name. First, their
structure and membership was different. They were umbrella groups. Many were civic initiatives
and movements with supporters and followers not traditional parties with members. They named
themselves alliances, movements or fronts. They did not even want to be known as parties. The
44
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Civic Forum in Czechoslovakia, Solidarity in Poland and the Hungarian Democratic Forum were
examples. These groups stood in the first elections as simply anti-communist. They had little in
the way of a platform. This is why they initially succeeded and eventually fell apart.
Communism in central and eastern European politics has a remarkable history since
1989. In the immediate aftermath of communism‟s collapse, many communists remained.
Second and third tier figures from the Soviet-era communist parties led the reformed communist
parties in the initial elections.49 Some helped form the current socialist parties in many countries.
Romania, Bulgaria and Albania have reformed communist parties that are popular.50 Montani
Guido and Adam Bromke explain that the continued support for communist parties has a
generational aspect. Both point out that much of the generation that fought and lived through the
Second World War is retiring from professional life or passing away.51 Furthermore, people
under the age of 35 probably do not remember life under communism. This plays an important
role in the current popularity of communism and democratic socialism.
Political systems in central and eastern Europe did not develop quickly or as anticipated.
Few states developed capable stable political parties immediately. The consolidation of
democracy enhanced many aspects of democracy and created some new national identities.
However, critics point out that democracy reveals racism, chauvinism and militarism. Much of
this was absent under communism. These scholars say things were better under “Sovietism”.52
Despite being democracies, the years immediately following 1989 saw ethnic rivalries, political
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bickering and government corruption.53 This environment saw the rise of radical populist,
sometimes opposed to EU membership, at times illiberal parties in many central and east
European states.
There are different theories behind the rise of illiberal parties in the region opposed to the
EU. Many in central and eastern Europe have strong and deep feelings against the EU, known as
euroscepticism.54 Euroscepticism is characteristic of many parties in Europe. Many of these
parties simply wish for greater dialogue and negotiation. They are referred to as soft eurosceptic.
Many mainstream parties in western Europe, including the Conservative Party in the United
Kingdom fall into this category. There are other parties that are more absolute in their opposition
to membership to in the European Union. These are labeled hard eurosceptic. These parties
include the United Kingdom Independence Party, the Front Nationale in France and Jobbik in
Hungary. Some of these parties in western Europe date back to the 1970s. Most of the
eurosceptic parties in central and eastern Europe started after 2000. Many of the hard eurosceptic
parties of the region are problematic to basic democracy. Many of these parties are xenophobic
and scapegoat ethnic minorities. These minorities have been physically attacked in some states
and legally attacked in others. Some state legislatures attempted to abridge the basic rights of
these minority groups. Other states of central and eastern Europe curtailed the most basic
freedoms in recent years. These forms of backsliding are a collection of much that is deficient in
central and eastern European democracy.
Another theory behind the rise of eurosceptic parties is more structural. Grigore PopEleches maintains that voter dissatisfaction with the traditional left and right led to support for
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populist, eurosceptic parties. In his theory, radical populist parties of evolved over three different
election cycles. The first cycle, posed post-communist, non-communist groups against reformed
communists. The non-communists won easily. These anti-communist coalitions fell apart before
the next elections.55 The following elections were about the actual issues facing the states of
central and eastern Europe. The pieces and parts of the initial, non-communist fronts and
alliances had key policy differences. The largest issue pertained to the marketization of the
economies of the former communist states.56 New liberal democracy parties formed around more
cohesive, concrete policy platforms. They won the second set of elections, but with smaller
majorities and margins of victory than their forerunners, the anti-communist alliances.
There were large changes in some of the parties of central and eastern Europe following
the second elections. Many of the parties reoriented themselves. Many parties changed their
names. Some changed their names several times. Eventually, many of the newer parties
splintered merged or simply disappeared. The total number of parties fell in this period as
democracy consolidated. The second election also coincided with the first appearance of populist
and extreme nationalist parties in some states of the region.57 At this point, these parties sat on
the periphery with small numbers of members and little electoral success.
The reformed communists and the liberal, post-communist democratic parties began a
strange dynamic where the two alternated being in power after the second election cycle. Life in
eastern and central Europe did not improve as expected. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union,
large portions of the population saw falling standards of living. Because of involvement with
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western countries as financiers and lenders, the IMF and the ECB, there have been limits to
domestic spending and sovereign debt. This impacted social welfare programs and financial
security net for citizens. Then, there were several cases of government corruption in Central and
Eastern Europe. Finally, their political systems are relatively new. It is not uncommon for parties
to splinter, merge, disappear or have defections to others.58 In this second generation of
elections, voters vacillated between the two major groups of parties.
The third generation of elections in central and eastern Europe was a protest vote. By this
time, both the reformed communists and liberal democrats had opportunities to lead. Neither
party saw any motivation to change. They both assumed that eventually they would be back in
power. They never accounted for a third option, like the populist parties of the radical right. 59
Now, populist parties could run as political “outsiders”.60 Populist leaders also appealed to the
people, promising “to regenerate the nation, combat privileged groups and transform the
`corrupt‟ established institutions.”61 In the situations of central and eastern Europe, the elites
include politicians from both the left and the center-right. These elections have incumbents lose
by wide margins. Radical–left and nationalist parties gain in their share of the vote. New parties,
usually centrist and populist, form.62
Former EU President Rompuy repeatedly called populism the greatest danger to the EU
because these parties threaten to weave their way into the EU itself with the parliamentary
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elections in May 2014. 63 Only days after one of Rompuy‟s many speeches lamenting populist
parties, it was reported that the anti-EU, populist parties of several member states were creating a
“pan-European” network. 64 Their goal is to stand against EU influence from its headquarters in
Brussels. A few members of far-right parties elected to the EU Parliament currently attend as
independents, but the radical right can form a parliamentary faction if they garner 25
representatives from seven different countries.65 A radical right faction in the European
Parliament could stymie further European integration and obstruct Union prerogatives internally.
The rise of the populist, radical right parties of Europe gave new focus to the subject of
euroscepticism. There have always been Europeans who doubted or opposed the European
Union. Support for the EU remains fluid in different countries at different times.66 This is
common in European politics and government. Political support for anything or anyone can ebb
and flow with time. EU support fell in the wake of the economic and financial crises of 2008 and
2009. This scared many in Europe because the EU was no longer aspirational, but operational. It
asserted its power, in order to preserve the Union. The conditionality attached to the assistance
from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) made the EU unpopular.
Some scholars note that European citizens are less pro-European than politicians.67
Opinion polls of citizens of EU member states illustrate the roots of euroscepticism. There are
fears of member states lack of influence within the organization. Many feel the EU lowers the
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quality of life for citizens. Some voters in EU member states think the EU endangers jobs and
limits economic growth. Another, more moderate response is that many feel that national
governments should deal with certain important issues, not Brussels.68 The Downsian Hypothesis
explains this growth of eurosceptic parties. The parties positioned themselves to pick up
unrepresented voters.69 Voter sentiment shaped the radical right party‟s views on the EU. These
parties do not feel national governments are doing enough to protect national interests. They
protest against loss of sovereignty. They oppose more EU policies than mainstream parties.70
The eurosceptic parties of Europe have expanded their width and depth. The United
Kingdom (UKIP), France (Front Nationale) and Holland (Party for Freedom) are the most
notable and visible of these parties in the west. Italy, Belgium and Switzerland have comparable
parties.71 The central and eastern region of the continent is home to the two of the more
prominent eurosceptic parties. Hungary has two such parties: Fidesz, which is the party of the
current Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, and Jobbik.72 Elsewhere, Poland‟s President Andrzej Duda
is officially unaffiliated but is supported by the eurosceptic party Law and Justice. The Prime
Minister Beata Szyłdo is a member of Law and Justice, as well. Most other countries of central
and eastern Europe have anti-EU parties, as well. They vary in strength.73 The European
Parliamentary Elections of 2014 illustrate the growing strength of eurosceptic parties. The
eurosceptic voting block earned 16 more seats than the previous election. The states of central
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and eastern Europe accounted for three of these members of parliament.74 These small numbers
understate the growing influence of eurosceptic groups domestically.

Figure 1. Percentage of Support for the EU By Country
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These results are indicative of central and east European sentiments towards the EU. The
Czech Republic has steadily trusted and relied on the EU less. They never entered the Eurozone.
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Czechs view the bailouts of southern Europe with derision. Czechs see these countries as rich
and irresponsible. Recent Czech leaders are eurosceptic, which adds to the collective negative
opinion of Brussels. 76 In 2012, for the first time since the poll began, Poles viewed the EU as
less trustworthy. This is largely based on the economic problems that plague the Eurozone. Now
many Poles do not want to adopt the Euro. Yet, their leadership knows that it would help in
moving Poland into a power position in the Union.77 The only notable improvement in the
opinion of the EU was in Bulgaria. This was because of distrust in their domestic political
institutions. The EU is perceived as an organization that helps correct issues in Bulgaria. Protests
in Bulgaria in spring of 2013 led to impromptu elections. Bulgarians viewed the EU as the lesser
of two evils.78
Many central and eastern Europeans are unhappy with the economic and social results of
EU membership. Economically, many in the region resent migrant workers from entering their
countries and see the economic difficulties as a basis for anti-immigration positions.79 Migrants
are the target of very easy criticism. There are two different sides to the debate concerning
migration and benefits. First, some argue that migration and open markets will allow cheap labor
to move to states with more generous welfare benefits. In turn, capital and businesses will leave
these areas due to higher taxes needed to pay for increased welfare rolls. The competing view is
that states need foreign workers and the relationship is mutually beneficial. Workers want work
not welfare. The former of these theories, referred to as “push-pull” by Christine S. Lipsmeyer
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and Ling Zhu, is not solidly based.80 Martin Kahanec maintains that migrants are in search of
better lives. Jobs and better living conditions drive migration. They seek higher wages, more
opportunities, and better social conditions.81
The legacy of the first 24 years of democracy in central and eastern Europe is one of
mixed results. Most states experienced a positive transition to democracy. There have been
obstacles and pitfalls along the way. It is obvious that lives for people in the region are more
politically free than the era under communism. These states established democratic political
systems and political parties. True democracy and the democratic ideals of the EU in the region
is a topic for debate. The greatest political challenge to democracy today is the treatment of
minorities. The epicenter of this is the political struggle between the hard eurosceptic parties and
the rest of the political spectrum. In most cases, national elections safely relegated them to third
or fourth tier parties within the government. Yet, these same parties remain a threat to democracy
at the local level in some cases. Most of central and eastern Europe already joined the European
Union. Now, these states must embrace its democratic pillars.
Economics
Creating a free market economy was almost as much a herculean task as creating a
democracy. The two are closely interwoven. Economics can play an essential part in maintaining
democratic ideals, especially equality. The establishment of a functioning economy is
considered by some to be the “single determining factor” as to when states enter a “post-postcommunist stage.”82 There have been economic successes and failures. The financial crises of
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the last decade, an inability to deal with migrants and immigration and the “greying” of Europe
continue to hinder economic prosperity and growth. Unemployment is still very high in some
countries. Income inequality remains a serious problem in certain places. With the recent events
within the Eurozone, sovereign debts, fiscal deficits, and the associated pension liabilities are
worthy of review as well.
Many decisions made shortly after the collapse of communism about the economic
structure in their states affect democracy, freedom and personal rights in the region today. The
economic evolution of the states varied much in the same fashion as politics. Different states in
the region had different starting points, strategies and philosophies about the free market, labor
and capital. In addition to trying to both create and learn about the free market economy, the
larger global economy endured shocks along the way. These fledgling economies experienced
the various crises that plagued the global financial landscape since 1990. Along the way, some
joined the Eurozone. The countries of central and eastern Europe saw different fiscal outcomes.
These varying outcomes yielded different levels of income equality, differing levels of
development in social programs and affected the durability of regimes.
Most of the countries of the region began their march towards a free market from
nothing. The states needed to privatize businesses. There were questions about post-communist
property reconciliation. Moscow practiced horrendous industrial practices that devastated the
environment. Few decision makers in eastern and central Europe knew much about trade and
trade patterns. Most did not know how to work with international financial institutions.83 Key
infrastructures in many places were dilapidated, unmaintained or simply missing. There was a
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hazard of these states meandering on the periphery of the developed world. 84 The west provided
ample, initial funds and tutelage to prevent this.85
The problems facing the countries of the region were fairly consistent. Hungary was an
exception. (It started “market socialism” in the waning years of communist rule as an attempt to
save a faltering system.) 86 The states‟ approaches to solving the post-communist economic
problems were different. Pasquale Tridico explains that the countries had three reform options.
There was a Scandinavian option, which foresaw the political pluralism introduced and
economic liberalization to happen separately. In this blueprint, workers and unions had very
prominent role. The second proposal was known as the Washington Consensus. Foreign
advisers, like Jeffrey Sachs, espoused this. It was Reaganomics for central eastern Europe. The
third set of reforms was based on the German-French glide path. It allowed for a gradual
privatization controlled by the state. The Washington Consensus was supported by the
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank. Many policymakers in these two bodies
became high level advisors to the new countries of central and eastern Europe. Most countries
eventually adopted this plan. Only Hungary and Slovenia opted for the German-French
strategy.87 No states adopted the Scandinavian framework.
The larger debate about the transition of the economies of the region concerned the
competing notions of action. Some economists and countries of the region implemented shock
therapy. This involved quick, sudden changes to the system and structure. Czechoslovakia,
Bulgaria and Poland implemented this. This strategy depended on prices. “Get prices right” and
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everything else falls into place. It depends on the relationship with everything else. The belief is
that the sudden changes in price would cascade a series of changes elsewhere.88 This includes
democratic institutions. The command economy and stet ownership were abolished. It
necessitated the establishment of private ownership laws, a court system to adjudicate simple
economic implements like contracts and other basic parts of democracy necessary for a free
market.89 Some heralded Sach‟s shock therapy in Poland a success.90
Some scholars advocated for a gradual approach or sequencing.91 Paul Hare and his
fellow authors note that gradualism was a better choice for Hungary. They acknowledge that the
transition might take two generations. However, it meant better short term conditions in
Hungary. Living standards were more stable.92 Politically, this allows the government to evolve.
Over time, it learns about market forces and adapts to managing a larger debt burden. Ownership
laws and policies on fiscal and monetary policy evolve with it.93 A majority of reviewed scholars
support the idea of a gradual approach to entering the free market. This avoids the gaps that form
between market forces and established law. Ábel and Bonin cite Schaffer who alludes to a
“legislative lag” in Poland‟s shock therapy.94
Tridico and Marie Lavigne discuss these at great length and complete their own
comparison of the results. Some states implemented shock therapy on their economies and swift
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stabilization. Others (Hungary, Slovenia and Romania) chose sequencing, gradualism and
structural reforms first.95 The results differed, but there was a consistent disappointment in the
results of both approaches.96 Central and eastern Europeans had high expectations. The grim
economic reality ended the euphoria of the democratic honeymoon for many. Tridico quotes
Kovalik who wrote that even the most successful central and eastern European economies dealt
with the same social problems as western Europe in the same time period: income inequality,
unemployment, gender discrimination and corruption.97
The transition was difficult. The people of central and eastern Europe had new rights and
privileges that accompany democracy, but they had the chaff as well. The new economy was
characterized by large gaps of inequality, high unemployment and many people living in
poverty. The economic woes of the region fueled social tragedies of prostitution, street crime,
juvenile delinquency and alcoholism.98 Tridico quotes D. Mario Nuti as saying “former
communist countries passed from a central planning system to a pure and simple
underdevelopment.”99 It would take years for most of the central and eastern European
economies to improve.
The most current numbers economic indicators for the region are evidence of a
moderately successful economic integration into Europe. Gross domestic product has grown at
levels very close to that of western Europe and usually slightly higher than the rest of the
European Union member states. Recently, unemployment in central and eastern Europe was
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comparable to that of western Europe. However, workforce participation steadily declined since
1990. Per capita income in the region is far below the rest of Europe. There are large
discrepancies between neighboring states within the region, as well. Income inequality improved
over a long period of time with no consistent path. Only recently has income equality improved
to the levels of western Europe.
Most of the central and eastern European countries rejoined Europe and face the same
problems as their western neighbors. The current state of economic affairs presents Europe with
a dangerous triangular dilemma. First, the states of Europe are experiencing a graying, as large
segments of the population are reaching retirement age. Second, there are the economic
implications of the contentious issue of immigration. Third, budget shortfalls challenge many of
the member states of the European Union. These three issues in concert endanger fiscal solvency,
the governments‟ abilities to provide infrastructure and essential social programs . This equates
to uncertainty ripe for political opportunists.
The greying of Europe endangers the tax base of European countries. This could have a
disastrous effect on quality of life for many. Unless the financial course changes in some way
very basic social programs are in danger. The population of Europe has been aging for decades.
Fertility decreased after the post-World War II “baby boom”. 100 Europe is now experiencing a
“grand parent boom”. In 1960 there were three persons under the age of 14 for every one person
over the age of 65. By 2060, there will be two persons over the age of 65 for every one person
under 14. Families are becoming more “horizontal” and less “vertical”. There are more
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generations and at the same time smaller generations.101 This change is in the European
population is “unprecedented.”102
This poses a large challenge for the governments and businesses of Europe. In Germany
for example, Holger Schäfer, Senior Economist at the Cologne Institute for Economic Research,
states that there is a projected labor gap of 3M workers in the next three years. Ten years later,
this gap will increase to over 6M workers. Over the next 20 years, this gap will be over 9M
workers. In Germany, almost 20% of the population is already over 65. Most other European
countries are close behind.103 As this large part of the workforce transforms from workers to
pensioners, the stress on national budgets could prove catastrophic.
One obvious solution to the quandary of a shrinking workforce is immigration. In terms
of population numbers, net immigration is the only positive addition to the population in many
EU countries. Italy and Germany have zero and net immigration, respectively.104 Christoph von
Ingelheim, who is on the staff of Christian Social Union Bundestag minister Andrea Lindholz,
confirms this paradigm in Germany. In 2012, there were 700,000 people who left Germany and
1.1M incoming migrants. “Immigration can therefore be seen as an option for softening the aging
process.”105 Furthermore, many countries have become very dependent on migrant workers.
Migration offers Europe an opportunity to revitalize its workforce. Migrant workers are
needed not only to remedy negative and zero fertility of European countries, but also to take care
of the aged. Many countries have been relying on migrant caregivers for decades already. The
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struggle for skilled workers continues, moving through yet another challenging cycle. At this
point, policies are geared towards offering opportunities to workers with two and four year
degrees. This is largely hampered by bureaucracy and nativist attitudes towards immigration.
There are two important areas of fiscal policy that orbit around the twin poles of a
greying Europe and the topic of migration. First is the subject of pension sustainability. This is
largely a reality that many European countries are reluctant to confront. The second topic is very
important to the migration conversation: social programs to include welfare and unemployment.
These two issues are the most debated not only in central and eastern Europe, but in developed
countries around the globe. This is due in large part to the poor economic conditions since the
late 2000s. The task of sustaining these important social safety nets offers government officials
with few good (read popular) answers. The question in many countries is not only how to pay for
them, but who is entitled to them. There are fears specific to Europe that their coffers will be laid
waste by immigrants. Pension sustainability is an authentic concern, but, fear of “welfare
tourism”106 is largely a fallacy. Set immigration aside. Many of the pension systems in Europe
need systematic reform or change.
The graying population in Europe and the shrinking workforce demands large scale
changes to the pensions of EU member states. In 2010 there were four people working for each
person over the age of 65. By 2060, there will only be two people working to support each
person over the age of 65.107 The European Commission began addressing this problem two
years ago with the “White Paper on Adequate, Safe and Sustainable Pensions”. The document
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suggests that employers do more to adapt jobs and tasks to older workers, suggests a few
different options to supplement traditional pensions, and restrict access to early retirement. Old
age poverty is already an issue in some parts of Europe.108 Some of the adjustments suggested by
the EC White Paper caused outrage and even violence in some member states.109
The current fiscal situation in central and eastern Europe is not as dire as some locales in
western Europe, but the age trend is just as problematic. The states of the region do not have
much of a dilemma with debt as a group. The average debt to GDP for the states is far below the
European Union average, both including and excluding the states of southern Europe.

Figure 2. National Debt as a Percentage of GDP, EU States vs. Central and Eastern
European States
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However, Croatia, Hungary and Slovenia all have debt levels that exceed the averages for the
region and the EU. This combined with the changes in the median age and their current
trajectories are cause for alarm. The states of central and eastern Europe are now aging faster.
Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Albania and Macedonia all have age trends that exceed those of the
rest of Europe. The populations of Romania and Albania are aging two years for every year the
population ages elsewhere. Early in the 2000s central and eastern Europe‟s trend was slower than
the rest of Europe. There was a lag in the trend. The lag is over and the trend accelerated.
The economic strength of the region is very dependent on growth. The economies of the
states of eastern and central Europe grew faster than the economies in the rest of the European
Union. They had to catch up to western Europe. They showed strong resilience following the
global economic crisis of 2009. A sudden shock to these results: another currency crisis, a debt
crisis elsewhere in the EU perhaps could trigger a dampening of growth. This could be the
preamble to a problem in managing debt in the countries of the region already leveraged at close
to 90% of GDP. A large enough lag in growth could be catastrophic to infrastructure projects,
basic domestic programs like pensions, and the fiscal solvency of the government.
Ethnicity and Culture
Ethnic tensions and cultural issues often operate as a factor in the level of democracy in
states. This is especially true in central and eastern Europe. Some scholars view ethnic and
internal conflicts as the chief threat to democracy in the region. These tensions arise from three
different phases of historical population change: pre-WWI shifts, Soviet attempts at
Russificiation and post EU Schengen immigration. The first phase consists of the different
imperial wars and changes to borders that affected the population of the region. The Soviet
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attempts to make the areas more Russian and side effects of stationing Soviet troops in the region
form the second phase. Population changes associated with EU membership and the Schengen
Treaty represent the most recent changes.
Many ethnic animosities emerged in post-communist central and eastern Europe. A war
erupted and Yugoslavia quickly shattered along ethnic and religious lines. The countries of the
former Yugoslavia are still struggling with re-establishing a civic society with acceptable levels
of law, order, rights and education. Many who are guilty of war crimes during the Balkan Wars
of the 1990s remain at large.111Amnesty International catalogs reported widespread human rights
violations. Hungary and Romania have been reported to the European Commission for
“Antizigansim”112 or racism against Roma minorities. Roma have been the victims of physical
attacks by violent mobs. Their houses have been burnt down.113 Roma also dealt with
substandard housing and Antinot the only targets of injustice in the region.
Central and eastern European cultures can clash with the ideals of the EU, as well. Some
governments have curtailed widely-held, basic rights endorsed by the EU. Many of these rights
are the norm in democracies throughout the world. Poland was cited by the European Court of
Human Rights for excessive pretrial detention. One such victim remained in prison for two years
before trial. Gender discrimination remains an issue, as well. Poland failed to adopt antidiscrimination laws to protect women. Women do not always have access to abortions even
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when legal or when their own health is at risk. Freedom of the press has come under fire in many
of the states in central and eastern Europe.114 Many specifically note Hungary‟s “roll back” of
democracy. Orbán‟s government now controls all media outlets. They control content,
advertising and even have access to employee records.115 This led the European Parliament to
request that the European Commission form a watchdog group. This group will monitor all
variety of rights within Union member states and report annually.116
Case Studies
Following a general analysis of the differing levels of democracy in the countries in
central and eastern Europe, this research singles out the cases of Poland, Hungary and Bulgaria
for closer analysis. Poland was largely regarded as the success story of post-communist
democracy. This was recently punctuated by the election of the Polish Prime Minister Donald
Tusk as President of the European Council.117 Additionally, Tusk was the first Polish Prime
Minister to be re-elected since the fall of communism. This signaled a new found stability in
their domestic politics and a higher standing among their EU neighbors. Then in 2015, the Law
and Justice party took control of the country. They have made not too subtle changes to the
structure of government, amended various freedoms and have supported groups that politically
attack the EU and its policies. The backsliding met with fierce opposition by the Polish people.
The final political result is yet to be seen. Economically, Poland enjoys the highest GDP in
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central and eastern Europe and the fifth highest in the European Union.118 Arguably, Poland is
the fourth strongest country in Europe.
Democracy in Hungary, our second case study, faces larger challenges. Viktor Orbán is
the first Hungarian leader that will serve more than one full term since the fall of communism.
Some criticize changes made by Orbán and his party, Fidesz. They replaced the liberal
constitution.119 The new more authoritarian constitution places strict regulation on the press.120
This caused an outcry from many, especially from international rights groups. The regime has
also occasionally taken pro-Russian attitudes and positions. This is troubling to many because of
the implications for the European Union and Cold War memories. Additionally, immigration and
minority rights in Hungary emerged as a pressing topic. Jobbik, a far right anti-immigration
party, has continued gaining votes and parliament seats. They are militant, xenophobic
nationalists. Their paramilitary groups have been implicated in violence against Gypsies and
Jews.
Finally, this work uses Bulgaria as something of a blind test. Bulgaria is a lesser studied
country in the region. It‟s not an economic powerhouse. Its leaders are not widely known on the
world stage. Bulgaria saw harder economic times than most after the fall of Soviet communism.
Many former communists remained powerful in Bulgaria years after they had faded from public
life in other former Warsaw Pact countries. They maintained their Cold War ties with criminal
organizations. This dark partnership developed into the modern Bulgarian mafia. It represents the
largest issue for democracy in the country. Bulgaria showed recent economic improvements and
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some stability thanks to foreign investments. It is also important to point out that Bulgaria has a
demographic composition parallel to Hungary. The country is 75% Bulgarian with other
minorities rounding out the population. Unlike Hungary and many other countries in the region,
Bulgaria has a large Eastern Orthodox population.
Conclusion
Central and eastern Europe present an interesting study in the effect of history, culture
and geography on democracy. Democratic quality grew to different levels and in varying ways in
central and eastern Europe states since the collapse of communism. The political evolutions
specific to the region, the states‟ histories with Russia and cultural receptions of
interconnectedness are large factors in the different levels of freedom and rights people of the
respective countries enjoy today. This work contributes to the literature by testing three
hypotheses. The levels of the democracy in the region are independent of most established
economic-based political theory. There are other examples of this throughout the world: the
Middle East and Africa. In each case, there are variables and conditions specific to each region.
The countries of all three regions share different cultures, different ethnic relationships and
histories, different sometimes unique political legacies within themselves.
Measuring diverse groups of states challenges models that seek to simplify and quantify.
In central and eastern Europe, we see some states with robust growth and average income
equality, but horrible conditions for many based on their race, ethnicity or religion. In others, we
see a lower standard of living, lower growth and higher inequality economically, but fewer
challenges to what are considered basic rights. In the region and the wider entirety of Europe,
there are states that are very diverse numerically with better conditions for minorities, yet much
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of the same can be said for the other relatively homogenous countries, as well. The history and
cultural differences of the specific groups living amongst each other and the legacies
communism left behind explain these cases. They are outliers and anomalies to most traditional
democratic theories.
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW
Democratization has several different facets important to explaining the varying levels of
democracy in central and eastern Europe. This literature review seeks to review the scholarly
writing for these different aspects. An assessment of the nature of democracy in the region needs
a working definition of “democracy”. Research of the established measuring methods and
theories of democratization provides a broad foundation for establishing a methodology. A
review of the region specific literature narrows the focus of the methodology and subsequent
explanation. Each section contributes to a study of democracy in the area and formation of an
educated and effective methodology.
The first step in explaining the qualitative differences in democratic governments is
defining democracy. Defining democracy challenges scholars. The literature studying and
discussing democracy spans decades, continents, ideologies and theories. Coppedge and his
colleagues cite David Held who noted that the concept finds its origins in ancient Greece.1 Held
wrote that democracy is “rule by the people,” and added that “political leaders of extraordinarily
diverse views profess to be democrats.”2 Most of the scholars in the body of literature use
different definitions of democracy. This is attributed to the different themes of their work. A bulk
of contemporary literature uses Robert Dahl‟s definition of democracy in whole or as a
foundation. Dahl stated that democracy is a government system that is responsive to citizens and
empowers informed contestation. He enumerates this extensively with a list of different rights
afforded citizens.
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A broad study of the contemporary measure of democracy and modern theories of
democratization offers a foundation for a methodology to measure democracy in the region. The
practice of coding, quantifying and grading governments is very popular. This work yields
volumes of research every year. The combinations researchers can create and combine are
virtually limitless. Many of these measuring indices attempt to operationalize different theories
of democratization. These theories are only somewhat useful to a study of democracy in the
region. Some successfully explain the democratic transitions in the region after the collapse of
their Cold War communist regimes. Most fail to account for the subsequent democratic
evolution. The literature in whole illustrates the need for a specific approach to examine the
region.
Region specific study of democracy and democratization achieves two goals. First, it
focuses the study on a very unique area in a very historically unique time. Second, researching
the evolution and current levels of rights and freedoms in central and eastern Europe aids in
developing a methodology to analyze the political realities of central and eastern Europe.
Widely-used indices and other contemporary measures used for other regions fail to explain the
reality of democracy in the region. The product of exhaustive region-specific study is a body of
literature that attempts to explain how most found independence, many found EU membership,
yet only some found true democracy.
Defining Democracy
A comprehensive, modern and applicable definition of “democracy” is one of the more
elusive pursuits of the modern age. Larry Diamond points out that few subjects have been
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subjected to “more prolific scrutiny” than what is democracy.3 He joins Chris Hasselmann who
wrote that there “is no agreed upon definition for democracy.”4 It is clear that democracy takes
different forms and changes with time. Andranik Tangian noted that in the cradle of democracy,
Greeks only voted for positions that demand special skills.5 Indeed, Aristotle‟s Constitution of
Athens cites some officials chosen “by lot”, or random. Different scholars focus on different
aspects of government in search of an effective definition of democracy.
Modern political science has developed variations on the concept of democracy. Alvarez,
et al. takes a very minimalist focus. They look at three different distinctions in government. First,
they analyze the limitations on government; whether the government is limited or despotic.
Second, they see legal structure as a factor. Laws are either created by the governed –
“autonomous”- or are legislators set aside from the laws they make – “heteronomous”. Third, the
final subject of Alvarez and his fellow scholars is the level of competition and contention in
elections.6 Hasselmann claims that there is an “underlying consensus” on a set of characteristics.
These include elections, various freedoms, a system of checks and balances and a separation of
powers. Each definition carries strengths and liabilities.7 The minimalist approach omits many
relevant attributes, despite its basic strength.8 It ignores what is regarded as fair, who in the
populace can vote, and other freedoms.9 The maximalist approached is criticized as simply being
too big. The numerous aspects of social justice in its definition of democracy make the definition
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useless.10 To this point, Alvarez and his fellow scholars note that “many definitions don‟t
describe any existing governments.” 11
Many of the theories of democracy share one common element: Robert A. Dahl‟s notion
of contestation. Munk and Verkuilen, Schmidt, Diamond, Tangian, Hasselmann and many others
included a reference to the concepts he put forth in his 1971 work, Polyarchy. It serves as a basis
for much of the minimalist study of democracy and is included in broader studies as well. Dahl‟s
foundations are rather basic. He wrote, “I assume that a key characteristic of a democracy is the
continuing responsiveness of the government to the preferences of its citizens considered as
political equals.”12 He expands on the notion of a responsive government, continuing that
democracy is “a political system of which is the quality of being completely or almost
completely responsive to all its citizens.” He elaborates on the obligations of a truly responsive
government. He wrote that democratic regimes are required to offer citizens “unimpaired
opportunities” to voice their will, beliefs and preferences.13
Dahl illustrates his combination of contestation and responsibility with a bulleted point
list of what this means for citizens, their rights and opportunities in a true democracy.
Democracy by Dahl‟s design is not simply the right to vote. Instead, it includes rights of
expression, association, eligibility for office and fair and free elections among other things.
Dahl‟s democracy also calls for the rights of political parties and politicians to lobby for support
and voter‟s right to choose between candidates or parties. He sets forth much of the blueprint for
modern democracy. Dahl‟s Polyarchy illustrates the basis for political parties, interest groups,
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politicians, campaigning and legislative government in the context of a democracy. The primary
differences in the various definitions of democracy are additional rights attached to Dahl‟s
foundation.
Some scholars have ventured to explain democracy without basic rights. The concepts of
hybrid regimes, illiberal democracy or democracy in authoritarian regimes seeks to explain how
oppressive governments remain in power despite human rights violations, restrictions on civil
liberties and other phenomena many scholars would clearly label undemocratic. This type of
government emerged in the 1960s and 1970s in countries like Mexico, Singapore and South
Africa.14 Their continued spread has left an “unresolved puzzle”15. Elections strengthen
authoritarian regimes in some countries and defeat it in others. The study of these regimes led to
different classifications of illiberal democracies, also known as electoral authoritarian regimes.
Researchers find hegemonic authoritarian regimes and competitive authoritarian regimes among
these states. The larger question is if these states should be recognized as democracies at all.
Larry Diamond referred to these types of states as “pseudodemocracies”. 16 Mehran Kamrava‟s
Politics & Society in the Developing World chronicled the evolution of these types of states in
the Third World. He also wrote that many of these democratic states “do not really deserve the
label”.17
The debate over the legitimacy of democracy in these hybrid regimes feeds into another
larger question about the nature of democracy. All scholars agree that one of the primary
characteristics of democracy is voting. The real variations in the levels of democracy lie within
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important details like voter eligibility, voting conditions, voting accessibility, and education.
Politically, these are the factors above and beyond Dahl‟s basic foundation that effect
democracy. Scholars, especially those of other fields such as sociology and economics, see other
factors effecting democracy as well. Combinations of these factors, along with understood
presumptions about democracy (like Dahl‟s foundation) imperil the notion of democracy‟s
absolute nature.
Measuring Democracy
The past time of attempting to measure democracy is a manifestation of the debate
surrounding its nature. Some scholars view democracy as a noun: “Angola is a democracy.”
Others see it as a descriptor; an adjective: “Angola has a democratic government.” A very
popular and more recent discussion is what factors can measure democracy of a varying nature.
(The notion of democracy as a binary measure is not that popular.) Many researchers seek to
measure democracy using complex mathematical models, using variables and indicators from
different official and unofficial sources. Other scholars seek to look past measuring democracy
and the associated labels. This group finds research models helpful, but seeks more insight into
more non-quantifiable factors.
The rise of the hybrid regimes and illiberal democracy are at the core of the debate over
the nature of democracy. There are two positions in the debate. One school of study views
democracy as dichotomous. Adam Przeworski argues that democracy is a kind of government,
not a degree. There is one kind of democratic government: a democracy. The proponents of this
binary view argue that “efforts to look for traces of democracy in `nondemocracies‟ are both
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invalid and error-prone.” 18 Other scholars think that gradient democracy “negates the concept of
regime and regime type.”19 Russia is held up as an example. Diamond refers to modern Russia as
a “pseudodemocracy” while Laurel Miller calls it “imitation democracy”.20
This argument holds a great deal validity in regards to Dahl‟s definition of democracy.
Based on this definition, there can be no democracy without certain rights institutionally
guaranteed. Some states in the world violate press freedoms. Some governments hold
monopolies on TV, radio and media. There are still allegations of voter fraud and voter
suppression and intimidation. Governments still jail candidates facing incumbents in some places
in the world. There are significant barriers to being eligible for public office in places. Any of
this disqualifies a country from being a democracy according to Dahl.
The other school sees democracy as a “matter of degrees”.21 Zachary Elkins argues that
graded measures are reliable, realistic and more theoretically faithful. 22 The rise of these hybrid
regimes “has encouraged attempts to empirically capture these new categories with the help of
existing measures of democracy.” 23 There are two widely used studies to this end: Polity IV and
Freedom House. Both of these analyses assign a score to each country. Freedom House goes
further and assigns various labels “free”, “partly free” and not free.24 The graduated concept of
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democracy and its grey zone allows for the study of states such as Russia, Cambodia and
Venezuela.
Attempting to mimic the science of Freedom House and Polity IV is a popular endeavor
in political science. Researchers use the most popular datasets from Polity IV, Freedom House.
Their results and datasets are available of the Internet.25 There are others: Adam Przeworski‟s
“DD” (a binary measure of democracy and dictatorship), Michael Bernhard, Timothy Nordstrom
and Christopher Reenock‟s “BNR” (an index created by the Economist Intelligence Unit: the
“EIU”), the “BTI” from the Bertelsmann Foundation,26 and the work of Mark Gasiorowski .27
There are still others that use these indices or their data as starting points for other models. Carl
Henrik Knutsen cites that Ronald Ingelhart and Christian Welzel‟s Effective Democracy Index
(EDI) is an aggregation of the Freedom House Index, Transparency International‟s Corruption
Perception Index or Control of Corruption index from the World Governance Indicators.28
Shawn Treier and Simon Jackman use indicators from Polity in a different model.29
These different indices expand on Dahl‟s operational definition of “democracy”. The
United Nations embraces representative government in Article I of its charter. More recently, the
European Union promotes democratization within its candidate countries.30 Dahl‟s proposition
of a free press is widely embraced, as well. The United Nations sponsors a World Press Freedom
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Day31 while UNESCO (The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization)
concurrently “promotes freedom of expression and freedom of the press and fosters media
independence and pluralism by providing advisory services on media legislation and by making
governments, parliamentarians and other decision-makers aware of the need to guarantee free
expression.”32 Dahl‟s work is a foundation for democracy, but only a foundation.
International organizations, non-government organizations and various transnational
networks added to the Dahl‟s original democratic attributes or clarified their meaning. The most
voluminous source of additional rights is the much older Universal Declaration of Human
Rights. It was adopted by the United Nations in 1948. It calls for equality of all persons under the
law, seeks to guarantee freedom from most discrimination, espouses an individual‟s rights to
marry, own property and practice the religion of their choice and declares that all people have the
right to an education.33 Many UN member states have comparable domestic rights for their
citizens. The European Union made most of these rights compulsory for membership.
The reality of these expanded rights is the basis for Elkin‟s argument supporting the idea
of the variable nature of democracy and expanded number of indicators in democracy indices.
Researchers consider these expanded rights when selecting variables for their indices because
they are points of difference between countries. Country A and Country B might both hold free
elections, but Country B might not allow women to vote. Country C and Country D might allow
both sexes to vote, but Country D might only allow people of a certain religion to be citizens.
Education is a large matter to consider. Countries have different levels of compulsory education
31
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and even more divergent completion rates. All of these variables matter to the researcher seeking
to expound upon Dahl‟s work and create a realistic comparison of governments.
The various democracy indices have critics. Daniel Pemstein, Stephen A. Meserve and
James Melton wrote, “There is no consensus on the reliability of any of these measures.” 34 Some
find fault with the theoretical aspects. Most indices do not include variables like geography,
history or ethnic groups. Some researchers find operational and mathematical flaws common to
the indices. There are debates over measurement and coding of data. Some take issue with the
aggregation of the different variables. It is interesting to note that scholars do not dismiss the
practice, but seek to improve operationalizing democracy study. Their suggestions usually
involve incorporating less traditional but intriguing factors into the aggregation process. In short,
these researchers want to adopt a different approach.
Many scholars cite theoretical flaws in the many democracy indices. Laurel Miller et al
warn that the “hard-and-fast labeling” of Polity IV and Freedom House is not beneficial. They
contend that many of the produced labels are not realistic. However, such studies can answer
questions over periods of time.35 They can illustrate changes and democratic transition or
backsliding. Miller saw problems with this very scientific study of seemingly unscientific
material. She sees democratization scholars pre-occupied with causes.36 Gerardo Munck and Jay
Verkuilen wrote, “Democracy indices reflect insufficient sensitivity to the key issues involved in
the choice of indicators.” 37 Matthiji Bogaards wrote that researchers who assume that democracy
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has a gradual nature “treat democracy and its absence as endpoints of a continuum, on which any
thresholds or boundaries are arbitrary.”38
Researchers agree that there are operational and structural flaws in the democracy
indices. Munck and Verkuilen wrote that researchers need to pick between parsimony and
fidelity. 39 Freedom House has too many components for some attributes. 40 One journal article
selected eleven different variables for study!41 They also highlight that indices are restricted by
data. Similarly, Coppedge at al wrote there are problems with “coverage and sources”.42 Both
equate to the fact that for some countries, data is available only some years.43 Munck and
Verkuilen wrote that some models, including Polity IV suffer from redundancy. Some models
use components that relate to two attributes. 44 Munck, Verkuilen and Coppedge agree many
indices have issues with measurement, coding and aggregation. Measurement and coding can be
subject to bias. Aggregation can be either biased or wrong.45
While some scholars allude to the difficulty in creating accurate democratic indices, none
advocate abandoning them. Most proposed ways to improve them. Coppedge and his fellow
scholars proposed including a variable that addressed history. They noted, “One cannot
understand the future of democracy in the world and how to shape it unless one understands the
forces that produced the regime types that populate the world today.”46 Additionally, they
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offered six different forms of “rule by people” as a coded variable in an effort to measure
democracy using another six more standard variables.47 Muck and Verkuilen warn researchers
of using systemic sources because laws change. They urge researchers to justify their indicators.
In measurements, they urge researchers to “maximize the homogeneity within measurements
with a minimum number of necessary distinctions“. 48
Some researchers focus on unquantifiable factors. Miller ponders if democracy was
contagious, occurring in geographic clusters, found in oppositional strategies (reform movements
versus the Communist governments) or there were other socio-economic factors linked to
development. She alludes to Jan Teorell‟s work, which uses a complex statistical model and
explains little about how democratization occurs: 40% in the long run at best.49 Analyzing
democracy with fidelity is more than a simple math problem. There are other unquantifiable
factors at work. Teorell wrote that there can be “non-structural country specific” aspects to
democratization.50 He proposes that a perfect theory of democratization does not exist and the
three different forms of testing theories should be combined: statistical, historical-comparative
and case studies. Each of the three methods fails on their own.51 Grzegorz Ekiert wrote,
“Analytical lenses were therefore turned increasingly to the past, with recent work emphasizing
the importance of historical legacies at the expense of the policy and institutional choices
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stressed in the earlier literature.” He cites the role that history, geography, conflicts and wars can
have on the political outcomes of regime change.52
This less statistical approach allows for more of a focus on the determination of
democracy and less on establishing mathematical relationships. The product of researchers‟ work
on indices is useful, yet not to the extent that some might argue. There are very few locales on
the globe where there are absolutely no cultural or historical animosities. In terms of ethnicity,
the role that diversity plays in developing democracy and the democracy‟s hardiness is
debatable. Religion remains both a unifying and divisive force simultaneously at different points
around the world. Many of these factors cannot be addressed by clever coding and contributing
factors can change from region to region. Statistically explaining resulting levels of democracy,
products of transition, and what determines democracy remain somewhat elusive.
Determinants of Democratization
A review of the established literature of democratization and its offspring, democracy, is
essential in an analysis of the different levels of democratic quality in post-communist Europe.
Most scholars view and concede a wave-like nature in democratic change and, at times, a
domino-like theory. The debate over the factors that actually contribute to a democratic state
with basic rights and freedoms is continuous. Many scholars attest to the role that existing
conditions play. Others allude to the importance of economics and finance. Just as many
researchers dismiss the primary role of these contributors in favor of other factors: history,
democratic structure, or geography to name a few.

52

Grzegorz Ekiert, “Eastern Europe’s Postcommunist Transformations,” World Politics Review, March 20, 2012.
http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/11749/eastern-europes-postcommunist-transformations. Accessed
August 2, 2015.

49

Tracking democratic transitions is relatively new. Samuel P. Huntington was the first to
attempt it in 1991.53 Accounting for democracy is an older pursuit. Yet, the two can be studied
in tandem by combining the Huntington‟s work and a chronological review at the dominant
theories over time. Democratic transitions are grouped into different “waves” based on when
they occur. This concept of waves was established by Huntington in his work The Third Wave:
Democracy in the Late Twentieth Century. A “wave” is a “group of transitions from
nondemocratic to democratic regimes that occur within a specific period of time and that
specifically outnumbers transitions in the other direction during that period of time.”54 It is
important to note that Huntington wrote that every wave of democratization is post-scripted by a
reverse wave where some of the young democracies revert back to nondemocracy.
The date of the commencement of the first wave of democratization in the world is a
point of contention. Jan Teorell marks the period after World War One as the first wave of
democratization.55 However, Huntington wrote that the first wave began in 1828 with the
American and French Revolutions. Huntington bases this on the fact that more than more than
half of adult males could vote and that there were representative bodies with executives chosen
in the U.S. and France at this time. The reversal of the first wave began with Mussolini‟s reign
in Italy, followed by coups all over Europe. This ended democracy in Baltics, Poland, Brazil,
Argentina and Portugal. The rise of Hitler and the Anschluss imposed a single totalitarian regime
over Germany and Austria.56 World War Two occurred. According to Huntington, the second
wave began with the Allied occupations in West Germany, Italy, Japan and Korea. The reversal
of the second wave began in 1958. Over the next 18 years, one third of the democracies in the
53

Bogaards, “Measure of Democratization: From Degree to Type to War,” 475.
Samuel P. Huntington, The Third Wave (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991), 15.
55
Teorell, Determinants of Democratization, 2.
56
Huntington, The Third Wave, 16-18.
54

50

world succumbed to authoritarianism. Most of these were in the developing countries of Latin
America and Africa.57
The 1960s was the era of modernization theory. Western Europe was held up as an
example. It was accepted that modernization could be difficult and democracy would take time.58
The basis for the theory is the principle that development equaled democracy and freedom.
Seymour Martin Lipset wrote that “this means that the more well-to-do a nation, the greater the
chances that it will sustain democracy.”59 Proponents see democracy as a manifestation of
economic development, industrialization and expanded education.60 In analyzing states, Lipset
wrote, “In each case, the average wealth, degree of industrialization and urbanization, and level
of education is much higher for the more democratic countries [referring to his dataset].”61 He
continues, “[Statistically] the factors that subsumed under economic development carry with it
the political correlate of democracy.”62 Written in 1959, Lipset and other researchers looked at
the results of the post-war reconstruction of the former battlefields of World War Two and linked
democracy to it.
The reverse of the second wave occurred from 1958-1975.63 In this period, dependency
theory emerged and dispatched modernization theory as the popular theory of democratization.
Dictatorships in developed Latin America countries disproved modernization theory.64 On the
topic of development, Teorell cites Przeworski and others who wrote that modernization does not
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aid in democracy, but simply hampers authoritarianism65 and backsliding. Providing a structure
helps build democracy, but only with external forces, meaning the international factors of the
diffusion of democracy and pressure to embrace it. Teorell wrote that while income matters,
modernization theory is pre-occupied with it.66 Scholars of dependency theory acknowledge the
role of economic development, but note that enthusiasm among key groups does not correlate
with modernization theory‟s economic indicators.67
Dependency theory approaches democratization from an anthropocentric point of view. It
focuses on people as opposed to other research that “has been overwhelmed by the flood of statecentric work that has dominated comparative politics for the past decade.”68 Teorell refers to it as
the “social forces” theory.69 There are two distinct schools within dependency theory. The first
identifies the capitalist class as agents of democracy. Barrington Moore wrote, “no bourgeoisie,
no democracy.”70 The second school identifies the working class as the agents of democracy.
Both groups agree on the basics of dependency theory. Democracy is struggle with a prominent
role for social forces. It is about interest, which propels change in government. This yields the
pessimistic view that material interests are the highest priority. These forces are more important
than economic development or history and culture. 71
The social forces approach of dependency theory is far from ironclad. It cannot explain
everything or all events. Political changes in Korea, Chile and Brazil validated the theory. Social
forces theory impact was more muted in Mexico, Tunisia and Egypt. The same forces opposed
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democracy in Indonesia, Singapore and Syria.72 Paul James writes a detailed account of the death
of dependency theory. He regards it as “a once-relevant attempt to understand a long-gone era
(that is prior to the 1970s).”73 He cites the rise of globalism for the demise of the once popular
theory. He cites Susan Strange, who wrote:
It is no accident that the “dependency school” of writers of the
1970s have lost so much of their audience. In Latin America (where
most of this writing was focused), politicians and professors were
almost unanimous in the 1970s in castigating the multinationals as
agents of American imperialism, but now they acknowledge them as
potential allies in earning the foreign exchange badly needed for
further development.74
International capitalism is now a forgone conclusion. Discussions of interdependency and postcolonialism replaced the topics of dependency and imperialism in theories and study. 75 James
clarifies that inequality and dependence still exist in the world. Dependency theory simply did
not address their roles in democratic transition adequately.76
Huntington marks the beginnings of the third wave of democratization with the
Portuguese coup de-tat in April 1974.77 In the 1980s and 1990s authoritarian regimes broke
down.78 (The most obvious of these was Central and Eastern Europe.) These democratic
transitions were different. In the second wave, many transitions occurred through decolonization
or by having democracy imposed by an outside force.79 Huntington divides the transitions of the
third wave into three different classes: transformations, replacements or transplacements. Elites
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in power led changes, resulting in democracy during transformations. Replacement scenarios
occurred when authoritarian regimes were overthrown in favor of democracy. Transplacements
were joint actions between the government and citizenry of states.80
A large number of democracies emerged in Latin America, Southern Europe and Asia in
the third wave. Many foreign policy officials in the Reagan Administration saw a “worldwide
democratic revolution”. Guillermo O‟Donnell and Philippe C. Schmitter compiled a transition
paradigm. The scholars pointed out that it was not a testable theory.81 It provided different linear
steps towards democracy. The main premise is that countries are moving away from an
authoritarian government are moving towards democracy.82 The foundations of the paradigm are
simple: liberalization and democratization.83 A commitment to these two these two goals trumps
all other factors. These include poverty, ethnic fragmentation, and past politics. O‟Donnell and
Schmitter wrote that pre-existing political institutions have little effect on authoritarian rule. At
times, institutions survive and matter, as the king did in fascist Italy. Yet, early 20th century
Greece saw different authoritarian groups demolish established political institutions repeatedly.
Elections are the definitive step in democratization, according to O‟Donnell and Schmitter.
“Elections equal democracy”.84 This plan faltered with the reverse of the third wave.
A reverse of the third wave occurred in the 2000s. Several authoritarian regimes proved
durable.85 “Many countries settled into a `gray zone‟ of diverse forms of government where
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autocratic and democratic features combined.”86 Diamond described it as a "democratic
rollback”. A “powerful authoritarian undertow” caught the governments in Nigeria, Thailand,
Bangladesh, and the Philippines. Freedom and civil rights also weakened in Chile, Ghana,
Poland and South Africa.87 This changed the landscape of democratization research and the
analyses of democracy. First, the emergence of hybrid regimes invalidated O‟Donnell and
Schmitter‟s transition paradigm. Second, democracy study evolved into a new form of analysis.
This analysis steps away from the straight science of democratic indices and older theories noted
for their exclusive nature.
The movement away from the most scientific of political analysis in democracy happened
in steps. The first step was the emergence of the notion of “young democracies”. The second was
a less mathematical analysis. Ethan B. Kapstein and Nathan Converse explained that younger
democracies act differently than older democratic governments. Kapstein and Converse use six
years as a cut-off. This is used to explain why many recessions of the third wave and fourth wave
democratic transitions flew in the face of established mantra. These governments were simply
not old enough to be judged with their older peers. They write:
Early indicators are, therefore, that initial conditions do significantly
affect the survival chances of democratic regimes. Low per capita income,
high levels of inequality, high rates of poverty, and higher ethnic
fragmentation all harm the prospects that democracy will endure.
Yet these relationships are not deterministic. There are several
countries (among them Guatemala and Mozambique) in which initial
conditions were extremely unfavorable, yet where democracy had
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endured as of 2004, albeit not without difficulties.88
Economic factors were especially over estimated in prior study. This allows for the next step in
departure from the traditional study of democratic transition.
Laurel E. Miller and Jeffrey Martini take up the second step. They note that there are
several different conditions to consider when examining democracy and democratization in the
third wave. Their blueprint bisects and includes several different established theories and
practices. First, consider the mode of change.89 Within the context of central and eastern Europe
there were three types of transitions. Hungary, Poland and Bulgaria were regime-initiated. East
Germany and Czechoslovakia were society-initiated. Romania experienced a violent
overthrow.90 Second, a country‟s past history with political pluralism is important.91 Tighter the
repression of dissent created more difficult the transition to democracy.92 Third, critical policy
choices during transition: role of the military in government, structure of representative bodies,
transitional justice or reconciliation court are included. Fourth, both sets of scholars alluded to
the importance of national cohesion. A number of states suffered from ethnic rivalries, unsettled
borders or insurgent groups.93 Some of these “frozen conflicts”94 of the region reignited in the
absence of Soviet central control. Fifth, economic stability is important. Kapstein and Converse
wrote that while important, economics cannot be estimated using a single factor or determine the
fate of governments. Miller and Martini hold that the last two factors towards democratization
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are dependent on external forces.95 This could include regional security, the status and conditions
in neighboring states, efforts by non-government organizations and involvement in international
organizations to name a few items.
Post-Communist Democracy in Europe
The collapse of communism afforded scholars and researchers in democracy a very
unique situation. Never before, and perhaps never again, will the countries of an entire region of
a single continent break free or simply walk away from ideologically similar totalitarian regimes.
The literature of post-communist democracy in eastern and central Europe tends to be very
region specific. It includes different theories. The most prominent of them is Rokkan‟s ideas
about political development.

Contemporary researchers have used much of his work to analyze

the territory and culture as factors in the democratization of the region. The end of the Cold War
also presented powerful international influences affecting democracy in the area. The most
recent literature specific to central and eastern Europe addresses post-EU accession regression
from democracy.
Many current studies about democracy in central and eastern Europe focus on historical
legacies, culture, outside support and geography. This practice faces a large amount of criticism.
Many researchers and member of the broader political science community view democratization
as “a process that displays fairly regular contours.” This creates a theoretical friction between
area specialists and general democracy scholars. Separate concentrations on theme and location
collide. Area scholars are referred to as “typical area scholars”. They are accused of being over
concerned with “trivial details of states”. They can be labeled as “deficient as social scientists”.
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At the same time, researchers specializing in certain regions accuse their detractors of using
“faddish theories” and showing “overeagerness”.96
Researchers point out that there are similarities with other regions of the world, but that
the shock of communism‟s collapse in central and eastern Europe was unique. Many of the states
of the region had no democratic tradition.97 Many of the new states had been parts of the AustroHungarian, Ottoman or Russian Empires. There was little memory or experience with a capitalist
economy.98 The military played little or no role in the end of communism in most central and
eastern European countries. Economically, most of these states started from a position of almost
perfect equal wealth distribution.99 It led Ekiert to write that, “Explanations emphasizing
geographic locations, deep historical preconditions and affinities for dense relations with the
West pose significant limitations to our thinking about policy lessons that can be transferred to
other regions.”100
Analysis about democracy in central and Eastern Europe evolved over time. Valerie
Bunce sees the democratic transition of central and eastern Europe in two distinct stages. The
first occurred from 1989 to 1996. The second occurred from 1996 to 2009. The first stage
included the democratization of approximately half of former Soviet states in the region. It was
characterized by increased political diversity, relative nonviolence and political cohesion of postcommunist parties. In the second stage, the “laggards” moved in a more democratic direction,
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some to relative democracy.101 Researchers pursued several popular theories of democratization.
Some theorized that the age of the state would reflect the quality of democracy after
communism. Bunce points out that Bulgaria and Romania were two of the older countries in the
region, yet evolved into illiberal democracies and hybrid regimes. Another theory attempted to
establish a correlation between religious and ethnic diversity and democracy. Bunce points out
that Poland and Albania are both very heterogeneous, but have completely different
governments. Some scholars saw that a difference in communist policies linked to a difference of
democratic result.102
A very popular attempt to explain democracy in the region emphasized elites and their
choices. This used the same templates researchers used in studying democratic transitions in
Latin America and elsewhere.103 Ekiert and Ziblatt, as well as Bunce, state this was conceptually
flawed.104 Reusing analytical frameworks used on Latin America and Africa overlook that the
process in Europe after the fall of communism is “distinctly European”.105 Ekiert and Ziblatt
write:
To compare the post-communist experience to democratic experiments
in other temporally proximate third-wave cases in other world regions
is to make the mistake of the drunkard whose search for his keys leads
him to the spot he can most easily see – under the lamppost.106
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This approach used “proximate factors”, such as mode of transition and framework decisions.
The theory was dismissed.107 Most of the transitions in central and eastern Europe were
similar.108 The election results in central and eastern Europe were not. 109
New theories about the democracy in the region combine much of these other theories.
They are akin to Stein Rokkan‟s analysis of western European nation-building. First and
foremost, they are intended to study only central and eastern Europe. Rokkan wrote that “smaller
political systems tend to be so heavily dependent on their cultural contexts that there is likely to
be very small payoffs in attempts at indiscriminate comparisons across distinctive cultural
regions.” 110 The theories account for the factors contributing to economy, territory and culture.
Rokkan‟s earlier model addressed these different forces along continuums containing four
thresholds: legitimacy, incorporation, representation and executive power.111 The factors have
different impacts depending on “various historical conditions”, such as the national revolutions
(until 1789) or industrial revolutions. The impact of economics depended on economic growth.
Territory impacted democratization based on geopolitical position, periphery control and timing
of national unification. Culture comprised of church-state relations and language.112 Regional
experts use Rokkan‟s approach to explain that democracy in the region can be linked to the
history, geography, culture and external forces in addition to the more conventional economic
factors.
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There are deep historical roots in many of the resulting democracies in central and eastern
Europe. The history of the region affected the immediate post-communist regimes, the more
developed democratic governments and subsequent accession to the European Union. There are
smaller debates and differences within the literature. Researchers contemplate which past matters
more. The first debate draws on the pre-1940s history and the legacy of the empires. Grzegorz
Ekiert and Daniel Ziblatt view democratization in the region on an unbroken continuum.
Communist and Soviet domination was simply a pause. The states of central and eastern Europe
simply started moving towards democracy again.113 Arista Maria Cirtautas and Frank
Schimmelfennig quote Jeffrey Kopstein:
The relevant past has been identified as the policy choices in the initial
post communist years that have been influenced by the path of extrication
from Communism. Whether roundtables or revolutions, that have in turn
been determined by the types of Communist regimes that are themselves
the product of the types of postcommunist state and society, which ultimately
reflect the level of modernization at the time of national independence
after World War I.114
Sten Berglund and Jan Åke Dellenbrant point out that many of the political parties in central and
eastern Europe immediately after communism‟s fall had roots in pre-World War II political
parties.115 Also, countries with pre-Second World War parliamentary traditions had higher levels
of political pluralism in the immediate aftermath of communism.116
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Ekiert and Ziblatt advance their idea further. They write that varying quality of freedom,
rights, economic development and political stability in central and eastern Europe correlate to
two different forces: pre-communist political patterns and more current events (reforms, wars
and crises). The challenge to researchers is combining the two stimuli. Researchers should
recognize the importance of pre-communist legacies, but that they are not deterministic.117 The
Czech Republic was industrialized before communism. Poland had limited experience with
democracy before communism. Hungary‟s right-wing politics reflect the legacy of the Soviet
crackdown in 1956, the failed communist revolt of 1919 and angst over the punishing Trianon
Treaty.118 Pre-communist patterns and current events are combined by the “institutional
mimicry” caused by sudden changes or shocks. Discontinuous changes do not allow for
evolution. Gaps form when governments simply collapse; disappear. 119 This is why “critical
antecedents”: religion, imperial legacies, pre-communist voting patterns, matter.120
A second issue in discussing historical relevance is the role of communism. Frank
Schimmelfennig, Hanno Scholtz and Arista Maria Cirtautas point out that in terms of states
within the former Soviet Union, there are two groups. Communism emerged in one group around
the time of World War One and the Russian Revolution. Another group became communist after
falling victim to Soviet, post-Second World War domination. 121 Bunce points out a strong
correlation between the duration of communist rule and the resulting quality of democracy in the
former Soviet Union. Most of the more democratic states became communist following World
War Two. Democracy is weaker or non-existent in other parts of the former U.S.S.R. where
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communism began after World War One: Belarus, Uzbekistan, the Ukraine (before 2004),
Armenia and Russia. Bunce reasons that longer communist rule and “deeper penetration”
conditioned these states for authoritarianism.122
Democracy in central and eastern Europe has an internal geographic aspect to it as well.
In short, location and proximity to Russia matters. One only needs look at a map of the region
and its periphery to understand that the farther east a researcher looks, the lower the chance of
finding even a moderate democracy.123 Bunce reverses this viewpoint. She wrote that states‟
geographic proximity to the West is a factor in the results of democratic transition. Before
communism, many central and eastern European countries were trading partners, shared cultural
ties and political ideas with the West.124 Michael Emerson and Gergana Noutcheva agree and
wrote “fast and deep democratization is explained to a significant degree by the proximity and
possibly of anchorage and integration with a major world centre of democracy.”125 More
recently, Russia, a historical symbol of oppression to many in the region, reasserted themselves
militarily in the republics of Georgia126 and the Ukraine. History causes concern. Current events
compound it.
The security questions surrounding geography overshadow larger issues than proximity
and history with the former Soviet Union present. There are factors of ethnicity and religion to
ponder. Many of the states of the region had large minority groups when communism
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collapsed.127 10% of Slovakia‟s population was Hungarian. There were two million Hungarians
in Romania and another 400,000 in Serbia. There was a large German minority in Poland and a
Polish minority in Lithuania.128 Soviet policy dictated immigration and, at times, forced it. In the
immediate aftermath of communism in the region, Berglund and Dellenbrant classified regimes
into three different groups. First, Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary underwent successful
government reforms and showed reasonable levels of stability. Second, the Baltic States
established independence and made progress towards democracy. There are some lingering
concerns over sizeable Russian minorities. Ethnic conflicts and nationalism racked the third
group. Berglund and Dellenbrant included Slovakia, Romania and Bulgaria in this group.129 The
former Yugoslavia would have definitely belonged in this group, as well, but the editors decided
not to include an analysis of the country in their study.
The study of religion as a factor in democratization became popular in contemporary
literature due in great part to developments in the Middle East. Natalia Vlas and Sergiu
Gherghina wrote that “For a long time, religion has been peripheral to the concerns of political
scientists.”130 The wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, the collapse of Gaddafi, and the Arab Spring
changed this. Interest in the Middle East yielded a useful by-product: an analysis of religion‟s
impact on democracy. The resulting body of work supports both a regional approach to the
study, but also a Rokkansian approach. The literature explores four different religious groups:
Protestant Christians, Catholics, Orthodox Christians and Muslims. It aids explaining different
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developments in post-communist governments, different levels of democracy and persistence of
some authoritarian regimes.
Any broad generalization about Christianity and its relation to democracy is an error. The
relationship between Christianity and democracy is “often taken for granted.”131 The new
literature on the topic cracks the perceived political monolith of Christianity. Peter Berger writes
that “Modern democracy originated in one part of the world - Western Europe - and there only,
through the course it has spread throughout the globe. In religious terms, it originated in the part
of the world crucially shaped by Christianity, and by Western Christianity at that.”132 Natalia
Vlas and Sergiu Gherghina see Western Europe as being built on a Christian foundation forged
by the victory over Holy Roman Emperors. However, the process was not as simple as Papal
supremacy. Two key events in Catholicism would play a role: the Protestant Reformation and the
Second Vatican Council.
The Protestant Reformation, its progeny and democracy have close relationships in the
context of a Rokkansian model. Robert D. Woodberry and Timothy S. Shah use the colonization
of the New World and the subsequent 18th century revolutions in explaining the positive impact
Christian Protestant religion has on democracy. Berger refers to it as a “natural affinity”.133
Unlike the scholars of Catholicism, Orthodoxy or Islam, Woodberry and Shah pointed to the
favorable conditions for democracy Protestantism provides. From this point, the Woodberry and
Shah cite a basic blueprint of modernization as a path to democracy: education, economic
development, democratic practices and pluralism.134 Berger notes that the Lutheran Church in
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East Germany played a role similar to that of the Catholic Church in Poland in the last days of
communism.135
The separation of Church and State and religious pluralism present in Protestantism and
Catholicism are absent in Orthodox Christianity. This separation is essential in liberal
democracy.136 The Eastern Church never experienced a reformation or anything like the Second
Vatican Council. The only religious pluralism experienced by Orthodox churches has been
hoisted upon them or accepted hesitantly. The Russian Orthodox Church today is aligned with
the Putin Regime.137 The Romanian Orthodox Church collaborated with the communist regime
in Bucharest. The Greek Orthodox Church had no role in the various democratic movements in
that country.138 Some scholars form a consensus that Orthodoxy impedes progress towards
democracy.139
Berger and Daniel Philpot explained that the Catholic Church only recently endorsed
democracy. The church played two basic roles in relation to authoritarian regimes before the
Second Vatican Council in the early 1960s. It was either outlawed, as it was in Eastern Europe,
or it was aligned with authoritarian governments. The Catholic Church collaborated with rulers
like Franco in Spain.140 The Second Vatican Council espoused individual rights and the
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separation of church and state and the Catholic Church became proponents of democracy.141
Philpot explores the implications of Catholicism in central and eastern Europe. He implies that
the democratizing impact of Catholicism depends on the size of the catholic community. He cites
the large role the church played in Poland and notes that more than 90% of the country identified
themselves as Catholic. He compares it to Czechoslovakia, that lacked a Catholic-based
opposition to communism.142
The literature concerning democracy‟s compatibility with Islam is extensive, theoretically
deep and very theological. The academic literature delves farther into Islam than the other three
counterparts discussed. It is a contemporarily contentious issue due to the aforementioned events
in the Middle East. The scholarly debate between Niklas Potrafke and Marek Hanush in the
pages of Public Choice in 2012 and 2013 prove that the question of democracy‟s viability in
Islamic countries is not settled.143 Some Arab scholars cite that there are inconsistencies between
the basic principles of separation of religion and state and individual rights with some
interpretations of Islamic law and teachings.144 Sometimes researchers gloss over them because
democracy became “fashionable” in the 1980s.145 Güneş Murat Tezcür and others point out that
many citizens may not understand democracy. They cited data from Vietnam, Egypt, Jordan and
Iraq. Scholars speculate that citizens in emerging democracies have unrealistic expectations
about it.146 This can lead to disappointment, frustration and skepticism in the notion of
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democracy.147 Additionally, Tezcür and his fellow scholars found that religious fervor in a state
like Iran has an inverse relationship with attitudes about democracy.148 Scholars agree that Islam
effects democratization and can make it a precarious proposition.149
International influences have a strong impact on central and eastern European regimes.
This was especially true following the collapse of communism. Scholars reason that there are
different combinations of outside influences that affect the region. Neighboring states, modern
Russia, the United States and NATO, and the European Union influence domestic affairs. 150
These different actors affect politics, trade and security in the region. They also interact with
each other. Relations between the West and Russia can place the region in the middle of larger
geopolitical tensions and chess games. This complicates political life in central and eastern
Europe. The most contemporary literature shows regimes balance improving their economies
through trade and being aware of military and security matters. This can recreate a Cold War
dynamic where countries in central and eastern Europe choose between being more pro-Western
or more pro-Russian. This balance was greatly affected by two events: Vladimir Putin‟s rise to
power and the initial foreign policy decisions of the Obama Administration.
The influence countries of the region have on one another markedly changed following
the successful transition away from communism. Berglund and Dellenbrant noted a domino
theory behind the spread of democracy and Huntington‟s idea of waves. Yet, much of this is
absent in more recent politics within the region; between the states of central and eastern Europe.
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There are completely different levels of priority afforded to regional politics by the different
countries. Andrew Curry pointed out that “Poland may be the most assertive of all of the new EU
countries in using its foreign aid budget to influence its neighbors.” He attributes this to Poland‟s
long legacy as victims of invasion and foreign influence. He noted that Poland assisted
democratic efforts in the Ukraine, Georgia and Belarus.151 Yet, András Rácz describes regional
politics as a “limited priority” for Hungary. They limited their initial direct involvement to the
countries of the Ukraine and Moldova. Most states concentrate their efforts within regional
groups: the Visegrad Cooperation, the Eastern Partnership and the Danube Strategy.152
Slovenia‟s foreign policy is similar, concentrating assistance efforts to the Western Balkans. This
is due in great part to both the shared Yugoslavian history and current political fragility of the
area.153 The influence the countries have on one another pale in comparison to that of Russia and
the West.
Immediately after the collapse of communism, central and eastern European countries
received ample support from the West. There were large benefits to EU and NATO
membership.154 Membership in the European Union equated to being civilized. Their return to
Europe offered the states of the region to “catch up” to other European countries.155 The onset of
accession for countries of central and eastern Europe offered a positive outlook for the future.
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The recent Euro crisis hurt the image of the European Union in the region.156 The Euro is no
longer a symbol of stability. The fiscal policies from the EU are undemocratic dictates.
The specter of modern Russia looms large over many of the countries in central and
eastern Europe. F. Stephen Larrabee points wrote that this has a geographic element. Countries
close to Russia have a greater fear of Russian military might.157 Guido and Bromke pointed out
the generational aspect of feelings towards communism and Russia.158 Most scholars attribute
the increase in fear of Russian influence with Vladimir Putin‟s ascension to power.159 He began
the reassertion of Russian power with the intervention in Georgia in 2008.160 Russia also seeks to
redevelop their Cold War era spheres of influence using other means, specifically through oil
trade. Various countries in the region have felt these commercial repercussions for resisting
Russian influence and leaning towards Brussels and the West.161 These tactics yielded numerous
Moscow-friendly governments on the periphery of Russia. Larrabee and Alex Palmer see this
creation of buffer states one of their minor goals in regional hegemony.162
Security concerns over Russia as a “revisionist power”163 involve the region‟s
relationship and perception of the NATO and the United States. The literature does not discuss

156

Montserrat Guibernau, “Prodpects for a European Identity,” International Journal of Politics, Culture & Society
24 (2011): 40.
157
F. Stehpen Larrabee, “Russia, Ukraine, and Central Europe: The Return of Geopolotics,” Journal of International
Affairs 63, no. 2 Spring/Summer 2010): 45.
158
Bromke, “Post-communist countries: challenges and problems,” 31; Montani Guido, “European Austerity
Without Growth? European Growth Without European Democracy? How European Citizens Can
Revive The European Project And Defeat Euroscepticism,” Annals of Faculty of Economics (2011): 91.
159
F. Stephen Larrabee, “Russia, Ukraine, and Central Europe: The Return of Geopolotics,” 35; Alex Palmer, “Russia
Rising: Moscow’s Quiet Resurgence,” Harvard International Review 33, no. 3 (Fall 2011): 32; Helena YakolevGolani, “Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation in the Slavic Triangle,” Canadian Slavonic Papers 53, No. 2/4
(June-Sept.Dec. 2011), 399.
160
Larrabee, “Russia, Ukraine, and Central Europe: The Return of Geopolitics,” 35.
161
Ibid., 43-44.
162
Larrabee, “Russia, Ukraine, and Central Europe: The Return of Geopolitics,” 37; Palmer, “Russia Rising,” 33.
163
Larrabee, “Russia, Ukraine, and Central Europe: The Return of Geopolitics,” 34-5.

70

the military role of the EU in terms of defending members from a Russian threat. There are
minor discussions about the outside agreements some member states forged with Russia.
Larrabee alludes to Russia‟s growing ties with Germany.164
Most scholars agree that much of the fear of Russia is wrought in the escalating doubt in
U.S. and NATO resolve.165 They all allude to the cancelled missile defense commitment
cancelled by U.S. President Barack Obama in 2009. The U.S. decided to deploy missile
interceptors on naval ships in the vicinity instead. Undeterred by the change, Russian President
Dimitri Medvedev announced increased radar systems and advanced warheads in the area of the
Polish border.166 Countries in central and eastern Europe did not feel like the region was a
priority to U.S. foreign policy in the early 21st century.167
Everything points to this concern as misplaced. First, the change to the missile defense
program actually helps the governments of central and eastern Europe, as well as the United
States. Second, the increased conventional American military presence does not support doubt in
the U.S. commitment to the defense of the region. These two aspects of the situation reaffirm the
traditional European reliance on American military might.
The alterations to the U.S. missile defense plan serve two purposes. One is a foreign
policy issue. The other is more military. From a foreign policy stand point, the move benefits the
states of the region and the United States. The missiles will not be on foreign soil. Putin cannot
allege a military threat. There won‟t be any domestic opposition. The states of the region are
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defended without much of the typical war of words. From a military standpoint, the United
States is more comfortable and enjoys versatility. They remain in command of the missiles and
fears of missile security or government stability in the host countries are assuaged. The missiles
can also can be dispatched anywhere a guided missile destroyed can go.
President Obama‟s pivot to Asia might have had all of the best intentions of refocusing
U.S foreign policy to China. He felt that the Bush administration had been pre-occupied with
other areas and other priorities.168 However, the Russian invasion of the Ukraine contributed to
pre-empting it. America has a strong cultural connection to Europe. This yielded the largest
American military deployment to Europe since the Cold War. NTO was the key. American
ground forces were sent to Poland.169 NATO performed Operation Atlantic Resolve that included
former Soviet satellites Poland, Romania, Bulgaria and Hungary and the Balkans. 170 Even the
most loyal Soviet satellite, Bulgaria, received American troops.171
The feelings are widespread affecting newer members and old alike. European specialists
acknowledge a “democratic fatigue” in the EU.172 “Distance between Central Europe‟s new EU
members and others has been growing,” wrote Ekiert. East-Central Europe thrives. The Balkans
struggle. The Eastern Slavic countries ride a carousel between instability and authoritarian
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rule.173 Fligstein and his colleagues note this with a major exception. They observed that already
connected governments of EU members, grew even closer.174
Backsliding
Most researchers agree that Diamond‟s democratic recession175 is real and global.
Several scholars noted that countries in different parts of the world backslid away from
democracy. Francis Fukuyama wrote that authoritarianism was on the march in 2014.176 There
are several different explanations for the incidents of illiberal democracy, hybrid regimes and
higher levels of authoritarianism in central and eastern Europe. This backsliding occurs in two
different ways. First, it occurs in the nature of the EU structure. Mihai Dinescu defines the
democratic deficit in the EU as “growing with the extension of competencies and prerogatives,
which Brussels claims from national capitals in a constantly larger number of policy
domains.”177 Peter Vesterdorf stated that “It [the EU] often replaces national legislation and
edges National Parliaments out of the game.”178 The second manner of backsliding occurs when
member states depart from EU expectations and norms. These two phenomena drive differing
schools of analysis on the topic.
A major failed assumption was that EU membership was the best way to democratize
central and eastern Europe. Jürgen Habermas wrote extensively about the topic, noting that
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“there has always been a democratic deficit” in the EU. The capitals of Europe wanted the EU
more than the people of their countries.179 His work noted the large initial economic interests
behind forming and expanding the EU and how the political aspects of it floundered from
neglect. This created vexing issues for Brussels. First, many see the Union as lacking legitimacy.
Second, the heralded economic benefits for many have soured as there are deadlocks between
member state governments and central bodies of the EU.
Richard Rosseau supports Habermas‟ assertion that the EU had legitimacy issues from
the start.180 Rosseau and Viven A. Schmidt share Fritz Scharpf‟s definition of legitimacy. It is
either input legitimation (government by the people) or output legitimation (government for the
people).181 Rosseau wrote that despite how scholars analyze the Union, it has legitimacy.182
Schmidt wrote in a different voice that throughput, what happens between the democratic input
and output, tells a different story.183 In two different pieces, Schmidt examined the EU structure
and cited several disconnects from theoretical legitimacy and the true reality of representation in
the Union. Members lack equality on the European Council. Germany and other larger more
affluent countries hold sway.184 The European Parliament is shut out of much what goes on when
heads of state or the high level EU appointees strike agreements behind closed doors.185 JensPeter Bonde noted that in 49 different areas, authority and control moved away from member
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capitals to the supranational EU level.186 He highlighted the fact that there are 90,000 rules that
voters can do nothing about. Even their elected European Parliament members are powerless to
act on many of them.187
The faulty structure of the EU hampers the development of a modern European identity.
Habermas points out that this is one of the chief criticisms of the EU: there is “no demos”; no
common people.188 They claim the EU is “built on sand.”189 The subsequent effect of the EU
structure is that European‟s do not feel important. This keeps voter turnout low. Habermas and
Schmidt see political involvement is imperative for the formation of a different national identity
for the EU.190 European citizens need to forge a new identity through developing a European
civic society, building a politically oriented public and creating a political culture. This will
enable Europeans to form political parties across state borders, create a belief in a democratic EU
process and learn to live with differences amongst other nations and states.191 Habermas
envisions this as a post nationalist democracy.192
This could resolve many of the deadlocks between the European capitals and the EU
leadership. The early economic prospects and coordination clash with the current lack of political
integration. Attila Agh cited economic woes for the ebb of democracy in the EU and the region.
He wrote that the three consecutive crises account for backsliding in central and eastern Europe.
First, there was a transformation recession. A post EU Accession crisis followed. The global
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economic crisis completed the triumvirate.193 Agh‟s explanation is very popular. Habermas,
however, refers to the EU structure again. He wrote that the crisis exposed major flaws in the
EU. First, The EU had no regulatory capacities.194 Second, the EU only controls half of its
member‟s economies: monetary policy. National parliaments still control fiscal policy.
Governments are walking a tightrope of free markets, social security and public debt.195
Habermas advocates further integration to resolve this and most issues.
Problems from a lack of political integration are not only economic. A failure to
adequately address other areas of policy allowed some undemocratic institutions and practices to
continue, contrary to EU principles. Some of the states in central and eastern Europe had bad
starts on the path to democracy and very troubled pasts. Othon Anastasakis wrote that transition
decisions caused instability in some areas of former Soviet rule. These states had illiberal starts
and strong communist pasts and suffered sustained democratic deficits.196 Transition decisions
propelled this political legacy. In other situations, domestic factors (often rooted in history)
created variations in approaches and solutions to problems. In this regard, the literature points to
three concepts. First, history matters. Second, perhaps Ekiert and Ziblatt were more correct than
they thought. Not only did states pause along their paths to democracy, but during accession to
the EU as well. This leads to the third idea: Ekiert and Ziblatt‟s institutional mimicry. Cirtautas
and Schimmelfennig pointed out that EU enlargement lost momentum. Member states were left
to deal with crises and problems on their own. Their separate histories shaped their decisions
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absent EU enticements. Pop-Eleches wrote that researchers neglect post-communist legacies in
this respect.197
The rush to enlarge the Union is also suspect in a decline of democratic ideals in some
member states. Problems existed in these fledging states before EU accession and were simply
covered by what Alina Mungiu-Pippidi called “the EU “anesthetic”.198 Then, it was too late.
Rupnik and Zielonka agree with Mungiu-Pippidi‟s assertion that the EU lost leverage and control
over states after accession.199 EU influence weakens without these domestic reforms.200 Agh
wrote that several changes implemented to gain membership were not operational. They were
simply changes; boxes to check. The post accession result was what Venelin Ganev called
“hooliganism”. Ruling elites chose to violate established norms.201 This is characterized by
government cronyism, corruption and suppression of the media.202 This is only one product of
backsliding the region has experienced.
Conclusions
The literature on the state of democracy in central and eastern Europe illustrates a
politically evolving region with a very unique political and cultural history, subject to many
different factors. Close study revealed that democracy is not a monolith. It has several strains,
forms and fashions. Measuring it can be easily done using equations and computers. Accurately
measuring it requires other, sometimes less quantifiable information. Furthermore, events in
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central and eastern Europe require historical and cultural context. The literature illustrates that
this is probably true for most regions of the globe.
There are tentative debates about the difference between democracy in a classical sense, a
modern European democracy in a contemporary sense and the role the EU will play in central
and eastern Europe. Dahl provides a neat and packaged definition of democracy. Yet, this is in a
more classical sense. Despite being far from parsimonious, it also does not address many modern
realities of global politics. Habermas‟ and Schmidt‟s contributions take a discussion of modern
European democracy to a more complete conclusion. The problems with transparency in
Schmidt‟s research into throughput legitimation illustrate the problems in developing a modern
European identity needed to achieve Habermas‟ post-nationalist democracy. This civic identity
provides the EU with a demos.
Most mainstream measurements of democracy are inundated with empirical,
mathematical data. Many of the conclusions depend largely on modernization theory. The
literature makes very valid arguments against these measures. Whether it is per capita gross
domestic product or income inequality, this information needs some context. Information on
regional culture and history enhance models. Yet, alone they too are faulty. No one empirical
factor or cultural aspect is deterministic. The two schools of research need to be combined for
the best assessment about political life.
Determinants of democracy vary region to region and, sometimes, within regions. There
are several different factors: internal political history, neighboring states, global trends and
external forces. This demands democracy development account for individual histories.
Memories can be powerful. Geography can be a strong factor. Regional events can pressure
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governments and motivate domestic political groups. Changes in the global economy can
manifest tensions or assuage fears. External forces can offer aspirational goals, instill fear or
provide stability.
The best research methodology accounting for the differing levels of democracy in
central and eastern Europe is one that is regionally specific. The literature illustrates that the
region is different from others elsewhere in the world. The states that comprise the area are very
diverse. They have different languages, religions, and heritages. A methodology seeking to
explain political difference in these states needs to include and incorporate the different histories,
regional trends, states‟ economic performances, cultural issues and traditions and the pressures of
global actors.
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III. METHODOLOGY
The research question of this work is “does history, culture, and geography effect postcommunist democracy in central and eastern Europe?" The study used a combination of methods
and a regional approach. The lion‟s share of research and data deals with history, culture and
geography. These are qualitatively assessed. There are a limited number of factors used to help
measure democracy that are quantitative. It attempts to avoid either extreme posed by the
arguments Bunce highlighted: completely relying on empirical data or material from simple area
studies. It includes analysis of certain aspects important to political life specific to the region.
These might not be as important elsewhere. Yet, it also incorporates a limited number of
variables that political science researchers use in assessing states globally.
This approach is based on a combination of different theoretical approaches and
assessments: Dahl, Rokkan and Teorell. Dahl‟s definition lays the foundation for a useable
criterion to examine the quality of democracy. Teorell interjects ideas about the role of
economics and democracy. The work analyzed case study subjects according to the assembled
criterion of democracy. Then, it reviews their different aspects of history, culture and geography.
Rokkan‟s work established that these different variations in society effect government and
politics. This illustrates any impact that history, culture and geography have on democracy.
This paper purposefully does not do a number of things. First, it does not look to establish
a set of specific variables to explain the quality of democracy to be used in other places. The
work uses a regional approach. However, Rokkan‟s different aspects of culture, history and
territory might be useful to future researchers. The countries of Southeast Asia might
operationalize the aspect of geography by their proximity to China. The countries of South

80

America might include the role indigenous Indians into an assessment of their culture. The same
can be said about the role of the European Union. There are few other organizations like it in the
world. Yet, there are minor similarities to ASEAN and the African Union. These are decisions
for others to make.
The work also does not attempt to reformulate a numeric measure or quantitative scale
for democracy. The work seeks to illustrate democratic differences due to a set of factors; not
estimate the exact amount of difference. It embraces the idea of democracy‟s relative nature and
seeks to incorporate the unquantifiable. Democracies will be compared to one another and the
general conditions of the region, not placed on a scale. It also does not attempt to assess
democracy in the region compared to the rest of the world.
The methodology of this work contains three subsequent parts. First, it establishes
criterion to analyze democracy. This uses a combination of works from the literature review with
Dahl‟s definition of democracy as a basis. This section also establishes different criterion to
research the impact that history, culture and geography have on post-Communist governments in
the region. It is a Rokkansian approach that draws on specific theories related to the political
roles of history, culture and geography. Next, it presents various hypotheses to be tested and
measured. Finally, it discusses and presents three countries of the region for subsequent case
studies using the presented criterion.
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Criterion
Democracy
O‟Donnell and Schmitter wrote that “elections equal democracy.”1 However, elections
are simply one of a variety of conditions required for democracy. True liberal democracy is not
about the singular event of voting and holding elections. Dahl educates us that, in its truest form,
democracy is more about conditions and different concurrent institutions. Democracy is
impossible without multiple political parties. These parties cannot truly operate without a free
press and methods of expression. This educates and informs an electorate made of responsible
adults.2 The ability to vote is yet another aspect. Then, the nature of elections is a question.
Liberal democracy demands a certain level of competition and contention. Second, the depth and
width of voting rights matter. Finally, without a peaceful transition of power, the system fails.
This work does not seek to create the ever allusive absolute definition of democracy. It
combines several notions of democracy and creates criteria to measure it in a relative manner. It
assumes that no country is a completely free and liberal state. Central and eastern Europe is no
exception. The research seeks to explain differences in democratic conditions. Are there
differences in who can vote? Why? Are there free and fair elections? If not, how are they unfair?
Why are they unfair? Are the factors of history, culture or geography the cause of any of this?
The criterion is assembled from Dahl‟s ideas in Polyarchy, Habermas‟ regionally specific
work and Teorell‟s observations of the role economics plays in political systems. Dahl and
Habermas furnish the appropriate philosophical material and structural benchmarks. Dahl
provides a broad view and observations about the general practice of liberal democracy.
1
2

Carothers, “The End of Transition Paradigm,” 7-8.
Dahl, Polyarchy, 3.
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Habermas contributes a modern European context to the concept. Teorell injects some of the
economic realities of globalism felt by populations and governments. The conditions of rights
and freedoms in the modern states of central and eastern Europe can be assessed using the
subsequent criteria.
This study incorporates the aspects of Dahl‟s broad definition of democracy to analyze
the status of current post-communist states of central and eastern Europe. Dahl wrote that there
were eight different “requirements for democracy among a large number of people.” These eight
structural requirements are:
1. The freedom to form and join organizations
2. Freedom of expression
3. Right to vote
4. Eligibility for public office
5. Right of political leaders to compete for support
5a. Right of political leaders to compete for votes
6. Alternative sources for information
7. Free and fair elections
8. Institutions for making government policies depend on votes and other
expressions of preference3
Most researchers agree that these requirements are the bare essentials to a truly free, liberal
democratic government.

3
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More specifically for European Union countries, their involvement in EU politics,
participation in EU Parliamentary elections, is an important facet of modern European
democracy. It is true that EU membership led to the sacrifice of some sovereignty on the part of
the capitals of Europe. Europeans still have a voice in Brussels. This is achieved by participating
in the elections for their own heads of state that comprise the European Council and their
representatives in the European Parliament.
While democracy is a global phenomenon, it has a regional aspect, as well. The
democratic deficit highlighted by Dinescu, Vesterdorf, Rousseau and Schmidt is a structural
issue for the countries of the region and the entire EU. The disconnect from Dahl‟s portents of
democracy and the EU structure occurs in relation to his last point: institutions for making
policies depend on votes and other expressions of preference. This is evidenced further by
Schmidt‟s observations on throughput and Bonde‟s noted 90,000 rules that Europeans can
seemingly do nothing about. This causes low voter turnout.
Habermas contributes an essential aspect to this study‟s by citing the imperative of
political involvement. Increased involvement will forge a new European identity. In relation to
Dahl‟s broader points about democracy, his eight points will apply to the larger union and not
just their sovereign members. Hypothetically, political parties will form of people from different
states. Supporters of large causes will include people from different countries. Habermas‟ postnational democracy will form. Democracy will be in practice, blind to EU member state borders.
Another important facet of democracy is the general economic condition of a country
over time. This is can be an important factor in politics. Economic health and wealth is far from
the ultimate barometer of freedom and rights. China is a trading juggernaut and is far from a
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democracy. Many of the richest countries of the Middle East treat women as second class
citizens or property. (These situations can be addressed by another factor relating to liberal
democracy covered in this research: culture.) However, the poor economic conditions over time
can lead to stress and strain on a liberal democratic system.
Some of the established definitions of democracy fail to acknowledge the role of
economics. These definitions treat democracy as a noun. Both modernization theory and
dependency theory dealt with income and capitalism in terms of democratization. Teorell
encapsulated the reality of globalization. While, poor countries are not always authoritarian,
becoming poorer can lead to it. In this regard, relative economic health is important to
democracy. This explains the popularity and widespread support enjoyed by modernization and
dependency theory in the past. It also illustrates the different role that economics plays in
democracy in the globalized world.
In summary, this study uses criterion wrought from the combination of Dahl, Habermas
and Teorell to illustrate the differences in the quality of rights and freedoms in the former
communist states of central and eastern Europe. Dahl presented a widely accepted model of
democracy that is applicable most anywhere in the globe. Habermas presented solutions to the
structural issues presented to the countries of the continent that are members of the EU. Teorell
dealt with the economic impact of globalization on the politics. Dahl‟s structure, Habermas‟
political participation and Teorell‟s economics present an adequate tool in looking at the politics
of the countries in question.
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Figure 3. Operationalized Democratic Criteria
Field of Assessment

Criteria

Right to form and join political parties and
interest groups.

Are there any laws forbidding certain political
groups from forming?

Freedom of Speech and Expression

What protests are permitted? Are there
restrictions on press, Internet or other media?

Right to Vote

Who votes? 18 and older? Men and Women?
Are citizens of all races or religions allowed to
vote?

Eligibility for Public Office

What restraints are there on holding office?

Right of political leaders to compete for
support/votes

Is there any systematic repression of
opposition leaders (imprisonment, etc.)?

Alternative sources of information

Is there a viewpoint opposing the
government‟s available? Is there Internet
freedom? Are certain languages banned? Who
controls television and radio?

Free and fair elections

Is there voter intimidation? Domestically, who
declares elections valid?

Institutions for making government policies
depend on votes and other expressions of
preference

Who is elected?

Political participation in the European Union

Is there higher than average participation in EU
elections? What is the government‟s role in
this?

General Economic Conditions over Time

GDP Growth and GINI Change over Time

History
Incorporating history into the methodology of the study is important because of the
intensely turbulent history of the region. Rokkan cited that history affected the impact of more
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contemporary forces in the development of government.4 This part of the globe witnessed the
start of two world wars with the rise of communism in different countries after each one, the first
in 1917 and the second in 1945. Prior to this, many of the current states were holdings or part of
far flung empires or repressive, non-democratic regimes of various types. This history helps
explain why different forms of democracy evolved after much of the area achieved true selfdetermination.
The states of central and eastern Europe experienced many different forms and fashion of
rule before the collapse of communism. Researching the different political systems in the states
of the region and the events that yielded them are important to current levels of democracy in
these states today. Before the First World War, some states were parts of large empires. Others
were smaller monarchies. Some countries were run by different unstable combinations. An
entirely different patchwork quilt of comparable varieties occupied the states of central and
eastern Europe following the Second World War. While Soviet domination was a common
characteristic of rule after the wars, it took different shapes in some countries. Their postcommunist governments had similar differences, as well. There are four distinct different eras in
the political history of the region.

4
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Figure 4. Historical Criteria
Political Eras of the Region
Pre-First World War
Interwar Governments
Communist Rule
Post-Communist Rule

Criterion
What type of government?
What type of government?
Length of Communist Rule. Nature of
Communist Rule.
References to Pre-Communist Antecedents.
Score settling. Traditional animosities.

The first political era, Pre- First World War, saw little government by the people in
central and eastern Europe. Many of the modern states did not exist in the period. Parts, portions
or the whole of the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Serbia, Slovakia and Romania lay within
the borders of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. The Ottoman Empire held some of the same
territory intermittently within the previous 50 years. This dynastic control affects the culture of
the modern state today.
The interwar governments of the era following the First World War were the first
opportunity for many of these states to exercise self-government. The victorious Allies created
some of the states in the region from the remnants of the defeated Austro-Hungarian Empire. The
period was relatively unstable. Various small wars between countries of the region
honeycombed the period. Politically, a small number of countries had some success in liberal
democratic government. Some started as liberal democracies only to fall under authoritarian
regimes. Notably, Czechoslovakia was exceptionally successful at establishing a resilient
democratic government.
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The analysis of the communist rule of the states of central and eastern Europe is a more
complicated endeavor. The states of the region experienced different communisms. First, the
duration of communist rule varied. Some became communist after the First World War and
others after the Second World War. Bunce wrote that states ruled by communism for longer
periods are more tolerant of lower levels of democracy.5 Second, the states experienced different
levels of systematic oppression internally under communist rule. This refers to the nature of
communist rule. There was more than a cosmetic difference between Ceauşescu„s Romania and
Tito‟s Yugoslavia. Late in the communist era, Polish leaders were blasted by Ceauşescu and
Honecker for allowing liberal reforms. There were differences between regimes, their ideologies
and their relationships with Moscow.
The final era of political history is post-communist rule. The literature review revealed a
consensus that the pre-Second World War politics helped mold the political landscape after
communism. This is the basis from Eikert and Ziblatt‟s proposal that democratization in these
states started after the First World War and continues despite being interrupted by communism.
Kopstein agrees with them. Some states politically reverted to “critical antecedents” or
“institutional mimicry”6, referring to what they historically knew. Some of the same pre-World
War Two parties formed. Many of the same institutions evolved. Some of the produced regimes
are still in place. This involves the different decisions made in relation to political and economic
framework. An important aspect is also EU membership, NATO membership and the states‟
relationships with Russia. The democratic level of these current governments is the topic of the
research.
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It is important to understand that the role history plays in democracy, politics and
government in the region is not always positive. History‟s power is subject to one universal
constraint: memory. The generation that survived of the Second World War is slowly dying off.
Many people in the region who lived through communism and Soviet domination have retired
from public life. Few people under the age of 30 remember either period. This generational
amnesia provides fertile ground for some of the same far right and far left political ideology of
that characterized Europe in the early 20th century. The ideas of isolationism, nationalism and, in
some cases, xenophobia are popular with many. These are generally found in the eurosceptic
parties. Even some mainstream political parties in Europe seem to be migrating back to the
politics of eras past. Notions of a “Fortress Europe”, the United Kingdom‟s “Splendid
Isolationism” and perceived threats to “Polishness” are examples.
Culture
Examining the cultural differences in the states of central and eastern Europe is important
in helping explain their different levels of rights and freedoms. The region offers a very diverse
group of peoples living among different states with vastly varying cultures. Few other regions in
the world have a more dense population that is more culturally heterogeneous. Bunce notes this
extensively. This supports taking a regional approach to the area. Culture is made up of a number
of things: cuisine, language, music and religion to name a few. This work draws on Rokkan and
Bromke to set criteria to research and analyze culture‟s political impact.
Religion, language and ethnicity collectively impact the level of liberal democracy in the
region. In many states, these different aspects of culture have the strongest impact. Rokkan chose
to use language and religion as the primary sources for studying the effect culture has on
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government and politics. He noted that the two were important in the culturally based policies of
governments.7 Bromke pointed out that large minorities were a factor immediately after
communism. Ethnic diversity persists as a political factor in many of the countries.
Religion remains one of the strongest unifying and divisive factors in central and eastern
European life. All three Abrahamic religions are represented. It serves as the crossroads for
Christianity and Islam. It sits between the two ancient Christian churches, Roman Catholic and
Eastern Orthodox. It is home to millions of Jews. It borders Germany, the home of the Protestant
Reformation. Many countries are religiously homogenous and at peace. Others are religiously
diverse and much the same. However, some states experience contemporary tensions from age
old religious wars. The states of the former Yugoslavia contend with animosities dating back as
far as the 14th century.8
Religious beliefs help mold domestic policies in central and eastern Europe. It is one of
the strongest social institutions remaining after the fall of atheistic communism. Rokkan alludes
to the relationship “the church” has to the government in his discussion of nation-building in
Western Europe.9 Select works of Philpot, Bergen and others who deal with contemporary
religion and democracy. Many of their themes are seen operationalized in this respect. Religion
affects many different types of laws by serving as part of its moral foundation. It helps form
social policy, like abortion. It informs an essential aspect of the judicial systems of the region.
Religious beliefs are evident in the extension of voting rights and rights of minorities.

7
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The literature review presented different aspects of the debate over the role religion plays
in democracy. Religion and its relation to government and politics is a rather popular subject
today because of the more recent wars and military options in the Middle East. Islam is a
primary, popular focus. The literature review offered beneficial secondary research: the
comparisons of the different denominational families of Christianity. In terms of this study, a
comparison of Catholicism, Protestantism and Orthodoxy are important. A vast majority of the
population in the region is Christian.
Minorities of different varieties play a very important part in the democratic process in
the states of central and eastern Europe. Many of the states were left with very large minorities
following the collapse of communism. The policies towards these groups by the newly birthed
democratic regimes varied from state to state. Some states opted to treat them as citizens first and
relegated ethnicity in the name of providing universal rights to all citizens. Others states did not
prioritize rights and freedoms. These states were susceptible to ethnic fragmentation and even
scapegoating in the subsequent years.
This is also an important aspect to the role ethnicity plays and the larger topic of culture
is language. Rokkan‟s analysis feeds into Dahl‟s democratic principles in interesting fashion.
Rokkan notes that there tend to be three different ways governments deal with multilingualism.
States can declare a national language and ban others, passively declare a national language
without suppressing others or embrace multilingualism.10 This is vital to the model of democracy
Dahl‟s sketches. The ability to communicate, campaign and engage in political discourse is
essential to liberal democracy. Forbidding a certain language or alternatives to a national
language would be antithetical. Citizens have the right to express themselves and form and join
10
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political groups in Dahl‟s democracy. Candidates also have the right to compete for support.
Much of this is achieved by providing and accessing information. Much of Dahl‟s portrait of
liberal democracy is impossible with an institutionalized language barrier.

Figure 5. Cultural Criteria
Aspects of Culture Impacting
Democracy
Religion
Ethnicity

Language

Criterion
Toleration. Dominant Principles. ChurchState Relations.
Minority Rights: Economic and Political…
Voting rights, Employment Discrimination,
Hate Crime Laws
Toleration or Banishment

Geography
Geography in select fashions affects the quality of democracy in central and eastern
Europe. Broadly speaking, the notion of geography became popular in the Cold War era with the
ballyhooed concept of Domino Theory. This idea of a political concept spreading continued as
analysts, historians and politicians fashioned theories around an updated concept: the contagion.
While the terms “Domino Theory” and “contagion” might seem recent additions to the lexicon of
political science, the term is not as new as it seems. Rokkan discussed the concept of territory in
relation to the formation of modern Western Europe in terms of democratic consolidation. This,
of course, pre-dates Cold War literature about the spread of communism. Subsequent
researchers continued the exploration of the relationship between geography on the quality of
democracy.
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The Literature Review revealed that there are different theories about geography and the
level of democracy in central and eastern Europe. This takes shape in several different ways.
First, the states of the region face an aged old dilemma. While a residually strong Putinist Russia
stands at its doorstep, Brussels and the European Union also try to exert influence. These two
competing forces wage geopolitical war over what could be described as the region‟s soul. This
forms an East-West dynamic. A closer relationship with the EU, its members and further
integration into the European experiment offer great benefits.
This stands true in terms of commerce, but also democratic quality. The economic benefit
is well established. The political benefits for citizens for EU member states is not always clear.
There are difficulties. The EU is still, in many ways, a work in progress. Access to the affluence
of the European market as a member state came with prerequisite directives. These directives
had to be met to the satisfaction of Brussels before membership was granted. There are several
aspects that some members continue to improve on, but this is the nature of the EU state.
Membership is conditional and aspirational even if it is already operational. In terms of
democratic rights and freedoms, accession to the EU benefited democratic quality and
membership helps ensure it.
The other side of the paradigm is Putinist Russia. There are some very contemporary
things to consider when analyzing Russian relations with central and eastern European states:
trade, especially in energy, and military threat. There are also parts of the relationships that bleed
into other areas of history and culture. Addressing the contemporary aspects, Russia is a large
trading partner with many in the region. This is especially true in the trade in natural gas and oil.
While this relationship is symbiotic, it is important to note the political leverage this give Putin
and the oligarchs in Moscow. This is unfortunate for the relationship with the EU since Russia
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sees the EU as representative of a West it does not trust. Putin uses Russia‟s economic leverage
and military threat to create a Cold War-like set of buffer states around Russia‟s periphery.11 He
has punished some states for failing to support Russian interests. The military threat is obvious,
especially after the annexation of the Crimea and the American retrenchment.12
The second political of geography is the deeper, unilateral relationships the countries of
the region have with Moscow. This is a strange collection of cognitions from different groups in
the region. First, there are large Russian minorities in some states. Many of these minorities
embrace Russia as their homeland, while living in neighboring countries of eastern Europe.
Second, there are still dark memories of Soviet domination, gulags and life under communism.
This is seen in the citizens of the states that are old enough to remember life in Soviet satellites.
This apprehension can also hurt relationships in the region. Third, there are some non-Russians
that feel cultural ties with Russia. Many speak Russian and practice Eastern Orthodoxy. This
latter aspect alone affects democratic rights and freedoms in an adverse manner. The consensus
is that certain aspects of Eastern Orthodoxy hamper democratic development. This is evidenced
by various traits of the religion. They do not allow female priests. Orthodox dioceses are also
very nationalistic in nature. They lack a linguistic toleration. (The services are in the specific
languages.) Orthodox churches are specifically non-Western.
The final democratic impact of geography is Miller‟s notion of democratic contagion.13
The first two of these is highly regional. The East-West notion is based on the nature of
Orthodox Christianity and regional history. This religion and political history of domination is
rather rare outside of central and eastern Europe. The idea of distance to the Soviet Union/Russia
11
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is both regional and temporal. Note that Finnish democracy remained intact for decades, even
thru the Cold War and borders Russia. Additionally, Russia has not always been the threat they
represented under Soviet communism or the threat they represent today under Vladimir Putin.
Finally, not every country east of Europe is less democratic, of course. Several states including
the largest democracy in the world lie to the right of Europe on a map.
The final theory behind democratic quality in central and eastern Europe is Miller‟s
Democratic contagion idea. Many researchers used this to explain the spread of democracy in the
final days of communism. Berglund and Dellenbrant agreed.14 The question is if the theory
applies to countries of the region more than two decades later. The spread of higher levels of
rights and freedoms continues but at an inconsistent rate. Much of this is now done through the
European Union when it occurs. The negotiating format, dissimilar parliamentary composition
and different political priorities in spreading EU principles help account for the asymmetrical
spread.
Figure 6. Geographic Criteria
Geography
East-West Paradigm
Domestic
Soviet/Russian
Factors
Democratic Contagion

Criterion
Russia v. Western (EU)
Relations with Russia,
including the related
threat
Look at Neighboring
States‟ policies.

Hypotheses
Central and Eastern Europe has a very unique history. It was part of the Roman Empire
and later overrun by Barbarians in Classic Antiquity. It was sliced, portioned and traded by the
14
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kings and queens of early Europe. The region was invaded by Muslim Turks. It reverted back to
the empires of Europe. It furnished the spark that started the First World War. It was conquered
by Germany in World War Two and was dismantled by an agreement between Allies following
the war. Then, it existed under communist rule for forty years. Now, these states turn to
democracy.
The region offers a very unique set of questions pertaining to democracy. Is the current
quality of democracy in central and eastern Europe affected by the history before the First World
War? or the Second? Does the duration or nature of communist rule have an impact on
contemporary politics in the states of the region? How consistent is the impact of these forces
across different states? If it is not consistent, why not? While history helps shape states,
governments and peoples everywhere, this work endeavors to two tests hypotheses about central
and eastern Europe:
H1: The earlier democracy is achieved historically, the stronger the post-communist
democracy in the region. The region democratized in two different groups: the initial
states that emerged democratic shortly after communism collapsed and another group
later.15 . Bunce said that states that experienced longer periods of communist rule are the
more tolerant of lower levels of democracy.16 Ekiert and Ziblatt‟s contention of a
continuous movement towards democracy support this.17 Logically, the sooner a country
shed communism and continued their move towards democracy the stronger it would be.
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H2: The level of former communist oppression does not appear to affect the quality of
liberal rights and democratic quality in the region. There were major differences in the
communist regimes across the region.18 Many even changed over time. Miller wrote that
high levels of oppression hampered the transition of democracy.19 This also connects to
the psychological impact of Bunce‟s notion of duration.
The research looked at specific political policies, practices and institutions in relation to
democracy and the countries‟ histories. There is, of course, a general relation to history and
political systems. The past is part of the evolution of any country‟s political system. The study
looked at how specific differences in democracy can be traced to historical relationships and
events and shocks specific to each country. For example, is there a seminal event in history that
helped shape laws on voting in a specific state? Is there a traditional animosity with another
group that affords them a lower level of democracy? The work seeks to explain how much
history matters to democracy in central and eastern Europe.
The history of the region created a culture that is as diverse as any in the world. Central
and eastern Europe is a combination of more than ten different peoples and nations, with a
similar number of languages all living amongst one another in the different states. Three of the
five major religions in the world have substantial populations in the region. Central and eastern
Europe is a unique opportunity to study how different people can live with alongside each other
successfully and unsuccessfully. Contemporarily, migration has contributed to the discussion of
culture in the region.
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These facts make it basically impossible to make generalizations about religion in central
and eastern Europe. Several questions emerge. Does religious homogeneity aid democracy? If
there is religious homogeneity, do the facts support past work about the positive effect of
Western religions? Does diversity impact democracy? If it does, are there consistent exceptions
across multiple states? Finally, with the Internet, cell phones and international media
conglomerates, does language matter like it used to? This study researched three hypotheses
about the impact of ethnicity:
H3: Western religions tend to promote a higher quality of democracy in the region. This
question pertains to the states of the region that widely practice Catholicism and
Protestant Christianity. It further investigates Vlas and Ghergina‟s contention that the
relationship between Christianity and democracy is “often taken for granted”.20 Modern
democracy began in Western Europe.21 Many in central and eastern Europe practice the
same religions with different democratic rights. Is there causation?

H4: Western ethnic heterogeneity has no effect on post-communist democracy in the
region, while the presence of non-Western minorities does. This is a new and different
theory. Most researchers look at homogeneity in a vacuum. This study analyzes the role
that non-western minorities have on democracy. The purpose is to see the political and
legal reaction to migration in the region and potential backsliding.
The study seeks specific laws in the countries of region and traces their relationship to
culture. The research delved into the motivations behind regulations placed on language use. It
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reviewed government policies on both diversity and hate crimes. It examined any faith-based
laws or policies. It questioned how much culture impacts laws, rights and privileges in the
central and eastern Europe.
Geography plays a prominent role in the political history of central and eastern Europe. It
defined the intensity of threat from land invasions; from the various conquerors throughout the
ages. Many say that it played a part in the collapse of communism. Today, it plays a role in
international trade and relations between the rest of Europe, the United States and Russia. While
the Cold War relationships changed, is there a comparable dynamic: East versus West? Do the
states of the region find themselves “caught in the middle”? Is there a larger East/West paradigm
that is at work? If this is true, what does this mean to the notion of political contagion? If such a
contagion exists, what does it mean to democracy within the region, excluding outsiders, namely
Brussels and Moscow?
H5: Relations with Russia have little to do with the quality of democracy in the region.
The traditional relationships between Russia and some central and eastern European
states are strong. However, there are some scholars that argue the pre-1940s political
history matters more.22 This leads to question the impact of EU membership. A break
from the traditional subservient role to the Russians would be historic for many countries
in central and eastern Europe.

H6: Democracy spread through parts of the region like a contagion, but now this type of
effect is sporadic. Looking at the first group of emerged democracies Bunce named, there
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is a good case to be made for the contagion argument.23 Perhaps EU accession is the
terminus of the contagion. Perhaps, these states can be referred to as mature democracies.
The advancement of rights and freedoms comes in the hand of domestic pressure,
international trends from international organizations like NATO, the UN and the EU.
However, there can be arguments made for illiberal contagions.24
The specific impact of geography on rights and freedoms is more difficult to clearly see. The
Russian aspect of geography can be assessed through foreign policy and the treatment Russian
minorities. More important democratically is the government‟s reaction to domestic opinions
about affairs with Russia. The impact of an East-West paradigm can be read through policy
towards the EU, NATO and Russia and to public sentiment. Voter sentiment is evident in the
notion of contagion, as well. States often mimic their neighbors for a variety of reasons. This is
especially true in a region with widespread viewership of international news, an unfettered
Internet and open borders.
This research examines select states of central and eastern Europe and determine the
effect that history, culture and geography have on the quality of democracy. The analysis is
based on he works of Dahl, Rokkan, and Teorell. Each contributes to a mixed criterion of
democracy. The work then looks at history, culture and geography to explain the differences in
democratic quality. It seeks to review theories found in the established literature, ideas formed
from recent scholarship and historically held notions. It explains that the history, culture and
geography of the states of central and eastern Europe help account for the difference in
democracy in the states of the region.
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Selection of Case Studies
The diversity of central and eastern Europe is well established. Selecting three countries
to serve as a representative cross section of the region is challenging. Many have sizeable
minorities. Countries in the region include states that fought on both sides of both World Wars.
This primes one‟s focus to the political. None of the states had democracy before the First World
War. Only a few had any success with it afterwards. Some states were established after World
War One. Others were created after World War Two. Some gained independence in the 1990s.
Economically, the region is a mosaic of successes and failures.
Poland is an obvious choice for a case study. They are arguably the fourth power in the
European Union. It has the sixth largest population with 38M people.25 It is also large: over
300,000 square kilometers.26 They are the largest and most populous in central and eastern
Europe. They have the healthiest economy in the region and one of the healthier in the EU. The
country has a tragic history until the late twentieth century. After the First World War, their
attempt at democracy was an unstable failure. Then, they were invaded by Germany. After the
war, they fell under Soviet domination. Poland offered the world most of the first images of
opposition to Moscow. Unusual for the region, Poland is largely homogenous. Demographically,
the country is very Polish and very Catholic.
Hungary has a far different history. The country existed as part of the Austro-Hungarian
Empire and fought on the side of Imperial Germany. During the Second World War, the country
aligned itself with the Nazis. Communism followed. Today, the country is largely Hungarian. It
is 37% Catholic. Other religions make up the reminder with 27% not specifying a denomination.
25
26

Eurostat
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It is an economically stable state.27 While similar to Poland in many ways, their politics took a
nationalist veer. The government faces widespread criticism due to its policy towards domestic
opposition, minorities and immigration.
Bulgaria is a solid choice for a case study because of its unique characteristics. The
country is markedly different historically, geographically and culturally. It experienced a half
century of Ottoman domination.28 The state‟s southern border is the southern border of central
and eastern Europe. Bulgaria is also home to one of the largest Orthodox populations in the
region. 29 This might explain their traditionally close ties to Russia.30 (Russia has the largest
Orthodox population in the world.31) It is also important to note that it has minority populations
of Turks, Russians and Armenians. The country has a small number of very large issues. They
are the poorest country in the EU. 32 Groups like Human Rights Watch and Reporters Without
Borders are critical of the government in Sofia.33 Yet, Bulgaria‟s real albatross is their
reputation for corruption. This has earned international criticism and hurt foreign direct
investment in the country.34
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The study uses Poland, Hungary and Bulgaria as subjects of case studies because of their
shared communist experience and very different internal characteristics and post-democratic
results. It is the contention of this study that examining these differences helps explain the
different levels of quality in their democratic governments. One country was dominated by a
non-Western empire. Another was dominated by a traditional European power. Two of the three
countries aligned with Germany during the Second World War. The other was Hitler‟s first
victim. One of the states experienced a communist revolution in 1919. The other two states only
experienced communism after Soviet domination. Two states are dominated by denominations of
Western Christianity. A third is home to a large Orthodox majority. Despite these differences, all
began their current democratic regimes at the same time, but provide different levels of rights
and freedoms to their citizens.
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IV. CASE STUDYS
POLAND
History, culture and geography have a profound role in molding the post-Communist
government and quality of democracy in the modern state of Poland. The subsequent political
product is a semi-liberal, Catholic democracy. The chronicle of oppression and suppression of
the nation of Poland helped form a national identity. This identity espouses the main pillars of
liberal democracy: equality, freedom and individual rights. This modern Polish identity is also
distinctly Catholic. It is impossible to untwine the two. Polish Catholicism originated in with the
Polish state in Antiquity. There are Polish Catholic beliefs that are contrary to some widely held
individual rights: abortion and gay marriage. However, in the grand scheme Poland‟s geography
helps counter these restrictions. Poland‟s lean to the west of the East/West paradigm, EU
membership, and liberal rights in neighboring countries, counter weigh some of this restriction
and act as a safeguard from illiberal policies.
This includes the policies and tactics of the Law and Justice supported regime led by
President Andrzej Duda and Prime Minister Beata Szydło. A dark cloud of uncertainty befell
Poland and its democracy in 2015. The Duda government staged various attacks on the
fundamental freedoms and rights. This imperils the notion of liberal democracy in Poland. Yet,
recent events illustrate that the Polish people will protect these rights if the government violates
the constitution or tries to abridge the rights them. Steps taken by the current government to
change the media landscape and alter the formulation of the constitutional tribunal sparked
outrage and protest. Many fear that the right-wing contagion perceived in Hungary might spread
to Poland. This fear remains in the hearts of many Poles after waiting for over a millennium to
gain true self-determination and democratic rights.
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Democracy
The de jure political structure and quality of rights and freedoms in Poland fulfills much
of the operationalized democratic criteria set forth in the previous methodology section. The
government in Poland seems relatively liberal when one reads their constitution. The prevailing
document is the Constitution of the Republic of Poland, signed into effect on April 2, 2997. It
insures the rights and privileges enjoyed in most other liberal democracies in the world: freedom
of religion, freedom of the press, freedom of assembly among other basic rights. There are
articles in the Polish Constitution that stand out. One article specifically outlaws Nazism,
Fascism, Communism and any group that sanctions national or racial hatred. Other articles
provide for traditional rights and freedoms, but seem more modern. It does not only ensure the
freedom of the press, but also “social communication.” Gender equality and minority rights are
also addressed. These are items absent from the Constitutions of many other older liberal
democracies of the West. Likewise, there are a group of articles that set forth economic rights
and freedoms: establishing a minimum wage, holidays and a social security system. These
articles make these standards constitutional rights, whereas in other Western countries they are
only federal laws.1

1
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The Constitution of the Republic of Poland of 2 April, 1997,
http://www.sejm.gov.pl/prawo/konst/angielski/kon1.htm. -Accessed January 12, 2016.
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Figure 7. Democratic Criteria of Poland

Field of Assessment

Criteria

Right to form and join political parties and interest
groups.

Polish Constitution, Chapter 1, Article 11-12

Freedom of Speech and Expression

Chapter 1, Article 14

Right to Vote

Chapter 2, Article 62

Eligibility for Public Office

Chapter 4, Article 99 & Chapter 5, Article 127

Right of political leaders to compete for support/votes

Chapter 1, Article 11-12

Alternative sources of information

Chapter 1, Article 14

Free and fair elections

Chapter 4, Article 101

Institutions for making government policies depend on
votes and other expressions of preference

Chapter 4, Article 99 & Chapter 5, Article 127

Political participation in the European Union

23.8% versus 42.5 Member State Average in 2014 EP
Elections

General Economic Conditions over Time

GDP growth: +96% from 2003-2013.
GINI: -4.9 points over 10 years

The Constitution establishes a three branched, parliamentary democratic government.
Any Polish citizens over 18 years of age can vote. The President is the chief of state, but not
head of the government. He serves as a check and balance on the legislative branch of the
government. The President is directly elected by a simple majority. The Polish Head of State is
the Prime Minister. The Prime Minister is appointed by the President and confirmed by the Sejm
(the lower house of a bicameral legislature). The Sejm and the upper house of parliament, the
Senat, are both popularly elected. Their legislative system is not unlike the bicameral legislature
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in the United States. The Senat is 100 seats and the Sejm is 460. The Senat is based on single
constituency, while the Sejm is proportional.2
The Judicial Branch of the Polish government is established by a separate article of the
Polish Constitution. There are several different levels of courts. The highest being the
Constitutional Tribunal. All judges are appointed by the President of the Republic and the
National Council of the Judiciary. It is very difficult to remove judges from their posts. It is a
lifetime appointment. They cannot even be detained except for a special court appointed by
special legislation approved by the Senat and Sejm. The National Council of the Judiciary is
made up of the First President of the Supreme Court, 15 other judges, four members of the Sejm
and 2 members of the Senat, these chosen by their peers.
The Constitutional Tribunal addresses questions pertaining to the Constitution, rights,
freedoms and general democracy. It provides judicial review for legislation and new laws as well
as the ratification of international treaties. A variety of different parties may bring cases before
the court: the President of the Republic, the Prime Minister, leaders of either of the legislative
houses, the National Judiciary Council, churches, and labor unions. The members of the Tribunal
are elected by the Sejm for 9 year terms. The members of the Tribunal nominate the President of
the Tribunal, who is selected from the nominees by the President of the Republic.
Poland enjoys a higher quality of rights and freedoms than in other areas of the world.
However, there are two aspects of modern Polish democracy criticized by some in the
democratic community, Europe, and the European Union. First, some are alarmed by specific
Polish constitutional articles. Second, there are subsequent government actions. There are Polish
2

Piotr Rakowski and Robert Rybicki, “An Overview of Polish Law,” Hauser Global Law School Program,
August/September 2010. http://www.nyulawglobal.org/globalex/Poland1.html. Accessed January 15, 2016.
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constitution contains some very unpopular constraints on the rights of some citizens. Abortion is
a prominent topic when researchers critique the quality of democracy in Poland. Chapter I,
Article 38 establishes that the government will protect “the life of every human being”. This
specifically alludes to unborn fetuses. Poland is only one of three EU members with an
exemption on abortion restrictions. Others criticize the establishment of marriage between a man
and a woman in Chapter I, Article 18. It is doubtful that either article will be changed in the
future
Since the collapse of communism and the advent of modern Polish democracy, Poland
enjoyed a relatively healthy quality of democracy. This changed in 2015. Poland was plunged
into a constitutional crisis. The Duda regime undertook sweeping political moves against
established democratic rights and practices. Poland was rocked in the first days of the year as the
Law and Justice-led government passed two very controversial pieces of legislation. First, Duda
signed a law to “reform” the Constitutional Tribunal. Many saw the changes as an attack on its
independence and ability to act as a safeguard against a runaway Law and Justice Government. 3
Then, the Duda government passed a law that gave authorities greater ability to conduct
surveillance.4 Later in the spring, the administration took over the power to dismiss and appoint
heads of public media channels. An independent committee had the task previously.5 In June, the
parliament passed new counterterrorism laws that limit the freedom of assembly, allow the
arbitrary detention of foreigners and empowered the state security service, Agencja
Bezpieczeństwa Wewnętrzneg (the ABW), to block Internet sites the government declare
3

BBC, “Poland court reforms signed into law despite protests,” December 28, 2015.
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5
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national security threats.6 Later in the year, NGOs faced a government crackdown following
criticism of the laws passed by the Law and Justice regime.7
Poland‟s Constitutional checks and balances stymied the Law and Justice agenda. The
Duda government took aim at the Constitutional Tribunal. They force through measures to
weaken the court.8 These tactics took the shape of executive action on the part of Duda
personally and legislative acts produced by the Law and Justice dominated parliament.
Collectively, they impaired the impartiality of the court, left the members of the court subject to
the same political currents as the legislature and all but ended the principle of judicial review.
Some characterize the results as “a complete takeover of the constitutional court” by the Law and
Justice backed regime.9
Duda‟s administration broke from established political practice and even rewrote several
the very basic laws governing the Constitutional Tribunal. There were five vacancies on the
tribunal when Law & Order took power in November 2015. The former government had already
selected three of the justices. This left Law and Justice to select two more justices and seat all
five of them. Instead, Duda selected all five justices, replacing the three from his predecessor.
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Thus, he packed the court with Law and Justice aligned jurors.10 Simultaneously, the
government took legislative steps to subjugate the court.
At the same time as Duda‟s moved to pack the court, the parliament passed a series of
measures altering the status and independence of the members of the Constitutional Tribunal.
The new laws make it easier to investigate and remove judges. This leaves the court subject to
many of the political winds as that of the legislature. The Law and Justice sponsored changes to
the court laws also require a 2/3s majority to invalidate a law. The legal change cripples the
court‟s basic ability of judicial review.11 Striking down laws that violate the constitution is
essentially impossible. The court now serves as little more than a rubber stamp for the
government in Warsaw.
This muting of the court by the Law and Justice Party make true democracy impossible in
Poland. From the standpoint of Alvarez, et al and the minimalists, one of the primary aspects of
democracy is the limitations placed on government.12 The judicial review of an independent
branch of government serves this role in most liberal democracies. Absent of this check on
unbridled government power, democracy cannot truly exist. The maximalist perspective of
Hasselmann finds the events in Poland problematic as well. This view demands among other
things a system of checks and balances and a separation of powers.13 The packing of the court
with party loyalists, implementation of a supermajority to render a decision and all around
10
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subjugation of the court violate these tenants of Hasselmann‟s view and model. This tampering
with the Constitutional Tribunal might sound the death knell for modern Polish democracy.
The regime in Warsaw abridged other basic rights. In June 2016, the government passed
other laws in the guise of anti-terror legislation. The wave of terror attacks across Western
Europe lent credence to enhanced government powers that breached several basic rights under
most definitions of liberal democracy. There were several attacks in Western Europe in late
2015 and early 2016, but even the government admits that the risk of an attack in Poland is
low.14 The need for counterterrorism efforts was clearly “imported”.15 Despite this black letter
confession by those in the Duda regime, the government curbed basic rights. This chipped away
further at the quality of liberal democracy in the state.
The enhanced surveillance law in Poland went into effect despite that it denies individual
privacy.16 The government gave the ABW the ability to look at citizen‟s tax reports, vehicle
information, banking records and insurance information.17 It serves as a dark reminder of the
nation‟s communist past. The law allows for covert surveillance based on “vague conditions”18
to investigate an “unspecified catalogue of crimes”19. The law does not provide for any judicial
oversight. The law does not require any type of probable cause before the government
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surveillance.20 It sparked outrage among many Poles and led to the creation of new opposition
groups like the Defense of Democracy (KOD).21
The Duda government attacked press freedom, as well. It forced through a law that
placed the power to hire and fire broadcast executives in the hands of the Treasury Minister. The
task formerly belonged to a supervisory committee. Admittedly, past regimes replaced broadcast
executives, but the Law and Justice law goes “faster and farther”.22 The government stated that it
sought to make the media presented in the country more balanced. They cited that the media was
largely made of parties opposing the Law and Justice Party. Media freedom advocates from all
over voiced the concern and disapproval in the changes. It placed very large, popular television
and radio stations under much tighter control of the government. One of the media companies,
TVP, has two popular television channels. They combine for a market share of 30% and reach
90% of Polish viewers weekly. The other large outlet is Public Polish radio, which reaches over
half the population and have 200 stations.23
The same law also limits two of the most basic rights of democracies: the right to
assemble and seeks to censor and control the Internet. The law gives government officials the
authority to ban demonstrations that counter government approved events. Before, local
authorities had the power.24 The mustered domestic control of the Internet allows the ABW “to
block websites deemed a threat to national security”. The law also codifies a “kill switch”25.
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During a state of emergency the Polish authorities have the power to disable all
telecommunications. These laws have brought widespread protest from NGO watchdogs, civil
rights groups, and domestic political opposition.26
These abridgements of fundamental rights strike at the heart of Dahl‟s consensus
definition of democracy. The premise of a conditional right to assemble undercuts the basic right
to assemble and further injures the right to expression (through protest) and freedom to form and
join organizations.27 The Solidarity movement that was at the forefront of modern Polish
democracy would not have succeeded under laws like this. Furthermore, the implementation of
warrantless surveillance, data collection and control of Internet content all have implications on
citizen‟s rights to alternative sources of information and potentially the rights‟ of political leaders
to compete for support.28 With no check or balance in a system containing these laws, the
phenomena of Polish democracy is in peril.
The final move of 2016 by the Law and Justice regime in Warsaw came when Prime
Minister Beata Szydło new announced plans to control NGOs in the country. NGOs have been
widely critical of the Law and Justice changes to the government, especially Constitutional
Tribunal.29 The President‟s spokesman, Marek Magierowski, called the NGOs‟ allegations “onesided” and uninformed.30 The government half-heartedly justified the retribution against its NGO
critics. Szydło stated that too many NGOs were working under the policies of the former
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government31 and that the government wanted to “clean up the country‟s civic sector.”32 The
measure would leave the primary public funding for NGOs in the hands of a new department, the
“national centre for the development of civic society”.33
The government has fought a quiet, subtle war against NGOs. The radio and television
stations brought under government control in 2016 openly attack NGOs. These media stations
allege that the groups are counter to Polish interests and “lackeys of Western powers”.34
Additionally, the government sponsors competing groups, like Solidarni and Ordo luris. These
two groups promoted the conspiracy theory behind the plane crash that took the life of former
President Lech Kaczynski and supported a near complete ban on abortion. The government
peddles these state-sponsored groups as speaking for the consensus of Poles.35
Duda‟s tactics and challenges to democracy in Poland will be telling for the futures of
both Poland and the EU. Before, many trumpeted Poland as an example for other EU member
nations. Polish turnout for EU elections increased since their accession to the Union.
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Figure 8. Voter Turnout in EU Elections: Poland, EU and Central and Eastern Europe
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According to Habermas, this enhances the quality of Polish rights and freedoms by developing a
post nationalist democracy.37 The President of the European Council is former Polish Prime
Minister Donald Tusk. Poland holds over 6.5% of the seats in the European Parliament.38
Poland‟s broader European political future seems bright. However, Law and Justice‟s
euroscpeticism increases the chances of allowing Poland‟s democratic progress to backslide. The
EU reaction might be the catalyst to stopping Poland from possibly developing into an illiberal
democracy.
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There are conflicting theories about what legal action from Brussels could bring.
Habermas argues that EU action against the Duda regime might force Poles to take a greater
interest in European Union policies and politics.39 Teorell disagrees. He observed that
organizations like the European Union help democratization, but measures like sanctions can
initiate backsliding. Ironically, the final results to either have little to do with Duda‟s government
and far more to do with Polish voters. They could react adversely to an EU attempt to exercise
power over their elected parliament. Alternatively, an EU challenge to Duda‟s unpopular and
illiberal initiatives could garner broad based support for Brussels with Polish voters.
Poland‟s economic performance helps maintain their political system and level of
democracy. This supports the scholarly consensus that economics do aid in democratization and
supporting democracy. Kapstein and Converse wrote that this cannot be left to only a single
factor. Ersson contributed that an economy‟s true impact is growth. The Polish economy proved
durable through the most recent financial crisis.
Poland‟s GDP growth shows a healthy rebound since 2011. Per capita GDP
improved over time, as well. This aided in the relative stability of Poland‟s political system.
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Figure 9. GDP Growth by Year, Poland
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Figure 10. Per Capita GDP (PPP) by Year, Poland
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GDP growth is important in managing sovereign debt. This enhances confidence in the
established political system. Poland finished 2005 with a national debt level of 46.7% of GDP. It
increased to 53% of GDP in 2010 and leveled off at just over 50% by the end of 2014. This
shows an overall improvement and an improvement versus the EU trend. The EU ended with a
cumulative debt of 85% its GDP.42
There are other economic performances that bode well for democracy in Poland. Noted
scholars allude to the effect of income disparity as measured by GINI. Kapstein and Converse
refer to this. Teorell discusses the prevalence of GINI as a factor in the established literature.
Poland‟s economy improved in this regard as well. Poland‟s level of economic disparity fell
every year since 2005. Poland‟s GINI is now in line with the rest of the EU member states.

Figure 11. GINI Index, by Year, Poland
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The collective positive effect of a reasonable debt to GDP, increasing per capita GDP and
improving GINI have helped maintain democracy in Poland. Its performance kept the larger
economy out of the political arena. The largest opportunity is continuing to improve
infrastructure and diversifying its energy sector.44 According to Teorell, energy dependency on
oil is a hazard for most western countries. A crisis in this arena could hurt the stability of the
government. Another global economic shock could also prove hazardous to democratic stability
and quality. Poland had a lower debt in 2009 during the last financial crisis. A higher debt along
with another comparable financial calamity would really test the strength of Poland‟s economy.
It might also fuel illiberalism and backsliding as some of the literature predicts.
The health and quality of Poland‟s democracy might be somewhat challenged under the
new Duda government. This cannot overshadow the political progress achieved since 1997.
Poland never enjoyed true self determination before the late 1990s. One interesting point to
highlight is that despite the efforts by the Duda‟s government in the country, the people and the
opposition seem readily resilient and willing to protect their rights. Their ability to do so is a
characteristic of the stable, well-functioning system in place. Despite the efforts of the
eurosceptics in Poland, the country still enjoys a reasonably high level of democratic rights and
freedoms.
History
Early Polish history establishes the seeds for some of the characteristics of the modern
Polish state. Most importantly, this period established the Polish state‟s Christian heritage. The
country remains largely Catholic. History also provided the seeds for democracy. The legislative
44
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bodies, the Sejm and the Senat, are examples of prominent historical antecedents. These are
referred to in the preamble of the modern Polish constitution as “the best traditions of the First
and Second Republic.”45 Finally, larger external powers partitioned Poland numerous times.
This formed angst over the Polishness of the nation and the state and helped create a Polish
identity. This is a popular topic of conversation in political circles in relation to the role Brussels
plays in Polish law. These attributes from pre-First World War history contribute to the nature of
government, as well as the political structure of Poland today.
There are five political periods in Polish history. The timeline begins shortly after the
death of Christ with the Monarchy. The Partitions of Poland follows 16 centuries later. This era
concludes with the First World War. The Second Polish Republic spans the interwar years.
Communism followed the defeat of the Axis Powers in 1945. The final era is the Third Polish
Republic, declared in 1989. It is important to point out that external forces demarcate the middle
three political eras. Partitions at the hands of European powers ended Polish control of the
original state. World wars gave way to the second republic and, later, Soviet domination. The
legacy started by the partitions of Poland created what Poles felt as “the need to fight against the
loss of national identity.”46
The first century reign of Mieszko I started the Christian monarchy that would rule
Poland in different forms until 1795. The nation and state would undergo turbulence and
different regional wars under the control of different kings, queens, emperors and collectives of
junior nobility. The early Polish Christian monarchy survived the Golden Horde of Genghis
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Kahn that invaded Europe in the 13th century.47 This version of the Polish state reached its high
point during the Jagiellonian Dynasty after the union with Lithuania in 1386 and the defeat of the
Teutonic Knights in 1410.48 This Polish Monarchy was an autocratic regime. There was a very
rigid class system in place. The nobility made up the highest class. Only this 8-10% of the
population enjoyed the rights and privileges. Serfs made up 72% of the population. Along with
Urghers and Jews, they had no rights at all and were not considered citizens.49
Poland developed its democratic ideals in several stages. Jan Olbracht, a Jagiellonian
King, first introduced the notion of democracy in 1493. He created the Sejm and the Senat to
advise the king and serve to protect the wider interests of Poland and its nobles.50 In 1573, the
Jagiellonian line of kings ended and electio virilum, or “elected monarch”51 was established.
Nobles were now allowed to vote for a king. This king was constrained by Henrican articles:
protecting noble rights, supporting religious toleration and convening the Sejm twice a year.52
These minor advances exposed Poles to limited examples of democratic rights. They introduced
the ideas of a restrained central authority and created political antecedents of the Sejm and Senat.
However, their contemporary effect was minor. It was still the sixteenth century and there was
still a ruling class. Prażmowska wrote, “the word `free‟ when applied to the description of a Pole
invariably was applied to the nobility and not the community as a whole.” The peasant class
remained unrepresented and enserfment continued.53
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Democratic and constitutional development slowed throughout the period of Poland‟s
partitions. The partitions and the subjugation of Poland to foreign powers followed numerous
European wars. Poland was first partitioned in 1771, in which it lost a third of its lands.54 A
second partition came in 1793, making it smaller.55 The third partition of Poland wiped it from
the map. This started a period of domination by Russia, Germany and Austria.56 Several
milestones contributed to the concept of Polish democracy in the late eighteenth century. First
was the Polish Constitution of 1791. Then, there was the Polaneic Manifesto in 1794. The third
and final of the period was the 1807 Polish Constitution imposed by Napoleon following his
defeat of Prussia.
The Polish Constitution of 1794 was an important document for a number of reasons.
First, it was Europe‟s first written constitution.57 Mark F. Brzezinski sees the document as the
culmination of seven centuries of “constitutional evolution”. It recognized the will of the people
and separation of church and state. For this, it is often spoken of in the same high regard as the
U.S. and French constitutions of the same era.58 Marian Hillar is far more critical. He noted the
mythology and romanticism in the analysis of the constitution. He wrote that it as “a measure to
guarantee the continuation of a stratified society.”59 Brzezinski concedes that what it provided
was “a far cry from popular sovereignty”.60
The slow slog of Poland towards real democracy continued. The Poleanic Manifesto was
put into effect the following year. This act protected serfs from eviction. More substantively,
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Napoleon‟s defeat of Prussia in 1807 placed Poland within is realm. The accompanying
Constitution of 1807 implemented key tenants of the Napoleonic code. This included more
political antecedents to modern Polish democracy: concepts of equality under the law and
religious tolerance. The document also abolished serfdom. Six years later Napoleon would lose
the Franco-Prussian War and Poland fell under the control of Czarist Russia.61 This all but halted
the democratic progress in Poland.
Democracy, rights and freedoms continued to elude Poland after the Congress of Vienna.
Austro-Hungary, Prussia and Imperial Russia divided what is the state of Poland today. The
newly minted “Kingdom of Poland” still had a Sejm. It comprised of nobility only with only
nobles and landowners voting, but the body had no legislative power. The Russian Czar served
as the Chief Executive. This rendition of the Kingdom of Poland was completely dependent on
Russia during this period.62 Landowners still controlled peasants, who could not vote. Local
nobility enforced landlord rights and could conscript troublesome peasants into the army.63 There
were intermittent, unsuccessful revolts. Romanov Czars dissolved the Sejm countless times.
Russian leaders would occasionally abolish the constitution. As Prażmowska titles one of her
chapters, Poland was a “Polish nation without a state”.64
The Second Polish Republic emerged after the First World War. Article XIII of
Woodrow Wilson‟s Fourteen Points called for “an independent Polish state”.65 The government
was modeled after the Third French Republic. The government had a weak executive and a
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powerful legislature with a large number of political parties.66 Unfortunately, this system proved
dysfunctional in Interwar Poland. Democracy advanced very little most and receded for others.
There was no reliable, consistent democratic leadership. The political parties were unstable.
They pulled in various directions at different times. Different governments attempted to rule the
country with no effect. The first Polish President was assassinated. Four years later there was a
military coup led by Józef Piłsudski.67 This began the period known as the “Rule of Colonels”.68
Piłsudski tried changing the Constitution to place limitations on established democratic practices.
When the Sejm blocked this, he sent troops to the building. He became Prime Minister and
imprisoned opposition leaders. 69 The military government ceased any democratic advancement
in Poland70
The political landscape in Poland was organized chaos. There were various parties based
on political ideology, there were other parties based on ethnicity. New parties formed, combined,
aligned and opposed each other constantly. Fragmentation earmarked the Polish elections of
1919, 1922 and 1928. Piłsudski launched a party, the Government Bloc meant to place the
country‟s interests over politics. Ethnic political groups divided and subdivided, while other
minority groups emerged. 71 The Government Bloc displaced the traditional right. Minority
voters saw their votes being diluted by an increasing number of minority parties.72 These voters
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threw their support behind the Communists, the Socialists or other parties of the left. 73 Some of
this was aided by Soviet influence and Russian Communism‟s contemporary success.74
The democratic result of the Interwar Period in Poland was inertia at best. Piłsudski‟s rule
bypassed the legislature. Minority rights were neglected. The Polish government took steps to
strip the Ukrainian language and culture from their Orthodox Churches. More seriously,
Ukrainians were often victims of physical and property violence. The state sponsored some of
this activity.75 William W Hagen‟s study shows that the plight of Jews in Interwar Poland as
comparable to that of pre-WWII Germany. He quotes Mariam Kosciałkowski, an interwar
government official in Poland, who stated that anti-Semitism was “common” and used by “all
parties for election purposes.”76 Even noted leaders of the Catholic Church in Poland blamed
Jews for the poor conditions in the new republic.77 As a whole, Poles suffered high
unemployment, insufficient infrastructure,78 income disparity, poverty and legal inequality.79
The interwar years also saw external conflicts that established domestic political feelings
in Poland. First, the Poles had border disputes with Lithuania and Czechoslovakia. Second, the
Bolshevik Revolution in Russia occurred in 1917. This changed the political landscape of central
and eastern Europe. Many countries feared Russia more than Germany. The Poles fought a war
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with the Soviet Union until the countries signed a treaty after two and a half years of fighting.80
Communists came to power in Hungary and Romania. Peoples of the region feared Stalin‟s
policies and increased violence from Communists groups.81 This fear led the Poles to decline an
offer of protection from Stalin and the Soviets.82 Poland‟s military leadership turned to Hitler to
no avail. 83 Three weeks later Hitler and Stalin signed the Soviet-German Non-Aggression Pact.
Hitler attacked Poland while the ink on the agreement was still wet.84
There were two large factions resisting the Nazis in Poland by 1942. First, there was the
Home Army backed by the Polish government in exile in London. The other was the Sovietbacked People‟s Guard. The People‟s Guard later helped form the Polish Worker‟s Party. The
Homeland National Council developed in 1943 and became the Polish Committee of National
Liberation. It proclaimed itself the legitimate government of Poland. Moscow recognized it 12
days later. 85 Churchill rebuffed appeals from the Polish government in exile that asked for
British help.86 This changed the future of Poland for the next 45 years.
Inept and betrayed describe the interwar governments of Poland best. The period of true
democracy between the wars was barely brief enough to mention. It, however, is typical of many
European governments of the period, like Weimar Germany, for example. While crafters of these
governments sought the diffusion of power away from monarch-like heads of state, their political
pluralism showed little stability. Large numbers of political parties can make a consensus
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impossible. In many cases this leads to the rise of strong men. In the case of Poland, it was the
Colonels. (Present day Egypt witnessed a similar turn of events recently.) The interwar
governments represented the last opportunity for Polish self-determination. Throughout World
War II and the Cold War, much of Polish policy was dictated by Hitler, victorious the Allies of
the Second World War or the communist leadership of the Kremlin. A clear political reference to
this is the Constitutional ban on fascist and communist political parties. Another contribution
from the period is the growing desire for true Polish leadership and the preservation of Polish
identity.
The failure of the United States and Great Britain to defend the idea of democracy in
Poland left the country firmly in the hands of the Soviets. However, non-communist political
parties, the Peasant Alliance and the Socialists helped form the provisional government. The
communist party was the weakest of the three coalition partners, but wielded great power. Red
Army forces and the NKVD undercut opposition to the party and the party held key positions in
the government. The communists staged a national referendum in 1946 and a general election in
1947. By the end of 1948, the Peasant Alliance was destroyed and the communist party absorbed
the Socialists. This ended Poland‟s post-war political plurality.87
The 49 years of Communist rule in Poland were brutal, especially for the Catholic
Church. Initial Soviet policies in Poland were shaped by moves to make Poland more
homogenous and minimize or eliminate the role of the Catholic Church. Ultimately, the country
became more Polish and more Catholic.88 Stalin was keenly aware of the nationalistic sentiments
of Poles. He sought to suppress this nationalism and any future pressure to unify the country by
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dividing Poland by ethnic lines. The Soviets moved Belarussians and Ukranians into other areas
of the Soviet Union and repatriated ethnic Germans.89 Polish leaders were replaced by Moscowtrained communist leaders. They attacked the Catholic Church, confiscated its property and
incarcerated priests.90 Following the death of Stalin, Polish workers took to the streets. Polish
troops fired upon them and killed around a hundred protestors. The protests spread. The party
rehabilitated a communist figure jailed by Stalin, Władyslaw Gomułka.91 As communist leader
of Poland, conditions in Poland improved to “bearable”.92 Gomułka allowed private farming and
small enterprise and gave the Catholic church more freedoms.93 A faltering economy and
increased tensions with the church started in the mid-1960s.94
Economic problems continued throughout the 1970s and in the 1980s. 95 The
underground opposition to the communist government grew to include several human rights
groups and what is described as a “press empire”.96 Polish communist party leader Edward
Gierek sought to placate the Polish people. He reassured them of improvements in life in Poland.
His government borrowed money from the West and purchased new factory equipment. The
investment failed and price increases were needed to meet the loan payments. This sparked the
protests in the shipyards of Gdansk, led by Lech Walesa. The striking workers were joined by
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many other groups from around the country. The government was forced to sign the Gdansk
Agreement. Solidarity became a nationally recognized reform movement.97
The Gdansk Agreement was the first step in establishing modern democratic rights in
Poland. It contains many of Dahl‟s criteria for democracy. 98 Despite being written in consult
with the communist government in Warsaw, it espoused much of the democratic rights
guaranteed in liberal democratic officiating documents of the world today, including modern
Poland. It guaranteed the role of religious organizations. It provided for a plurality of political
views in media. It insured the right to self-expression. The document provided for landownership
and areas of rural self-government. Most Poles including many communist party members
became Solidarity members.99 The central controlled economy continued to flounder and the
demonstrations and strikes continued. The government made more and more concessions as the
economic problems mounted in Poland.
The neighboring communist states and the Kremlin were deeply alarmed by this and
called for a crackdown. Faced with a Soviet invasion, Polish communist leader Wojciech
Jaruzelski declared martial law. The government imprisoned opposition leaders, former party
members who embraced reforms and other activists. Jaruzelski reversed all of the reforms made
by Solidarity and the Gierek regime. Soldarity was outlawed. Press censorship returned. Soldiers
patrolled the streets. The poor conditions in Poland persisted through the 1980s.100 Gorbachev
succeeded as Soviet Premier in 1985. His policies gave more freedom for the communist
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governments of central and eastern Europe to govern their own affairs. Moscow encouraged the
communist government in Warsaw to invite Solidarity to negotiations.101 The Catholic church
aided in establishing the dialogue.102 These Round Table Talks started the end of communism in
Poland.103
Poland lacked a free civil society, political parties and a government that could be a
“mediating establishment” after the collapse of communism.104 There was only one noncommunist institution in the country: the Catholic Church. The new parliament went right to
work, restoring the country‟s name, ended the communist monopoly on power, and declared
Poland a “Democratic state”. Many of the communist groups changed their names and handed
their leadership over to a younger, less experienced generation. Most socialist practices and
institutions were repealed in the first months of 1990. This included the Security Service of the
Ministry of Internal Affairs (the secret police).105
The different political periods of Poland contributed to the current quality of modern
Polish democracy. The early history of the country rendered the antecedents of the bicameral
legislature made of the Sejm and Senat, close ties to the Catholic Church and the idea of a
cherished Polish identity. The Interwar Period and Communist Period contributed to the
Constitution in the bans on fascist and communist parties and rock-ribbed protections for
religious freedom, namely the Catholic Church. In sum, the two most resolute historical
narratives are that of a Polish identity and the role of the Church. Throughout history, the nation
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of Poland remained strong, intact and self-aware even when there was only a marginalized Polish
state. Understanding the role of the Catholic Church is essential to understanding how these
Polish ideals perpetuated down through the ages.
Culture
The impact of Roman Catholicism on the nature of Polish rights and freedoms cannot be
overstated. Church leaders had a large role in writing the modern Polish Constitution. Today,
Church leaders remain a strong political force. While very Catholic, the Polish people are not
very free. Catholicism and the rights it insures, instills and provides are limited. This leads to
very undemocratic and even uncatholic practices at times. Democracy in Poland is limited by its
strong interconnectedness to Catholic dogma.
The prevailing cultural feature of Poland is its Catholic religion. Lech Walesa wrote that
without the Catholic Church, there would be no Poland.106 It is a defining institution for the
Polish people. Ewa Morawski calls the Catholic Church the “major public spokesman for Polish
society.” Catholicism was essential to opposing communism.107 During the Cold War, the
Catholic Church took a defining role in the political future of Poland. This is accounted
thoroughly in Cardinal Stanislaw Dziwisz‟s work A Life with Karol. Poland, of course, was
intensely personal for John Paul II, a Pole who referred to himself as the “Slavic Pope.” 108
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Abortion, divorce and contraception were common in the region under communism.109 He
envisioned a free Poland as “The Christ of Nations”, which could be the Savior of the continent.
With a Polish Pontiff and a large Catholic population, the Church took an active role in the
creation of the modern Polish state. Catholic bishops had concrete demands for Poland‟s new
constitution. The demands helped dictate rights and freedoms in the new Poland. The church
sought a reference to God, subjugation to God by the state, a ban on abortion and Gay marriage
and no separation of Church and State.110 Most of these theological aspirations for the new state
of Poland were fulfilled. Chapter 1, Article 18 defines marriage as the union of a man and a
woman and Chapter 2, Article 38 commits the new state of Poland to the protection “of every
human life”.111 The Polish Constitution also set religious holidays as federal holidays,
guaranteed religious instruction in school, and made Catholic charities equivalent to its public
counterparts in later articles.112 The rendered Polish Constitution created a Catholic democracy.
Pope John Paul IIs personal involvement in Poland and his religious awakening during
Vatican II played a defining role in shaping post-communist democracy in Poland. 113 The two
major points from Vatican II found in modern Polish democracy were tolerance and the
supremacy of the Catholic Church. Several of the Vatican II texts advocate religious and racial
tolerance is mentioned in. The Decree on Ecumenism, Unitatis Redintegratio mentions the
protestant denominations and the Orthodox Church. The manuscript calls for a unity among the
followers of Christ. Another passage goes even further. It states, “The Church reproves, as
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foreign to the mind of Christ, any discrimination against men or harassment of them because of
their race, color, condition of life, or religion”114 This idea of tolerance is present in the modern
Polish Constitution.
Vatican II‟s produced texts call for unity among Christians and tolerance, but also sets the
Holy See above other practiced, Christian religions. It refers to them as “deficient in some
respects.” Another passage declares, “For it is only through Christ's Catholic Church, which is
`the all-embracing means of salvation,‟ that they can benefit fully from the means of
salvation.”115 Furthermore, to aid in the spread of the Catholic message the Declaration on
Christian Education, The Gravissimum Educationis calls for Catholic instruction in schools.116
The Polish Constitution provides and funds Catholic teachings and Catholic schools. The
Vatican II documents also mentions a regulated press. It acknowledges the great power of media,
television radio, ad film, but warns of its misuse. The document advocates using it to serve “the
cultural and moral betterment of audiences”.117
Poland is a Catholic democracy, but there are limits on personal rights. Polish democracy is
best described as semi-liberal. Many question the true worth of written Catholic teachings in
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Poland today.118 Some allege that homophobia is passively supported by the Church. The Church
opposes gay marriage119 and abortion. Abortion remains a very partisan issue that divides the
country.120 Many are unhappy with Church leaders after it was revealed that some Church
leaders collaborated with the communists during the Cold War. Others are upset and
disillusioned by sex abuse scandals involving clergy.121 Many Poles wish the church would stay
out of politics.122 They question the Church‟s motives. 123 The Church‟s top concern is
preserving its prominent role in everyday life.124 Bishops in modern Poland are comparable to
lobbyists in the American political system.125 Religion and politics and the interests of the state
and the Catholic Church intersect and overlap.
Real ethnic equality in Poland is understandably challenging. The country makes
admirable attempts to provide rights and freedoms for minorities despite being one of the more
ethnically and religiously homogenous countries in the world. The Polish Constitution provides
for the toleration and pluralism examined by Vlas and Ghergina. The Polish Constitution seeks
to establish a welcoming, even religiously diverse, liberal society. Article 13, Chapter 1 of the
Polish Constitution forbids national or racial hatred. Article 35, Chapter 2 protects minority
rights. There a substantial federal laws seeking to implement these core constitutional
prerogatives. However, there are still gaps in enforcement, opportunities to achieve true ethnic
equality and other areas where Polish law falls short.
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Poland has an extensive criminal code dealing with hate crimes. Crimes based on race,
creed, color and national origin have risen the past few years and the government reacted.
Imposed reforms have improved the legal responses to hate crimes.126 The government formed
special police forces with human rights officers known as Human Rights Protection Teams. The
Prosecutor General now has prosecutors who specialize in hate crimes.127 More importantly, in
the past many hate crimes were not prosecuted and were classified as a “minor social harm”.
Polish prosecutors discontinued the practice.128 Unfortunately, these advances in combating
racial and xenophobic crime accompany a complete absence of protections for member of the
LGBT community. 129An Amnesty International report from 2015 states that the police and
prosecutors are not even obligated to investigate homophobia or transphobia as a motive.130
Much of this can be attributed to widespread Catholic beliefs.
Employment rights and protections in Poland are more effective. Despite a lack of
protections for some against hate crimes, most groups including the LGBT community enjoy
employment equality. There are very strict economic rights and freedoms set forth in the Polish
Constitution (Articles 64-69, Chapter Two). This includes minimum wage, working conditions,
holidays and the provision of social security. True wage equality remains an issue.
Many studies illustrate that gender equality in the workplace illustrate that gender
equality, especially in wages, remains an opportunity in Poland. Only 45% of women believe
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enough is being done to fight workplace discrimination.131 In 2014, the World Economic Forum
(WEF) placed Poland ranked 75th out of 145 countries in economic participation and
opportunity for women. This sets them in the top half. Part of this assessment is a wage survey.
The survey cited a higher than actual level of disparity between men and women working at the
same job. Additionally, over eight years of the study, Poland has shown small improvements on
the WEF‟s scale. 132 While better than average, Poland still has opportunities to improve
workplace rights for women. They sit at the lower half of countries in the world and lag behind
other countries in central and eastern Europe.
Here again, equality for women contrasts more accepted traditional roles for genders in a
predominantly Catholic country. A recent European Union report gender inequality cites lower
than needed childcare subsidies, gender stereotypes and “a conservative view of the family” as
roots of gender disparity. The government has various programs to try and expand roles for
women in education and the workplace. The Church launched campaigns to oppose “gender
ideology” behind these initiatives. The report cites young Poles and their interaction with other
non-Poles they interact with and meet as a positive factor in the results..133
Many of these non-Poles, more specifically, non-Polish speakers play a prominent role in
the definition of Polish democracy. Traditional Polish ideals of identity clash with the new
realities of globalization and free trade. Despite ethnic and religious homogeneity, modern
Poland embraces multilingualism. The Constitution declares that Polish is the official language.
131

Magdalena Grabowska, “Gender equality in Poland after EU accession. Expectations and reality,” Heinrich Böll
Stiftung, July 22, 2014. https://pl.boell.org/en/2014/07/22/gender-equality-poland-after-eu-accessionexpectations-and-reality. Accessed March 3, 2016.
132
World Economic Forum, “Global Gender Gap Report 2015,” http://reports.weforum.org/global-gender-gapreport-2015/economies/#economy=POL . Accessed March 3, 2016.
133
European Parliament, “The Policy on Gender Equality in Poland – Update 2015,” 25-27.
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/IDAN/2015/510023/IPOL_IDA(2015)510023_EN.pdf. Accessed
March 3, 2016.

137

It also provides for language rights for non-Polish speakers (Chapter 1, Article 27). Poland is
also a signatory to the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages. Fourteen different
languages are covered. Poland invests money in using some of these languages on TV, radio and
educational materials. 134 Foreign language proves to be a restrictive element in the lives of many
in Poland.
A recent report cites language as a major barrier to integration and the success of many
foreigners in Poland.135 This affects the integration of the Roma minority, especially children. A
failure to learn basic Polish impedes their academic progress in the class room drives high
dropout rates and causes ostracism by Polish students. The end result is continued poverty and
poor social development. These affects are compounded for Roma children with special needs.136
Another report cites the obstacles for other minority groups.
Poles are not used to cultural, religious or linguistic diversity.
There is a very strong reluctance among the majority of Polish
society towards accepting refugees, especially Muslims. Muslims
are often perceived as a threat to Polish culture and heritage. However,
3,000 Muslim Chechens live currently in Poland with causing any public
outcry. This negative attitude, based on fear of the unknown, is alarmingly high
among young people.137
The cited situation of Muslim Chechens and the large number of Lithuanian workers138 points to
both, an ethnic and linguistic dynamic. Geography and an East-West dynamic account for the
different reactions by Poles to these noted groups.
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Geography
Geography plays a unique role in shaping Polish democracy after communism. Their
location provides for this in three different ways. Poland leans west towards the EU in the EastWest paradigm. They opt for a society and laws favoring the individual freedoms denied to them
historically endorsed by modern Catholic teachings. Poland lies safely out of reach for Vladimir
Putin and Russian political interests. Poland is surrounded by some strong democracies, but also
other neighboring countries rules by illiberal democratic regimes or despots. These three factors
help mold the nature of Polish democracy.
This westward influence created a more liberal democracy in Poland. Much of the rights
and freedoms included in the Polish constitution are found in the constitutions in the
constitutions of Western Europe: press, religion, assembly and association. It guided the
evolution of the political system, as communism and fascism were banned. The communist
parties slowly faded as former communists retired and more liberal socialists took their place to
counterweigh liberal democrats on the domestic political scene. Due in large part to their
westward predilection in the paradigm, Poland‟s political structure and landscape now resembles
that of France, Germany and other European powers.
Accession to the European Union accounts for some of this Europeanization The
negotiations for Poland‟s accession resulted in a more liberal democracy. These negotiations
were no small task. They involved the Sejm and Polish government accepting as much as
100,000 pages of legislation and this was the easy part. Implementation and the changes of
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Polish law to align with EU Directives was more challenging and follow.139Unrealistic
expectations compounded the difficulty. A majority of Poles believed that joining the EU would
mean access to Western wealth without changing or concessions. With many changes unpopular,
the EU‟s image was somewhat sullied. Thus, it became the target of many political groups
including specifically eurosceptic parties.140
The alterations to Polish government affected every aspect of Polish life. There were
numerous improvements to worker‟s rights. Employment contracts, mandated time off for
workers and parental leave regulations all changed. The EU directives also mandated changes to
youth employment laws.141 Joining the European Union meant changing immigration and
refugee laws. These laws changed incorporated the EU directive on temporary protection for
refugees. This resulted in more affirmative decisions on refugee applications.142 A large change
to the grand scheme of Polish government was accepting the supremacy of some EU regulations.
EU membership obligates Polish courts to interpret laws in accordance with EC law and the
European Courts of Justice. In the event of a conflict with established Polish law, jurors are to
use the EU law.143
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The Polish ambition for self-rule and their strong ties to Roman Catholicism led them to
look west in the context of the East-West Paradigm. The impetus behind this lay within the core
concepts of “Western democracy”. One of the primary pillars of this democracy is a belief in the
role of the individual. This is shared in Dignitatis Humanae produced by Vatican II. Poles see
themselves as being caught in the middle, serving as a crossroads between east and west. The
Polish situation remained unchanged for centuries: fighting off Mongol attacks, conquered by
Germany, divided by larger powers and dominated by the Soviets. This created an aspirational
environment for Polish self-determination and democracy. In this regard, some see Poland as
“the Christ of Nations”. It was repeatedly crucified by partition and occupation and will return as
the Savior of the continent. Poland is an “essential foundation of Europe‟s true authentic unity.”
144

This differs from the role of the political submissive many nations play in the states east of

Poland.
Poland‟s democracy is further aided by its safe proximity to Russia. Over the last decade,
Putin‟s regime sought regional hegemony over some of its former satellites. Poland‟s location
prevents Russian military adventurism and large Russian minorities from easily entering the
country. There are few Russian speakers and few ethnic Russians.145 Polish is Catholic, where
Russia is Eastern Orthodox. The Polish population has no segment or group that is pro-Russian.
Therefore, Russia has little political influence in the country. The speedy expansion of NATO
and enlargement of the European Union aided in buttressing any attempts by Russia in exert
political influence in the country. This is reinforced today by sharing borders with Germany,
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Lithuania, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia. Each state is a democracy free of any worrisome
Russian influence.
The resulting effects of Poland‟s safe distance from Russia increase the quality of
democracy in Poland in an especially regional manner. These effects allow there to be a unified
voice against Putinist Russia. This is important in two ways. First, there are no large pro-Western
and pro-Russian groups that clash. This can result in oppression of one group at the hands of the
other. Clashes such as these come in the form of oppressive governments that seek to silence or
dissolve opposition to their policies, either pro-Western or pro-Russian. This was all seen in the
Ukraine. Second, it leaves Poland to embrace most of the pro-Western, liberal democratic ideals
of the European Union.
The final role that Poland‟s geography plays in its quality of democratic rights and
freedoms is in political contagion. During the Cold War and early in the post-communist period
this was related to the spread of liberal democratic ideals viewed positively by most people. The
more recent wave of irregular, eurosceptic parties has changed the bright view of the
phenomenon of political movements spreading internationally. Poles see successful democracies
to the north, little democracy and Russian invasion to the east and backsliding to the south. Thus,
the trajectory of most Polish governments has been clearly towards the liberal democracies of the
West. This is punctuated by the military cooperation with the U.S.146 The new Law and Justice
Government‟s perceived moves against some of the most basic individual rights and freedoms
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sparked protests in several Polish cities. Some Poles worry that their new leader will emulate
Hungary‟s Orbán.147 They fear the spread of illiberal democracy into their Polish, liberal
democratic state.
The effect of Poland‟s location on a globe helps mold the true nature of rights and
freedoms in their country. Their quality of democracy is increased by their lean to the west in the
East-West Paradigm. Poland enjoys a higher quality of democracy because of their safe distance
from Putin‟s Russia. However, Poland occupies a place in an increasingly dangerous
neighborhood. A new government similar to neighboring Hungary took post in 2015. The regime
attempted to rebalance the Constitutional Court, implement domestic surveillance and limit the
established press freedoms. Geography matters to Polish democracy.
Conclusion
The history, culture and geography of Poland play an operative role in the strength and
quality of their semi-liberal, Catholic democracy. Though they may be under threat, Poland
offers many liberal rights and freedoms. This is an achievement for a country that is decades
younger than its Western counterparts and formerly communist. Their history of oppression and
victimhood created a nation of people seeking a state. This state is distinctly Roman Catholic.
These two reasons led the country to adopt the framework and foundational rights of modern,
Western, liberal democracy. Poles have, so far, shied away from their former Soviet masters,
who they have little in common with. Despite the decision to look west, embrace NATO and
embrace the EU, Polish democracy is not perfect.
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Their Catholicism is their democracy‟s foundation and their spiritual strength. The
religious basis for much of their democracy, their freedoms and their rights also serves as a
limiting factor. Large groups are denied basic rights in the name of Catholic teachings. Many
crimes are not investigated for the same. Poland‟s ethnic homogeneity serves as a divisive point
for many Poles as well. Ironically, this seems specific to non-Europeans, but not just Muslims.
Poland and its Catholicism evolved into the basic European nation-state.
Polish democracy‟s future looks bleak under the leadership of Duda and the Law and
Justice Party. In terms of political rights and freedoms, the barbarians are at the gate. While
much of the power grab of 2016 is contingent on a threat to national security or national
interests, the act itself is astounding. A country that seemed to be a model for democracy in the
making; a state that produced the President of the European Council now offers many basic
rights conditionally. Many Poles rose up to oppose the Law and Justice agenda in 2016. They
took to the streets in protest and formed groups reminiscent of the Solidarity movement. This and
further pressure from the European Union and other international players might be the only hope
to stave off the wave of authoritarianism some see sweeping through the region.
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HUNGARY
History plays a large part in the quality of modern Hungarian politics. From the end of
communism to present day, its role dwarfs that of economics, culture or geography. It was the
impetus behind the evolution of Orbán‟s illiberal democracy. It is not enough to say that
Hungarians have a long collective memory. They have a strong memory culture1 in Hungary.
Hungary enjoyed one short period of true democracy before 1989. Before this, the Hungarian
people lived under various undemocratic systems, sometimes quite contently. It is as if electoral
authoritarianism suits them. There are other more specific historical antecedents. Anti-Semitism,
Antiziganism, and other forms of xenophobia exist in many countries of the region. However,
few places see these narratives as institutionalized as Hungary. For their part, political parties
and politicians use religion and language to reinforce pre-existing historical mantras.
The Orbán government fostered Hungary‟s decent into illiberalism. It passively deals
with crimes and rights violations against certain minority groups, if at all. The administration
used the New Fundamental Law of Hungary passed in 2012 to consolidate Fidesz power. The
document offers a wide variety of rights, but also implemented supermajority voting practices.
Furthermore, the provided rights are difficult to enforce. Orbán took steps to eliminate true
judicial review of the government and restrain the press. These moves by the Fidesz government
drew widespread condemnation. Hungarian democracy under Orbán is clearly illiberal,
something he openly embraces.
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Democracy
Hungarian democracy is maintained by a constitution, The Fundamental Law. The
current Fidesz government led by Viktor Orbán wrote and passed new constitution into effect on
January 1, 2012. This is the first post-communist constitution in Hungary. Before this, Hungary
was governed by the amended communist constitution passed in 1949.2 The Fundamental Law of
Hungary sketches an image of a relatively liberal, modern democracy. There are some
interesting aspects to the document specific to Hungary. The “Preamble” speaks of a “Christian
Europe”, while at the same time commits to promoting both Hungarian and minority languages.
It also mentions supporting a Hungarian diaspora. The Fundamental Law provides the basic
rights afforded most people in most western democracies: voting, property, religion, speech and
association. It also establishes equal rights, specifically gender equality, bars child labor and
establishes working conditions, social security and guarantees universal education.
The document addresses popular constitutional issues from the late 19th and early 20th, as
well as the 21st centuries. There are articles obviously based on religious tenants despite also
establishing a separation of church and state. Article L of the “Foundation” defines marriage as
that of a man and a woman. Article II of the “Freedom and Responsibility” section insures for
the protection of the unborn. The document addresses more contemporary issues, as well.
Article III of “Freedom and Responsibility” prohibits human trafficking, a large problem in the
region. This article also bans human cloning. Article VI establishes a protection of personal
information. The constitution creates limits and restrictions on spending and sovereign debt in
Article 36 of “The State”. It places limits on budgets versus gross domestic product and
2
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addresses debt reduction measures. Article 37 limits international bailout terms. The document
attempts to preserve basic 19th century religious beliefs while providing 21stcentury rights.
Links to Hungary‟s past are further reinforced by Article U of the “Preamble”. It is a
lengthy entry that names the Hungarian Socialist Worker‟s Party as a criminal organization. It
lists the various crimes of the former communist party, including submitting to foreign interests
and betraying a country. Furthermore it seeks to establish an investigative body to uncover the
crimes committed during the Soviet communist period. Many different states undergo
reconciliation following authoritarian regimes, but this as different tone. It leaves the statute of
limitations on communist era crimes open ended. The passages have a strong aroma of scoresettling.
The Constitution establishes a three branch government. The power is concentrated in the
legislature known as the National Assembly. The Assembly is the basis for Hungarian
democracy. It is the only regular instance of voting in the Hungarian political system. The
members of the National Assembly choose a President and Prime Minister. The President must
be 35 years old and can only serve two 5 year terms. The President deals in domestic matters and
serves as the Chief of the Hungarian Armed Forces. Most importantly, the President nominates a
Prime Minister. The Prime Minister nominated by the President and elected by the members of
the National Assembly serves as Head of State for the Republic of Hungary.
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Figure 12. Democratic Criteria of Hungary

Field of Assessment

Criteria

Right to form and join political parties and
interest groups.

Freedom and Responsibility, Article VIII

Freedom of Speech and Expression

Freedom and Responsibility, Article IX

Right to Vote

Freedom and Responsibility, Article XXXIII

Eligibility for Public Office

18 years old*

Right of political leaders to compete for
support/votes

Freedom and Responsibility, Article IX

Alternative sources of information

Freedom and Responsibility, Article IX

Free and fair elections

The State, Article I

Institutions for making government policies
depend on votes and other expressions of
preference

The State, Article 8 (Referendums)

Political participation in the European Union

29% versus 42.5% Member State Average in
2014 EP Elections

General Economic Conditions over Time

GDP Growth:+10.23 points in five years, but
trailing pre-crisis figures

The State, Article 5

GINI: +3.3 points in the last 12 years
*Not included in the Fundamental Law3

The Hungarian election system is “one of the most complex in Europe”.4 There are
single-member constituency lists and national lists. The single member-constituency lists are for
specific locations: town, village and city. The national lists are published by voting blocs:

3

Euronews, How Do Hungary’s Elections Work, March 25, 2014. http://www.euronews.com/2014/03/25/how-dohungary-s-elections-work/. Accessed April 10, 2016.
4
The Hungarian Parliament, The Hungarian National Assembly.
http://www.parlament.hu/fotitkar/angol/general_info.htm. Accessed March 27, 2016.

148

primarily political parties or minority groups. Hungarians vote for one of each. Single-member
constituency candidates win by securing the most votes. These officials account for 106 seats.
The other 93 seats are disbursed proportionately based on the national list votes and “fragment
votes” (candidates that earned votes but lost their single-member constituency seats). There is
also a 5% threshold. No party can seat a representative unless it is met.5
The constitution provides for a judicial branch of government to provide for judicial
review. This branch is led by a fifteen member Constitutional Court. Again, the National
Assembly elects members to the Court. There are two other bodies that attempt to insure
constitutionality of laws: the Curia and the National Office of the Judiciary. The head of these
national offices are, again, elected by the National Assembly. The President of the Republic
appoints lower level judges. The Fundamental Law also states that the National Assembly elects
Prosecutors and a Commissioner for Fundamental Rights. This Commissioner‟s primary task is
protecting the rights of “nationalities living in Hungary.”6
Hungary‟s constitution maps out a liberal democracy. However, the quality of democracy
in Hungary has come under widespread criticism in recent years. First, many legal scholars,
international organizations and constitutional specialists object to the fashion the new
constitution was passed into law and the democracy it yields. Many warned of the development
of an autocratic regime and a “simulated democracy” in Hungary. 7 Second, human rights groups
have long scolded Budapest for the treatment and policies towards minorities, namely the Roma.
This group is not alone. Anti-Semitism has reemerged as well. Finally, the domestic policies of
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the government in Budapest raised eyebrows of other EU member states and the European
Union.
Democratic scholars point out structural and procedural issues with the new Fundamental
Law emerged. First, the government made the constitution the law of Hungary using heavy
handed tactics. Many view the passage of the new Fundamental Law as an abridgement of liberal
democracy. Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch and the Vienna Conference (the
Council of Europe‟s constitutional advisory body) characterize the way the new constitution
passed into law as “rammed through”.8 Most opposition parties boycotted the vote. Second,
important parts of the constitution unfairly favor the Fidesz government in power. Certain
provisions of the new constitution and Orbán‟s tactics strip much of the democracy from
government in Hungary.
The current system lacks the limitations on government of Alvarez‟s minimalist view of
democracy or the checks and balances of Hasselmann‟s competing maximalist approach.9 EU
leaders in Brussels are concerned over Fidesz‟s supermajority tactic used to steamroll opposition
in the National Assembly.10 A “qualified majority” or a “two thirds” vote is needed in over
twenty instances. The constitution requires a supermajority to do much of anything. Others
allude to the changes to the Constitutional Court. The government enlarged the court and
“packed” it, placing members politically aligned with the current administration. With the new
8
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constitution, the court has little authority over fiscal matters of budget or spending. The court
now has far less power in reviewing laws passed by the Fidesz controlled National Assembly.11
Many view the plight of the Roma minority as the largest deficiency in Hungarian
democracy. The Roma represent the largest minority in Hungary. They experience widespread
systematic discrimination in education, employment and housing. Many even refuse to selfidentify in fear of reprisal, violence or discrimination.12 70-80% of the Roma in Hungary live
below the Poverty Line. Segregation, discrimination and a lack of equal opportunities in most
facets of life are hallmarks of the modern Roma experience in Hungary. 60% of Hungarians
claim that the Roma are genetically pre-disposed to crime. Racial profiling and unwarranted
violence by the police is also a concern.13
The Roma are easy scapegoats for right-wing politicians and targets for paramilitary
groups. Fidesz came to power and the ever more far-right Jobbik party emerged with substantial
support in the Hungarian Parliamentary elections in 2010.14 Jobbik (the Movement for a Better
Hungary) rails against “Gypsy crime” and is led by Gabor Vona, who also founded Magyar
Garda. Magyar Garda serves as the foot soldiers of a violent far-right wing front that developed.
They wear traditional “folk dancing dress”. Their symbol is an ancient Hungarian crest that was
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first revitalized by the fascist Arrow Cross regime in the 1940s.15 There have been numerous
crimes perpetrated by Magyar Garda members against Roma in Hungary.16 These occurred
despite a national ban on the group.
Members of Jobbik and Magyar Garda are not only anti-Ziganist but anti-Semitic, as
well. In 2012, Jobbik parliament member Márton Gyöngyösi suggested that all Hungarian Jews
be cataloged because they were a security threat.17 In 2012, three Holocaust monuments were
vandalized. Other aligned groups have contributed to the anti-Semitism in Hungary, as well. The
leader of the Outlaws Army stated that Adolf Hitler was not yet appreciated, but his time would
come. Another group, Pax Hungarica, made a statement commemorating Hitler‟s birthday.18
Despite outcries from advocacy groups, international organizations and non-government
organizations, little is done about anti-Ziganism or anti-Semitism.
The steps the Orbán administration took were largely cosmetic and did little to relieve the
suffering or end the hate. Fidesz does not condemn Jobbik.19 Orbán‟s government does nothing
about their rhetoric.20 A local Budapest court banned Magyar Garda in December 2008.21
Despite the ban, a Jobbik member of the European Parliament wore his Magyar Garda uniform
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to the European Parliament.22 While many fault Orbán for the rise of anti-Semitism and antiRoma feelings, others point to a larger issue. Henriett Dinok said, “It has become a standard
practice for many politicians to use the `Roma issue‟ as a vote-winning strategy in elections.” 23
Unfortunately, Dinok is right. Despite the visceral message and the negative implications, Fidesz
and the right wing won by large margins in the last two Hungarian elections. Fidesz, its
conservative partner the Christian Democratic People‟s Party and Jobbik combined for over 69%
of the electorate in 2010 and 65% in 2014.24
The de facto conditions in Hungary are far different from what would be expected from
the written law. The new Fundamental Law of Hungary outlines countless rights. It loosely
mirrors the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Many sections of the new constitution
address very specific groups: women, religious minorities, ethnic minorities and non-Hungarianspeaking citizens. The failure of the government, either orchestrated or unintentional, to enforce
their own constitution supports negative contentions about democracy in Hungary. The
conditions in Hungary lend themselves to Diamond‟s definition of a hybrid regime: democracy
without what are considered basic rights. A failure to preserve and secure basic rights is not the
only problem with the quality of modern Hungarian democracy. Orbán‟s other political tactics
and changes support the allegation that Hungarian democracy might be dead.
Another problem for democracy in Hungary is freedom of the press. Throughout 2013
and 2014 the government in Hungary has been lambasted by observers, analysts and members of
the press. Even the head of the European Commission, Jean-Claude Junker, greeted Orbán by
22
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saying “hello, dictator” in Latvia in May 2015.25 The government now has more control over the
media, including a “Media Council” that can shut down outlets. The political leanings of the
government body meant to enforce the personal information protections of the new constitution
are being questioned.26 The government is accused of exerting influence on private outlets to
gain favorable coverage. Reporters are often brought up on charges for breach of good repute
and hooliganism”. Broadcast licenses are denied to stations critical of the Orbán government.27
These steps against press freedom disqualify Hungary from being a democracy according to
Dahl.28
The European Union and several of its courts have ruled that much of what Hungary is
doing is wrong. The European Court for Human Rights ruled against new Hungarian surveillance
laws and practices. They pointed out that the law contained no judicial oversight.29 They criticize
this, Orbán‟s cronyism and dispute the validity of his 2014 re-election. Some say the election
was neither fair nor free.30 Despite criticisms, Hungary has done very little to improve the
quality of democracy.31 They have instead, opposed the idea of EU sanctions against Poland and
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the sanctions against Russia.32 Rights advocates called for a full audit of Hungarian democracy
under the Orbán regime or a suspension of their voting rights.33
An analysis of contemporary Hungarian democracy and the Hungarian democratic
system yields a very unflattering assessment of their democratic quality. The current political
situation in Hungary fails all three of the distinctions Alvarez and his fellow scholars earmark as
a liberal democracy. 34 First, the government seems despotic. The Constitutional Court provides
little limitation or legal constraint on the government. Orbán‟s government lowered the
mandatory retirement age to replace judges with more Fidesz leaning jurists.35 Second, the legal
structure is hamstrung by a supermajority clause. This results in virtual one party rule. Third,
election observers questioned the fairness and legitimacy of Orbán‟s 2014 re-election.
The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) report on the
Hungarian Elections of 2014 is very critical of the election process and question the fairness of
the elections. The report stated that Fidesz enjoyed an “undue advantage” due to tight campaign
regulations, a biased media and campaign activities that “blurred the separation between political
party and the State”. The report points out that much of this is the product of recent legislation
passed by Fidesz. Political radio and TV ads were banned in the country. The ban was later
found to be unconstitutional, but for the election of 2014 media access was limited. Fidesz took
advantage of its role as the ruling party by creating government public service messages that
32
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were virtually campaign ads. The report also highlighted recent changes that “removed checks
and balances” from the current government. The changes reduced the number of members of the
National Assembly from 386 to 199. Government officials redrew the voting districts and
gerrymandered them to benefit Fidesz. The report concluded that the elections were not fair and
advised the OSCE to push Budapest for reforms in their electoral law.36
There are clear fundamental differences between Budapest and Brussels. Many blame
Orbán.37 Most Hungarians take issue with how the government decides to negotiate with the
Union, but not with the European Union itself.38 The Hungarian turnout in European
Parliamentary elections has fallen, but remains higher than the rest of the region.Hungary‟s
approval of the European Union is in line with the rest of the member states. According to the
Standard Eurobarometer 84, pollsters offered Hungarians three choices to classify their general
outlook of the Union as “positive”, “negative” or “neutral”. The percentages of the Hungarian
responses were within two to three points of the respondents from other countries.
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Figure 13. Voter Turnout in EU Elections: Hungary, EU and Central and Eastern Europe
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Like most other member states, around 40% of Europeans hold a positive outlook, another 40%
have a neutral view and 20% disapprove of the Union.40 This is within five points of the numbers
Hungarians voted in to approve of their country‟s membership in the Union in 2003, when only
16% of Hungarians voted “No”.
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There are probably several reasons to account for the lack of change in these numbers.
First, Hungary enjoys a moderate level of representation in the European Parliament. They hold
2.8% or 212 seats. Second, Fidesz is a member of the large and popular European People‟s Party
in the European Parliament. This insures that Hungarian interests are heard.41 Third, there are
large economic benefits that accompany EU membership. Hungary benefitted from a €20 billion
IMF bailout in 2008. It rescued the Hungarian economy from a free fall during the financial
crisis of 2007.42 The Hungarian economy subsequently stabilized.
The current financial outlook for Hungary is carefully optimistic. Financial analysts cited
both growth and expansion in the Hungarian economy since the bailout. Despite tax increases on
certain sectors, retail sales growth was at an eleven year high in spring 2015.43 Following the
IMF bailout, Hungarian GDP tracked reasonably well. This expansion of the economy coincides
with material positives for Hungarians.
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Figure 14. GDP Growth by Year, Hungary
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Figure 15. Per Capita GDP (PPP) by Year, Hungary
$40,000
$35,000
$30,000
$25,000
Hungary

$20,000

European Union

$15,000
$10,000
$5,000
$0
2010

44

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

45

Eurostat, http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/tgm/download.do?tab=table&plugin=1&language=en&pcode=tec00115.
Accessed August 11, 2016.
45
World Bank, http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.PP.CD. Accessed August 1, 2016.

159

Per capita GDP doubled in Hungary from 2000-2015. Post bailout, there was nearly a
25% improvement for Hungarians. Unemployment dropped from 7.7 to 7.1% from 2014 to
2015.46 This is great progress since the double-digit unemployment figures of 2011-2013.47 The
employment market has rebounded to pre-2008 crisis levels.48 Hungary‟s per Capita income PPP
now sits at around $25,000 (PPP), the same level as their counterpart Poland. This is where the
balance sheets of the two countries diverge. There are other economic factors that have not
improved and even gotten worse in Hungary in recent years. Hungarians disproportionately
benefited from the recent recovery. Hungary‟s long term solvency could be in peril, as well.
Income inequality increased steadily from 2009 to 2012 and remains an issue. This is a
recent trend that began after the bailout. This lends credence to Teorell‟s. External, targeted
economic forces from international organizations, like sanctions, can hurt the quality of
democracy. Hungary illustrates that the same forces in the form of external bailouts can prove
damaging, as well.
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Figure 16. GINI Index, by Year, Hungary
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It is important to note the domestic political repercussions. The 2009 bailout also served as the
impetus behind the section of the new constitution restricting bailout terms and austerity.
In terms of these bailouts and macro policy, Hungary is less stable than many of its
central and eastern European neighbors. It carries a sovereign debt of 94% of its GDP.
This amount of debt is higher than the European Union average. Hungary‟s debt is more than
double most of the other countries in the region. A sharp downturn in the future could affect the
current GDP and employment levels causing a crisis or even default. The 2011 constitution
addresses these situations. Articles 36-38 set limits on government spending whenever the debt is
higher than 50% of GDP. They also give the Constitutional Court broad powers in annulling
49
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laws in the event the debt reaches these levels. Furthermore, the results of these acts by the court
remain in effect even after the debt recedes.
The improvements in the Hungarian economy since 2008 have probably stymied the
eurosceptic movement within the country. However, the tactics of Viktor Orbán‟s regime have
degraded the quality of democracy in Hungary. Orbán‟s illiberal democracy is enshrined in the
compact forced upon the country by a party line vote with no opposition. The true harm, the long
term implications arise from the need for supermajorities throughout the constitutional process.
These can be yielded like a broadsword against any opposition working to reform Hungarian
democracy. Fidesz erected a government not unlike that of Moscow, who they occasionally
gravitate towards.
History
History is a large factor in the quality of liberal democracy in modern Hungary. The
strong effect history has on contemporary politics in Hungary is due to a very strong memory
culture.50 The wide variety of different forms of governments and democratic arrangements over
Hungary‟s history had a few characteristics which have re-emerged in modern Hungary. First, it
is important to note that until 1989, Hungary had no real democracy other than the two years of
the Second Hungarian Republic. Second, when the Third Hungarian Republic was declared,
Hungarians kept their traditional unicameral National Assembly. Finally, their long history is full
of former enemies and perceived threats. Some are valid, while others are completely false
narratives that are widely held. Unfortunately, this last fact is reflected not only in written law,
but in the political conditions in the country for certain groups.
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The history of Hungary begins at the turn of the first millennium with eight centuries of
monarchy. This is followed by the Duel Monarchy known as the Austro-Hungarian Empire.
Following the First World War there was a short communist period. Then, there was a period
known as the Kingdom of Hungary. It lasted from 1920 until the Second World War. During the
Second World War, the Arrow Cross Party led the country for a short time. There was a short
period of somewhat liberal democracy known as the Second Hungarian Republic from 1946 to
1949. The Hungarian People‟s Republic lasted until 1989 when communism collapsed and the
Third Republic of Hungary was declared.
What is essentially Hungary and Hungarian started in the first century. Magyars asserted
themselves over six other tribal groups in the region of central Europe. The Magyars fought their
German neighbors and endured a “tug of war between Catholicism and Orthodoxy”. A marriage
resolved this in feudal fashion. The Hungarian monarchy was established on Christmas Day on
1000 AD with the coronation of St. Stephen following his marriage to the daughter of a rival
Catholic, Bavarian prince. 51 Stephen established a safe, functioning, Christian country through
peace treaties, marriages, and a strong government system.52 St. Stephen welcomed immigrants
and embraced the linguistic diversity. He stated, “…for a state which owns but one language and
one habit is feeble and fragile.”53
Hungary was a prototypical European feudal monarchy. Very few people had any
democratic rights, Landowners and nobility wielded the little power they had over their lands
and estates. The first real glimpses of Hungarian democracy came in the 13th century. A
collection of tribal chiefs evolved into a Diet, which chose the king. The Diet gained more power
51
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over time and became a legislative branch that would send legislation to the king for approval.54
In 1526, Ottoman Turks invaded Hungary.55 This left Hungary divided between Royal Hungary,
the Turks and a separate Transylvania.56 It is most interesting to point out that Jews in Hungary
flourished under Turkish rule. In exchange for Turkish tolerance many Jews fought alongside the
Turks against Habsburg forces.57 After repeated defeats at the hands of Habsburg armies, the
Turks relinquished control of Hungary after 156 years.58
Hungary lost its independence to the Austrian Hapsburgs. Despite this loss, Hungarian
nobles retained much of their power.59 In 1608, the Diet took the shape it kept until 1848. It
became bicameral. The upper house was occupied by the nobility. The lower house comprised of
middle class members of specific areas. The peasantry was not represented. In this system, only
7% of all Hungarians were represented.60 The 18th century saw a flurry of wars.61 The start of the
19th saw the Hungarian‟s revolt against Austrian rule and christen what is commonly referred to
the Reform Period by many historians.62 The revolution yielded the April Laws which
“constitute a charter of the breakthrough of modern Hungary”63 and “laid the foundations of the
modern Hungarian state”64. Act IV of 1848 expanded democracy, yet didn‟t really improve its
quality. Many feudal practices were abandoned and Hungarian was declared the official
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language.65 More Hungarians gained voting rights, but there were the expected 19th century
restrictions. Only male landowners of a specific income and certain trades could vote.66
The main contribution of the 1848 Diet and the April laws was a new, modern political
structure that offered representation, albeit limited. The Upper Chamber remained unchanged. It
would be made of nobility. The lower chamber would be made of 446 deputies elected by the
new expanded electorate. This government would be able to communicate with the Austrian
monarch as an equal.67 Shortly after the creation of the new, more modern legislative body
differences on monetary policy and Hungarian military reinforcements would cause Vienna and
Pest to meander away from each other again. Yet another war was fought.68
The Compromise of 1867 ended the conflict with Austria. The compromise established
the Dual Monarchy and began the Austro-Hungarian Empire. In the agreement, Hungary
regained most of its legal sovereignty except for “common affairs” to include defense,
international trade and treaties. These issues would rest with the Crown.69 The compromise
began moves towards becoming a mainstream European democracy. Steps were taken to make
Hungary more open. Minorities were granted more rights. Foreign languages were permitted.
“Nationality schools” and cultural groups were established to help migrants. Quality of life and
infrastructure was improved too. The government started public schools and a public health
service.70 There were subsequent moves to liberalize Hungarian democracy. Laws were passed
providing for civil marriages and the registration on births, deaths and marriages by local
governments. There was also a law recognizing the Jewish religion and providing for Freedom of
65
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Religion. 71 Geopolitically, the Dual Monarchy sought security through a mutual defense
agreement with Germany. 72 The First World War followed.
The Treaty of Trianon ended the First World War between the victorious allies and what
became the Kingdom of Hungary. The new Kingdom‟s borders were redrawn and Hungary lost
territory to various European states. The treaty gave Hungarian territory to a new “CzechoSlovak state”, known as Czechoslovakia and the new “Serb-Croat-Slovene state” of Yugoslavia.
The agreement made the new Hungarian state agree to insure minority and non-Magyar speech
rights, equal rights for all and freedom of religion. Hungary also forfeited all of their overseas
holdings.73 Trianon is considered by some as the “greatest tragedy” in Hungarian history.74
The Trianon Treaty has a tremendous impact on Hungarian democracy and the quality of
rights for some in Hungary. Some scholars trace the roots of today‟s right wing politics to the
“lingering trauma”75 of the Trianon treaty. Some refer to a “Trianon syndrome” that makes
Hungarians “bristle with resentment”76. László Kövér, the current Speaker of the National
Assembly called it a sad day in Hungarian history and a tragedy.77 Several Hungarian
government representatives lamented the loss of land, the plight of the Hungarian diaspora and
vowed to strengthen the Hungarian identity. In June 2016, young nationalist radicals held a
march through the middle of downtown Budapest. The route passed in front of the Serbian,
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Romanian and Slovakian embassies.78 As far back as 2010, mainstream Hungarian politicians
called the treaty “a robbing peace, an unjust peace which was concluded on the basis of ignoring
fundamental human rights and freedoms.”79 This is the basis for xenophobia and resentment of
non-Hungarians for many in the country.
Count Mihály Károlyi declared Hungary‟s First Republic on November 16, 1918.80
Negotiations over post-war borders led to President Károlyi‟s resignation. He handed the
government over to a coalition of Social Democrats and Communists. A Soviet Republic was
declared on March 21, 1919.81 The parties merged and took their orders directly from the
Bolsheviks. Bela Kun, a journalist close to Lenin, became the head of state.82 Their economic
policies mimicked those of the Soviet Union: nationalization, collective farms to name a few. 83
They also endeavored to establish an internal police force like the Soviet Union‟s NKVD. The
number of their victims ranges from a few hundred to a few thousand.84
The Hungarian Soviet Republic contributed to the nature of modern Hungarian
democracy. This is due in great part to the number of Jews who led the short-lived, communist
government. It lasted only 133 days and met a bloody end.85 Entente-backed Romanian armies
invaded and defeated the Hungarian Red Army in November. The Entente engineered a
Romanian withdraw and Hungarian Admiral Mikos Horthy marched his Hungarian National
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Army into Budapest the next day. This chapter of communism in Hungary ended with revenge
and reciprocity. Horthy looked away while military units launched a White Terror. Military units
targeted supporters of the Kun Regime, socialists, democrats, and Jews. Several historians note
that anti-Semitism swelled following the collapse of the Moscow-backed regime.86
The Kingdom of Hungary was established with a caretaker government to negotiate with
the Entente until elections. The government operated “flawlessly” until 1939.87 In the end, it
would be Hungary‟s association with Hitler‟s Germany that would spell the end of the realm.
Admiral Nicholas Horthy was elected Regent of Hungary on March 1, 1920.88 There were
several changes to voting rights and election laws in the limited time of the Kingdom. First, in
1919, the government made a decree that extended limited voting rights to women. Potential
female voters could vote if they could speak and write one of a number of approved languages. 89
Three years later the government applied a number of restrictions to voters. Voters had to
have been citizens for 10 years and have four years of primary education. Women had additional
requirements to be met. Women voters had to be married, have three children or have an
independent income. Interestingly, the age requirement for women was waived if they were
university educated. The secret ballot was abolished in rural areas and party lists replaced
individual constituencies in major towns and cities. The government intended to protect their
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hold on power with the changes. The number of eligible voters dropped from 3.1M voters to just
over 2M. 90
In 1926, the government underwent a structural reform. Despite the initial advances in
democracy in the early days of the kingdom these changes, again, sought to preserve the power
of the elite. The Upper House, known as the House of Magnates, was changed. Up to this point,
the Upper House consisted of senior, wealthy nobility. The new Upper House contained four
different groups. Certain noble families elected some of the members. Other members were
drawn from the leadership of the predominant religions: Catholics, Protestants and Jews. Some
were elected from the academic ranks. Others were senior tradesmen. Most were elected in one
fashion or another. Hungarians exercised universal suffrage and elected both the Upper and
Lower Houses of the Parliament for five year terms.91
A series of Prime Ministers guided the Kingdom‟s government. These prime ministers
politically migrated towards Berlin as Germany gained more geopolitical power in the region.
The government signed the Anschluss with Nazi Germany in March of 1938. This meant
aligning domestic politics with those of Berlin. Codified anti-Semitism came in three successive
legislative waves over the next three years.92 Hungary regained much of the territory lost under
the Trianon Treaty under the hand of the Nazis. 93 This and the reintroduction of the secret ballot
aided in support for Hitler in Hungary. Many Hungarian Nazi supporters came from the
reclaimed territories lost in the Treaty of Trianon.94 This aided the Hungarian fascists of the
Arrow Cross Party. The party was the third largest Fascist Party in Europe in the 1930s. It
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emerged as the second largest party in Hungary after the elections of 1939.95 The Arrow Cross
Party seized power with German assistance in 1944. Their hit squads sought and executed
thousands of Jews.96 The tenure of the Arrow Cross Party was short lived. Soviet forces occupied
the country months later.97
The pro-Nazi Arrow Cross government neither holds a monopoly on anti-Semitism in
Hungarian history nor did anti-Semitism end with the groups‟ downfall. In fact, this anti-Jewish
rhetoric proves to be one of the stronger historical antecedents of modern Hungary. Jen Becker
wrote, “A culture of resentment of Jews, `gypsies‟ and `communists; has intensified.” It is all
historic.98 Anti-Semitism was the intellectual property of right-wing political groups before the
First World War. Three anti-Semitic trends emerged afterwards. They were scapegoated for the
defeat of the Central Powers in Germany and Hungary. 99 In late 1918, a Roman Catholic Bishop
accused Hungarian Jews of evading military service. Bishop Prohászka warned that Hungary
might “become a Jewish country”. More specifically he warned of Jewish revolutionaries.100
This fostered a second trend in anti-Semitism: a perceived “a `natural‟ attraction of Jews and
international communism.” 101 This Bishop and others like him throughout the region focused on
Jewish communists. This created what Hanebrink coined the “Judeo-Bolshevik Myth”.
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Hanebrink wrote that such paranoia was not unusual in central and eastern Europe after the First
World War, but also that the effect was especially powerful in Hungary.102
The final anti-Semitic products of the First World War were associated with the Treaty of
Versailles. These were the myths of a Jewish conspiracy to wrest control of Europe, the ever
popular “stab on the back” narrative (Jews betraying European countries), and the idea that
Jewish bankers profited from the payment of war reparations.103 Some scholars view the Treaties
of Versailles and Trianon differently. They feel the losses of Hungarian lands and money in the
treaties left Hungary crippled and demoralized. It was easy prey to the enticements of Hitler‟s
Germany. He offered Hungary a return of their lands. This left Hungarian Jews “caught in the
middle”. 600,000 Hungarian Jews and Roma were exterminated by the Nazis and the aligned
Arrow Cross Party. 104 Regardless of the cause, one would think that such a horribly, dark period
of history might serve as a formidable warning to present day Hungarians. It has not.
Several authors allude to a common, broad denial of the past on the part of Hungarians.
Laszlo Somorjai feels that history is important to Hungarians because so many have simply
refused to deal with the past. This leaves the country open the racist nationalism of groups like
Jobbik.105 Paul Lendvai agrees with him.
Polls on recent Hungarian history reveal a rejection of any
attempt to come to terms with the past and a strong tendency
to embrace nationalistic and xenophobic stereotypes. Everything
in Hungarian history that was a failure or `unpleasant‟ is blamed on
neighboring countries, on minorities or on foreigners living in Hungary.106
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He notes that only 4% of people between 18 and 30 know what “Holocaust” means.” Two-thirds
of Hungarians believe Jews are too powerful in business. 50% of Hungarians believe Jewish
financers are responsible for the world economic crisis of 2012. 40% think that Jews worry more
about Israel more than their mother country”. In 2009, 46% of Hungarians said Jews talk about
the Holocaust too much.107
Not only does the “iron silence” about Hungary‟s role in the Holocaust continue, but antiSemitism and crimes against the Roma minority continue. Márton Gyöngyösi, a member of
Jobbik, called for Hungarian Jews to be cataloged and screened as national security threats.
Another Jobbik candidate recently accused Jews of using gypsies as a “biological weapon”
against Hungarians. Alarmingly, he won his seat despite this. Other right-wing and eurosceptic
parties in Europe reject Jobbik‟s anti-Semitism.108 Wilders of the Netherlands and Le Pen of
France refused to form a European parliamentary voting block with Jobbik in the European
Parliament. Jobbik remains the third largest party in the Hungarian parliament despite their
extremism.109
There are few peoples more maligned in Europe than the Roma. The problem goes back
to the 12th century.110 They were banned from the Holy Roman Empire in 1501. In 1666, French
king Louis XIV said that Gypsy men should be imprisoned, the women sterilized and children
placed in poorhouses. Spain declared a “Great Gypsy Round Up” in the late 18th century. The
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Kingdoms of Wallachia and Moldova enslaved Gypsies until the 19th century.111 The 1910
Encyclopedia Britannica states that Gypsies “have no ethical principles and they do not
recognize the obligations of the Ten Commandments. There is extreme moral laxity in relation to
the two sexes… At the same time they are great cowards.”112 During the period of the AustroHungarian Empire, Empress Maria Theresia implemented a program of forced assimilation. This
included removing children from their parents.113
The plight of the Roma in Europe continued into modern Europe. There are varying
reports about the numbers of Roma killed by the Nazis. Belinda Cooper wrote that
approximately a half million Roma were killed. The Office of the Commissioner of Human
Rights in the Council of Europe notes that some European states lost half of their Roma
population. Central and eastern European Soviet satellites saw a “Gypsy Problem”. Their policy
included breaking up families and dispersing them to different countries of the Warsaw Pact.
Despite this, even then, Gypsies occupied the worst jobs.114 Even today some EU states
fingerprint, segregate or expel Roma populations.115
Hungary has the largest issue with anti-Roma activity. This should be no surprise for two
reasons. First, the Roma represent the largest minority in Hungary.116 They are a large, readymade target for xenophobic, nativists. Second, oppressing Roma is probably second nature to
many Hungarians because of Hungarian political history. The Dual Monarchy saw them as
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inferior and attempted to assimilate them. The Nazis and their Arrow Cross brethren
exterminated them. The communists tried destroying their culture by breaking up their basic
family units. One of the few consistencies in Hungary‟s political history is a lack of rights and
equality and poor treatment of the Roma.
Democracy in Hungary after the Second World War had an unfulfilled and short life.
This period is the closest Hungary came to liberal democracy before 1989. The government was
started in the adverse conditions highlighted by Kapstein and Converse.117 The country had a
large war debt and indemnities. There were some institutional weaknesses. Hungary had no
political system following the war. However, parties coalesced. They successfully forged
coalitions to govern. Kenez wrote that Soviet support for authentic coalition government in
Hungary was “perfectly genuine”.118 Molnar differs. He summed the period up best. He wrote,
“For three years, Hungary lived a limited and supervised democracy under Soviet occupation.”119
Perhaps, if left alone, the Second Hungarian Republic stood a chance.
The Yalta agreement called for elections. The Soviet leadership abided by the agreement.
Elections were held in August of 1945. The electorate was the most expanded of any in
Hungarian history up to that time. All Hungarians, male and female could vote. Property and
education requirements were dropped.120 The Small Holders‟ Party won 57% of the seats. They
formed a coalition government that included the communists.121 In short, the Soviets needed this
type of election. Moscow allowed the creation of multiparty system to give their future plans
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legitimacy. It attempted to lull the Allies into some sort of false hope, but more importantly it
provided the Soviets with a method to take charge later.
Moscow‟s political moves in Hungary immediately following the end of the war look like
parts of a larger plan aimed at taking power. These moves culminated in the rigged elections of
1947. 122 Molnar wrote that the key to Moscow‟s plan were the certain political “mines” planted
in the different parties and the political system. Historians refer to these political maneuvers as
“salami tactics.” When detonated, the communists could take charge.123 Leaders of prominent
non-communist parties were arrested and sent to the Soviet Union others fled the country in fear.
Communist operatives infiltrated non-communist parties. In 1947, the National Assembly passed
laws disenfranchising large numbers of people: former Nazi sympathizers, people who fled the
entering Red Army at the end of the war and other political opponents of the communist party.124
The stage was set. The communists faced fragmented parties in the election after the salami
tactics of Moscow.125 Despite 49% victory, the communists further consolidated power two years
later.126 The Hungarian People‟s Republic began with the elections of 1949, which were even
less democratic than the elections of 1947.The parliament was basically dormant from 1949 to
1956.127
The Hungarian communist leaders modeled their rule after Soviet policy. This included
forced industrialization, agrarian collectivization and using education as propaganda. They
imposed a state security apparatus like most other communist regimes. In1950, state security,
AVH, monitored an estimated 1.3M Hungarians. 6,000 were jailed without trial. 387,000 were
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condemned for various crimes against the state.128 When Stalin died, the leadership in Moscow
saw fit to relax tensions by easing political oppression. Stalin‟s successors felt “that the screws of
Stalinism had been tightened too recklessly.”129 The Hungarian General Secretary, Mátyás
Rákosi was replaced by Imre Nagy, a more moderate member of the party.130 This was the first
in a chain of events that led to the Hungarian Revolution of 1956.
Nagy had a few immediate goals. First, he ended of softened some of the more
oppressive measures of Stalinism. He rolled back some of the economic policies. Nagy granted
amnesty to political prisoners. Politically, he bravely sought to modify single party system.131
Nagy wanted to revive some parties excluded from Hungarian politics by the one-party policy.
These parties would be known as the Patriotic People‟s Front. This would pursue national
instead of Soviet oriented themed socialism.132 This plan worried hardline communists. Rákosi
organized their support and overthrew Nagy. The following year, Nikita Khrushchev gave his
famous renouncement of Stalin at the 20th Party Congress. Many hopes democracy might follow.
This included university students of Budapest.133
Hungarian University students saw a possibility for change in the death of Stalin. The
Hungarian Communist Party permitted the students to demonstrate. The students sought free
elections, wanted Soviet forces out of Hungary and demanded Imre Nagy be named Prime
Minister. The student demonstration of a few hundred grew into a mass demonstration of a few
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thousand.134 A ceasefire was brokered and Nagy was named leader of the government and started
to move to a multi-party system. He declared Hungary‟s neutrality and withdrew from the
Warsaw Pact. In response, Soviet forces attacked Budapest and crushed the revolution. Nagy was
tried and executed in 1958.135
The 1956 Revolution is a prime example of how history can affect democracy. It is “at
the core of contemporary political culture” in Hungary.136 The events of the nine days on
October of that year played a part in the collapse of communism, figured into the rise of Orbán
and made their way into the Hungarian Constitution. Central to the memory of the Revolution
was the fate of Imre Nagy. Before the end of communism in Hungary, over 300,000 Hungarians
attended a formal burial for Nagy. This “delegitimized” the communist regime and illustrated the
power of the Hungarian people.137 Karl P. Benziger wrote that “Memory culture in Hungary is
powerfully reinforced through various rites of memorial that include not only the burial of the
dead but also the remembrance of symbolic figures who help link Hungarian identity to the
connect of community and nation.”138
Some of the first acts of the new Parliament in 1990 involved the 1956 Revolution. These
included rehabilitating Nagy and others and commemorating October 23rd. It is important to note
that some of the participants of the revolt served in Parliament at the time.139 There other aspect
of the Revolution politically addressed was justice. Many Hungarians seek the prosecution of
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those who collaborated with the Nazis, member of the Arrow Cross Party and worked with the
communists.140 The soldiers who helped put down 1956 revolution are primary targets for this
movement.141 The judicial principles and democratic ideas behind such a prosecution are
wrought with peril: extending statutes of limitation, ipso facto laws being enforced. Yet, the
Constitutional Court granted that such prosecutions were legal citing the Geneva Convention.
The massacres on October 1956 fall under crimes against humanity.
A very recent political reference to the Revolution of 1956 came in 2006, when protestors
took to the streets to show their opposition to the election of Prime Minister Ferenc Gyursany. It
became known that he lied to the Hungarian people about promised tax cuts and fiscal policy to
get elected. The protests were staged at the very same places on the very same calendar days as
the Revolution. Viktor Orbán took advantage of the historical imagery to call for Gyursany‟s
resignation.142 His Fidesz Party staged a mass gathering at Astoria Square and other
demonstrations later on the Elisabeth Bridge. The two locations were prominent in the events of
the Revolution.143
Janos Kadar became the Secretary General after 1956. He knew that the socialist utopia
had come partially unraveled. Kadar seemingly pushed the limits of Moscow‟s toleration. There
is no indication that he ever entertained the notion of liberal democracy, but he offered a more
tolerable authoritarian rule. He restored churches, their subsidies. The government reformed the
criminal code and granted a partial amnesty. When he felt pressure from regional communist
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peers, he re-collectivized agriculture, but he used tax incentives to lure farmers. He is famously
quoted as saying “Those who are not against us are with us.”144
The material goods of “goulash communism” made life in Hungary more tolerable. This
same liberal Hungarian model held the roots of its own downfall.145 Allowing Hungarians
precious nibbles of free market capitalism and very limited liberal rights gave them an alternative
when the economy took a downturn and the Soviet system faltered. Eventually, Moscow
replaced the intransient Kadar and started negotiations with opposition groups. On October 23,
1989, the Third Hungarian Republic, the Hungary known to the world today, was declared. In
the first few years of the republic, the state took great steps in securing human rights. The
National Assembly amended the 1949 constitution which “recognizes the inalienable an
inviolable, fundamental rights of law, and regards their observance and protection as the state‟s
primary responsibility.” It provides for equality regardless of race, color, religion, sex, political
views national or social origin, wealth or ancestry.146
The history of Hungary is a chronological mix of different political leaderships. It has a
long period of traditional European monarchy, a short period of constitutional monarchy,
subservience to a foreign European power, two different eras of communism, a short period of
fascist rule and, now, two periods of democracy. The historical antecedents are limited, but
resilient. The lack of a substantial period of democracy until now seemingly makes them tolerant
of rule that smacks of authoritarianism. The structure of the Hungarian legislature remains
unchanged, but they also retain some age old racist attitudes towards Jews and the Roma. These
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groups historically served as scapegoats and this continues today. Hungary proves how history
can dominate a political landscape and not always in a positive manner.
Culture
Culture affects the quality of Hungarian democracy in marginal, yet negative ways. The
country is largely secular. Many declared Catholics and Protestants would be best described as
lapsed. The co-opting of pre-Vatican II themes and use of the Church as a bully pulpit for Far
Right endeavors are the lone impacts religion has on politics and democracy in modern Hungary.
Ethnicity and language are used in much the same manner. Most Hungarians view European
migrants and ethnic groups as benign. Others from outside the continent or who are regarded as
less European are kept from their exercise of full rights. In this, language barriers prove useful.
Religion, ethnicity and language aid in lowering the quality of democracy in modern Hungary. .
Religion in post-communist Hungary is a multi-faceted conversation. First, Hungary is
religiously diverse. There is a large Catholic congregation in Hungary. It also has the largest
Protestant population in the region.147 One might suspect to see Woodberry and Shah‟s link
between Protestantism and democracy or the positive effect of post-Vatican II Catholicism noted
by Berger and Philpot. You would be disappointed. A large number of Hungarians are
religiously unaffiliated. This unaffiliated group is the largest of its kind in the region.
Researchers attribute this to either church collaboration with the communist government or
oppression by the regimes. For whatever reason, modern Hungary today is largely secular.
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Research shows even those who claim a religion attend infrequently.148 For most Hungarians,
religion is something that has been reduced to the tool of the Far Right political parties.
The pluralistic quality of Christianity in Hungary dates back to the Reformation. The
Reformation was very popular in Hungary.149 Measures taken by the Austro-Hungarian Empire
further distanced Hungarian society from the Catholic Church.150 The end result is a religious
diverse population that maintains a shrinking Catholic population. In 1992, Catholics accounted
for 50% of Hungarians.151 Today, Catholics account for 45% of the population and Hungary is
15% Protestant.152 Yet, the fastest growing number is the group that associates with no church.
Hungarians claiming no religious preference are the second largest group at 27%. 18% state
“none” when asked about their religious preference.153
These figures lead to a discussion of central and eastern Europe: secularization. The
existing literature lends three different theories credit for secularizing Hungarians. First, some
scholars use modernization theory to account for it. Second, some scholars point to communist
oppression. Third, others cite church collaboration with the Hungarian communist regime. This
has the most support among analysts and researchers. The other two are not only supported by
fewer in the field, but they do not stand up to critical analysis. Gautier wrote that modernization
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accounts for a decline in religious beliefs and activity.154 Máté-Tóth, a former theologian,
supports this. He advanced the notion that EU influence indirectly secularizes member states. 155
This simply does not stand up to scrutiny when observing other countries in the region, namely
Poland.
There is evidence that communist repression of religion initiated secularization in central
and eastern Europe.156 Communists in Hungary were relatively hard on religious leaders. Their
tactics included prison sentences, torture and internment.157 Müller and Nuendorf researched the
effect of differing generations and established the age of fourteen as an essential benchmark in
developing religion.158 There is a high disparity between religiosity between the pre-Cold War
and Cold War populations in Hungary.159 However, some facts support that there is not a direct
causal relationship between communist oppression of religion and recent secularization. Many
scholars point to the church reaction to the anti-religious, government tactics.
The final explanation for Hungary‟s secularization was the churches cooperation and
collaboration with the communist regime in Hungary.160 The Catholic and Protestant churches
discovered that aligning itself with the communist regimes was the only way to survive.
Protestant churches accepted the role of a “church within socialism”. 161 The Catholic Church
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often “appeared as an official Church serving the interests of the government.”162 The decision
to work alongside and, in some cases, with the government cost them credibility.163 Many
Hungarians associate church with socialism.164 54% of Catholics today have little or no
confidence in their church.165 The result is a far less religious country.
The secular nature of the Hungarian populace is evident in their post-communist politics.
Religion had very little to do with the transition to democracy in Hungary after communism.
There is a trend away from religion in the contemporary written law of Hungary. 166 When
communism collapsed in 1989, Hungary did not adopt a new constitution like most other states
in the region. The old Soviet-styled 1949 constitution was kept in-place although it was heavily
amended. The new Constitution passed into law in 2013 has the earmarks of a more secular
document. The Preamble mentions Christianity, but in the context of “nationhood”. It lists some
rights and laws that are based on widely held Christian beliefs. There is no mention of a specific
church nor is there any real reference to theology specific to a single denomination. A large
portion of the document addresses practical issues (specific rights in the work place) and says
little about anything spiritual. The document is reflective of the more secularized contemporary
Hungarian state.
Paradoxically, religion plays a role in the everyday, domestic politics of modern
Hungary. Politicians, specifically Orbán, use religion for political purposes.167 Most are not
liberal or very democratic in spirit. Both churches essentially support far-right groups. Catholic
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priests give politicized sermons and distribute pro-right leaflets.168 The Catholic Church ignores
the plight of the Roma and is careful not to confront Fidesz or Jobbik. Reformed Calvinist priests
gave blessings at radical right-wing events. 169 Church leaders from both denominations attended
the inauguration of Magyar Garda.170 This political alignment with the far-right is the extent of
religion‟s impact in Hungarian democracy. These far-right political efforts tend to target
minorities.
The ethnic minorities in Hungary are small, but growing. 85% of the population claim to
be at least partially Hungarian. The Roma minority make up 3.2% of people living in Hungary,
while ethnic Germans comprise 1.9%. This can be deceiving. More than 7% of the population
claims to be multi-ethnic and 14% are classified as “unspecified”. 171 These figures compare to a
Hungarian population 15 years ago that was measured as 92% Hungarian.172 Over the last decade
Hungary became less Hungarian. Many see this as a negative side-effect of open borders,
migration and the older “problem” of the Roma. This contributes to established historical second
class status for non-Hungarians.
Ethnic minorities, religious minorities and different groups of every ilk enjoy basic rights
under the 2012 constitution. Yet, none of it really seems to matter. First, simply put, “migrants
aren‟t welcome in Hungary.” Orbán opposes a multicultural society and fears Hungarian people
“dying out”. Some in the Fidesz government want the ability to round up and arrest asylum
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seekers and end immigration. 173 Many political parties and paramilitary groups, like Magya
Garda, regularly engage in hate speech directed at migrants, along with Jews, the long-hated
Roma and members of the LGBT community. The Budapest Pride Parade celebrating gay rights
was attacked by neo-nazis.174 Newer laws addressing hate crimes go unenforced. Ethnic minority
children are segregated in schools. These minority groups suffer from inadequate housing. 175
Some NGOs familiar with the migrant situation in Hungary see the improvements in the asylum
process and steps towards integration as “window dressing”.176
Another opportunity for improvement for minority groups in Hungary is gender equality.
There is little published about women‟s rights, violence or more of the physical threats to women
in Hungary. Like most other former Soviet satellites, women achieved suffrage in the early
1900s. Abortions are not unreasonably restrained.177 Most of the advances for women in
Hungary came from NGOs and the government under the new 2013 Penal Code. Domestic
violence has larger jail sentences and stronger restraining orders. A new women‟s crisis hotline
was established. There are generous maternity leave options. There are more generous
government stipends for stay at home parents and parents of disabled children.178
Despite government efforts, women lag behind in other areas. Politically and
professionally, women are legally equal to men according to the written laws and constitution in
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Hungary. Women have large problems in public and private sector jobs. Daycare is hard to find
in more rural areas.179 This keeps workforce participation lower. Women are paid just over half
of what men are for equal work despite laws against it. There are few women in government and
virtually none at the higher levels. The World Economic Forum ranks Hungary in the bottom
half of the world and the worst in Europe when it comes to the overall lives of women. In
political empowerment, Hungary is only sixth for the bottom.180
Language rights impact democracy in modern Hungary three ways. First, there is the
legal framework. This is found in the new Constitution and the newer Penal Code. The next
aspect lies in the educational approach by the government. The third and final part of languages
function on democracy is the implementation of liberal language rights and gaps between de jure
rights and de facto conditions. The 2012 Hungarian Constitution ensures equal rights regardless
of spoken language.181 Much like many other EU member states Hungary ratified the European
Charter for Regional and Minority Languages.182 Legally speaking, non-Hungarian language
speakers should enjoy the same rights and opportunities as any other Hungarian. This is also
reflected in the multi-lingual approach seen in Hungarian schools.
Hungary has a law that provides for primary education for children in either Hungarian or
the language of their national or ethnic group. The kindergarten program in Hungary is very
liberal and open to minorities. “An increasing number of kindergartens provide care, nursing and
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education for children of foreign citizens.”183 It is very interesting to note that the source of this
data said very little about the Roma minority. It discusses nationalities and language speakers
from other EU states, but nothing about Roma children. This highlights one of the largest gaps
for integration into Hungarian political life for Roma and migrants from other non-European
spaces
The efforts made by the Hungarian government in terms of language neglect the people it
needs to help the most. The 2015 Mission Report collected material from various NGOs about
language. In summary, much of the information offered to Roma and asylum seekers is not in the
right language. Much of it is offered only in Hungarian.184 MGYOSZ, the largest organization of
employers in Hungary, cite that language is the largest obstacle to integrating newly arrived
persons into the labor market.185 One researcher notes that the difficultly of learning the
Hungarian language and increased xenophobia against migrants makes teaching Hungarian
difficult.186
The difference between the written law and actual conditions of rights for foreign
language speakers is substantial. Officially, non-native speakers are protected from workplace
discrimination.187 Yet, the new Penal Code fails to safeguard non-Hungarian speakers from
discrimination or hate crimes.188 This lack of legal support for language rights is even worse at
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the local level. The 2015 European Commission assessment of Hungary‟s integration plan
mentions a lack of implementation and oversight at the local level numerous times.189 In
summary, minority rights, whether it is language or otherwise, are approved in Budapest, but
mean very little outside of the National Assembly.
Geography
Geography is relevant to the discussion of the quality of democracy in Hungary, but far
greater in terms of the region. There is little to be found in reference to east and west religiously.
The East-West paradigm and Hungary‟s geographic relation to Russia effect Hungarian
democracy in a limited manner. Hungary‟s geography has a greater impact on the rest of the
region. It presents a possible source for a reinvigorated wave reversal of Huntington‟s Third
Wave. In this regard, contagion does not affect democratic quality in Hungary. Politics in
Hungary could affect the politics in neighboring central and eastern European countries. It
illustrates what a contagion might look like from the source.
The East-West paradigm plays a minor role in shaping democratic quality in Hungary.
There were essentially three stages in its function. First, NATO and the west helped form the
initial post-communist government. Second, the rise of Vladimir Putin and his subsequent
overtures and threats altered the dynamic. Finally, the rise of Fidesz and Orbán place the
paradigm‟s effect were it is today. For it seems that Hungary is sitting closer to Putinist Russia
than the United States and even the EU leadership in Brussels. Orbán marked the new embrace
of power politics and self-interest in lieu of many of the founding principles of the European
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Union. This illustrates not only the power of the East-West paradigm, but how it evolved over
time since 1989.
Hungary and most former Soviet satellites moved itself politically closer to the west
following communism. It joined NATO in 1999 and the European Union in 2004. The notion of
belonging to a modern Europe, implied promises and possible economic benefits motivated postcommunist, pro-western regimes for a quite a number of years. Culturally, it made sense, too.
There are few ethnic Russians in Hungary. There are few Eastern Orthodox adherents. The
number of Russian-speaking Hungarians is not noted it is so small. The celebrated “return to
Europe”, the new world order and prospects of western affluence made the alignment logical.
This period illustrates the positive effect EU membership has on democracy in Hungary.
Hungary had extensive work to complete before their membership to the European Union was
granted. Some changes to laws and structure met with opposition. The government in Budapest
cut their deficit, their healthcare system was modernized and somewhat privatized and wages
were increased.190 New food safety regulations were passed to align with EU standards.191
Protection of personal data was bolstered.192 The parliament passed new amendments to the
Labor Code.193 There were large scale changes in the treatment of the Roma minority. The
responsibility was reassigned to the office of the Prime Minister.194 The government made large

190

European Commission, “Comprehensive monitoring report on Hungary’s preparations for membership,”
November 4, 2003, 7-8. http://ec.europa.eu/development/body/organisation/docs/CMR_HU.pdf. Accessed
January 12, 2017.
191
Ibid, 19.
192
Ibid., 22.
193
Ibid., 34.
194
Ibid., 36.

189

changes to their visa and asylum policies. They also aligned their border security with EU
standards with neighboring countries.195
Over the next few years, the economy deteriorated. Orbán and the conservative Fidesz
Party won control of the government in 2010. Relations with the west and the European Union
soured over the next few years. Initially, this was caused by the international outcry over
Hungary‟s immigration policy. The Union‟s demands for reform placed Budapest in less than
good standing with EU leadership. Many have discussed revoking Hungary‟s European
Parliamentary voting rights over their opposition to EU migration policy and contemplating reintroducing the death penalty in Hungary.196 Viktor Orbán drew Hungary closer to Putin. In
light of the sanctions against Russia for the invasion of the Ukraine, Orbán was characterized as
a “disloyal member [of the EU] agitating it from within.”197 Hungary broke with Brussels and
signed a bilateral gas deal with Moscow. This flew in the face of EU efforts to punish Russia
over their invasion of the Ukraine and support for Assad in Syria.198 Orbán continues to oppose
the EU on further integration and migration policy.
It is important to note that Hungary‟s proximity to Russia has little to do with Hungarian
domestic affairs and rights. Orbán does emulate the illiberal democracy of Russia. He and Putin
rule in much the same manner. They differ in that Putin seeks to destroy the EU and Orbán
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simply wants member states to have sole control over domestic affairs. He has no issue with the
free trade zone which benefits Hungary a great deal. In this respect, Orbán is not pro-Putin. He is
Pro-Orbán. He seeks to ingratiate himself to the Hungarian people and the oligarchs that profit
from Hungary‟s economic success.199 One only needs to see Orbán‟s pro-NATO comments after
the July 2016 NATO Summit in Warsaw to see how thin his ties to Russia are.200 It illustrates
that Orbán is not pro-East or pro-West. He is pro-Orbán.
Orbán‟s government plays a specific role in the contagion model. Miller wrote of the
democratic contagion in the days following communism. Huntington spoke of democratization
comparably: in waves. Orbán represents what might prove to be something akin to Cold War
domino theory. It is a palpable example of a wave reversal or Diamond‟s “democratic rollback”.
Hungary represents the contagion in this situation. It is a possible starting point for an erosion of
liberalism in democracies or democracies as a whole. Some fear Poland is already a victim. The
phenomenon does not stop there. Following the Brexit, Orbán‟s government proposed a national
referendum on the proposed EU migration quotas. Some researchers predict a “referendum
contagion”.201 While not a victim of the contagion, Hungary seems like it might prove to be
patient zero. This might lead to other countries breaking with Brussels on large issues. The
contagion could signal a reversal on EU integration.
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Conclusion
History is the dominant force in molding a modern illiberal democracy in Hungary.
Culture and geography play far smaller roles in shaping its character. The press faces obstacles to
its freedom. Women face legal and economic hurdles to equality. Minorities experience
discrimination and hate crimes, often with little recourse. The Orbán Regime oversees this lack
of fundamental rights and seeks to control power by manipulating the judicial branch of the
government and safeguarding their power with supermajority requirements in the legislature. It is
comparable to a historian picking some of the worst of Hungarian history and implementing it as
law.
Much of the deficiencies in democratic rights in Hungary are historical antecedents. AntiSemitism is rooted in the national memory of betrayal by Jews who formed the interwar
communist regime of Bela Kun. This hate and animosity was fed by European contemporaries
and Hitler‟s Germany. The second class treatment of the Roma is another age old institution that
Hungarians inexplicably embrace. These attitudes towards threats to Hungarian identity flourish
today and include similar attitudes about non-European migrants and refugees. Even native
Hungarians are left with the scraps and trappings of democracy and lack a clear voice as the
National Assembly represents an institutional mimicry202 of the Diet under a monarch. Today,
Fidesz is the nobility and Orbán their king.
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BULGARIA
Geography, the East-West Paradigm and accompanying contagion infected the emerged
contortion of Bulgarian government. The state‟s post-Communist government is a mafia state
with limited democratic rights. The situation is deceiving in researching Bulgaria since the
collapse of communism and social democracy. There are plenty of historical antecedents that
lead one to suspect history is the prime influence on Bulgarian politics today. The same can be
said of Eastern Orthodox. Yet, deeper investigation reveals that the common denominator is their
neighbor across the Black Sea. The former Soviet Union and the subsequent Russian state
established strong ties with the country centuries ago, but remain exerting influence through
extra-political means. Complicating the research of post-communist Bulgarian democracy is its
current state of transition.
The portrait of political rights and democracy in Bulgaria today is a snapshot of a medias
res. Russian influence (communist, religious and criminal) stymied the initial quality of
democracy and liberal rights after the declaration of a democratic state. These influences started
to decline with Bulgaria‟s accession to the European Union. Advocates for democracy can only
hope that Bulgarian President Rosen Plevneliev will continue reforms and break control of the
oligarch‟s “thick necks”1. This will give EU influence more time to develop Habermas‟ theory of
post nationalist democracy.2 It can produce freedoms and rights to the point where Bulgaria Is on
par with other liberal democracies seated in Brussels.
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Democracy
Democracy in Bulgaria was established on July 13, 1991 by the Constitution of the
Republic of Bulgaria. The document guarantees most of the liberal rights enjoyed in liberal
democracies around the world: universal suffrage for all persons over 18, protection from
discrimination based on race, sex or ethnicity, political plurality and religious tolerance. The
constitution also bans torture, ensures the rights of the accused, and provides for basic privacy
rights, the right to petition and the right to an education. The document also contains an
extensive number of obligations for the state. It establishes universal healthcare and state run
hospitals. It sets up a pensions and disability fund, as well as financial safety nets for the
unemployed. It states that the state will play a role in raising the children of the country. It also
seeks to provide free school up through college.
The Constitution of the Republic of Bulgaria addresses many of the basic liberal
democratic rights found in other Western democracies. The document, however, is far less
thorough in terms of rights and privileges than most of its central and eastern European
neighbors or fellow European Union members. This is most evident in the number of
amendments to the constitution originating from ratified treaties with the European Union. If
anything, the document can be read like the rings of a tree. The original document illustrated a
refined communist influence. This accompanied the obvious influence of the Orthodox Church.
The pull away from the communist past and the work of post-communist, pro-democracy groups
is evident, as well. Membership to the European Union accounts for the most recent changes to
Bulgaria‟s constitution.
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Bulgaria‟s constitution illustrates lingering post-Cold War support for collectivism and
core communist beliefs. The first article of the first chapter declares the inviolability of popular
sovereignty. Such “people power” rhetoric is common among communist and socialist regimes.
The constitution is hefty with communal ideals and sets out to establish a large strong
government that theoretically defends its people from harms, dangers and even themselves.
Article 16 guarantees and protects “labour”. It creates a constitutional right to a job for
Bulgarians. Article 18 establishes state ownership over natural resources, the right to regulate
radio licenses and a monopoly over telecommunications, railways and mail. Later in the
document, it declares a freedom of expression (Article 39), but this is limited by challenges to
the “established order”. Also, Article 43 states that some political groups will have to register.
The implication is that some parties could be dangerous.
The document has several historical antecedents from its communist past, but the true
dangers to liberal democracy in Bulgaria‟s constitution are what are not included. Article 43 does
not state what kind of political groups will be registered. Furthermore, there is no reference to the
Communist past, past party members or the communist party itself. Many other countries in the
region have bans on the communist party, fascist parties or comparable groups. Bulgaria‟s
constitution does not reference the 40 years as a Soviet satellite at all.
The Orthodox Church left its impression on the form of Bulgarian democracy. The
writers of the Bulgarian constitution incorporate the most basic, and some of the more
controversial, tenants of Orthodox dogma into the document. This is somewhat surprising.
Orthodoxy is the largest denomination and religion in the country, but there are a large number
Bulgarians that claim no official religion, 27.4%. Article 13 declares Eastern Orthodox is the
“traditional religion” of Bulgarian. This despite pledges for religious tolerance and no official
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religion. Article Four guarantees “life” and Article 28 guarantees the “right to life”. This means
opposition to abortion. Article 46 declares that a marriage be between a man and a woman.
These measures continue in Bulgaria despite membership in the European Union. Perhaps, this
will change as much in the country is in transition.

Figure 17. Democratic Criteria, Bulgaria
Field of Assessment

Criteria

Right to form and join political parties and
interest groups.

Fundamental Principles, Article 6

Freedom of Speech and Expression

Fundamental Rights and Obligations of
Citizens, Articles 39 and 40*

Right to Vote

Fundamental Principles, Article 10

Eligibility for Public Office

National Assembly, Article 65: 21 years old,
President of the Republic, Article 93: 40 years
old

Right of political leaders to compete for
support/votes

NOT GUARENTEED

Alternative sources of information

NOT GUARENTEED

Free and fair elections

Fundamental Principles, Article 1

Institutions for making government policies
depend on votes and other expressions of
preference

Fundamental Principles, Article 1

Political participation in the European Union

35.8% versus 42.5% Member State Average in
2014 EP Elections

General Economic Conditions over Time

GDP Growth: Doubled in the last three years
to nearly 3%
GINI: +36% and increasing steadily

*Amended by approved EU Treaty
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The Bulgarian government is divided into the three traditional branches: executive,
legislative and judicial. The executive branch is led by the President. Candidates must be 40
years old. They are directly elected for five years terms with a two term limit. 240 elected
members comprise the unicameral legislature, known as the National Assembly. Members must
be 21 years old and serve four year terms if elected. The members of the National Assembly
nominate the Prime Minister, who is the head of the government. The President is the head of
state and appoints the nominated Prime Minister. Both the legislative and executive branches
have input into the composition of the judicial branch.
The judicial branch provides judicial review and oversight of the government. Three
main courts exist in addition to courts in the various localities. The three most important courts
are the Supreme Court of Cassation, the Supreme Administrative Court and the Constitutional
Court. The chief justices are appointed by the President for five year terms. After that, they can
remain on the court until they are 65 years old. The Supreme Judicial Council is chaired by the
Justice Minister and selects judges for the courts. The Supreme Court of Cassation over sees the
conduct of justice within the courts system. The Supreme Administrative court oversees the
government and the Council of Ministers, the President‟s cabinet. The Constitutional Court
provides the true judicial oversight. This court is comprised of 12 justices. Four are elected by
the National Assembly. Four justices are appointed by the President. The final four remaining
justices are selected by the Supreme Courts or Cassation and Administrative Law.
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The largest challenge to Bulgarian democracy is corruption. The Bulgarian government
was infiltrated by modern day gangsters after the Cold War. 3 These crime organizations
misused and plundered money given to Bulgaria in efforts to revitalize its economy and
modernize the country. Corruption in Bulgaria is three times higher than the European Union
average.4 These criminal organizations embezzle cash, commit tax fraud and circumvent
countless other violations of domestic and international law. 5 The Mafia in Bulgaria is deeply
involved in contraband cigarettes, human trafficking and illicit drugs (heroin and amphetamines).
These groups “exercise a considerable influence over the economic activities in the country.” 6
This makes their support important to politicians. This level of corruption is a threat to
Bulgaria‟s sovereignty. 7 A U.S. intelligence memo from 2005 noted that corruption infects all
three branches of Bulgarian government. Mob bosses have purchased their way into the political
arena.8 More recent analysis by Moisés Naím cites that “the national interests and the interests of
organized crime are now inextricably intertwined.”
The EU investigated Bulgaria various times for government fraud, but some say Brussels
has made matters worse. 9 Critics say that Bulgaria reverted to totalitarianism in 2009 with the
election of Boyko Borisov to Prime Minister. Borisov still has connections to the former
communists who are important figures in the underworld. 10 Many of these men were former
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communists who “are fond of European money, but not European regulations.” 11 In 2008, the
European Commission cancelled hundreds of millions of dollars in aid to Bulgaria due to
corruption concerns.12 These types of punishments were the impetus for stronger efforts on the
part of the Bulgarian government to wipe out corruption and curtail their money making
schemes, like drug trafficking.13 Yet, there has been little progress made.14 Naím characterizes
Bulgaria as a mafia state.15 A Bulgarian politician was quoted as saying that “other countries
have the mafia; in Bulgaria the mafia has the country.”16
The mafia in Bulgaria is intertwined with the government. The Bulgarian mafia, as it is
today, was started by former state security leaders. They had taken bribes and allowed the drug
smuggling during the communist era. When communism collapsed throughout the region, they
were already in business. Illicit drugs are a big business for the mafia in Bulgaria, which makes
the situation complicated. The depth of the involvement in government by the mafia is
incredible. It is on every level. Some fear that the country might not be able to exist without it.17
The corruption in Bulgaria damaged public confidence in both parties. Representatives
from every part of the political spectrum participate in corruption. Members of GERB, the
center-right party, and its main opposition the Socialists have each had high profile allegations
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and revelations about involvement in dirty politics, cronyism and ties to organized crime.18 Some
Bulgarians turned to alternative parties. One of these parties was ATAKA. The party drew on
principles of both the far left and far right. It emerged as the union between splinter groups from
across the political spectrum in 2005. Instead of debating ideology and politics, the group took to
capitalizing on the malaise of the country.19
ATAKA attacked the status quo, the established political system and its associated
corruption. Along the way, a dangerous nationalism rose. ATAKA used “a discourse of ethnic
and religious intolerance to garner popular support on the far right for what is essentially a farleft political agenda.”20They openly declare the infallibility of the state, a ban on all nonBulgarian language and leaving NATO. At the same time, the party calls for a very robust set of
social programs and state that these programs take precedence over military spending.21 Much of
their platform might sound soft-eurosceptic albeit extreme. However, they are not eurosceptic
and make no mistake they are a far-right group.
ATAKA is vocally critical of ethnic minorities and the Roma.22 The party founder Volen
Siderov blames the recent increase in crime, which he cannot factually support, with
international organizations that tell people that come to Bulgaria that they “should act
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differently.” He declared that “Racism was never an issue in Bulgaria. However when crime
rates rise, and all this crime originates with these ethnic groups, people start having negative
sentiments. So there is not a single village in Bulgaria that has not been robbed by Gypsy
groups.”23 This extremism appealed to many Bulgarians. Many attended ATAKA‟s
Independence Day political rallies.24 In June 2005, the party garnered 8.8% of the national vote.
In 2014, their support slipped to 4.5%.25 The party has not seen the popularity it did before
Bulgaria‟s accession to the European Union.
Membership to the EU has a positive effect on Bulgaria‟s transition to higher quality
democracy. The transition from mafia state to true liberal democracy in Bulgaria is slow. Union
membership accounts for the most recent advances in liberal democratic rights in the country.
Article 4 commits Bulgaria to aid in the building and integration of the EU. The National
Assembly amended Article 22 granting land rights for foreigners. Article 85 establishes the
mechanics for integrating EU treaties and policies into Bulgarian law. Articles 42 and 105 sets
the parameters for Bulgarians electing Ministers to the European Parliament and how the
ministers work with the government on Sofia. Bulgarian President Plevneliev voiced his support
for EU policies as a whole and endorsed the idea of a closer Europe. He advocates for greater
European solidarity in the face of the migrant crisis and other matters, like fighting organized
crime.26
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Bulgaria is a very pro-EU country. 51% of Bulgarians have a positive opinion of the
European Union. Most of their opinions about Brussels‟ policies are more pro-EU than most
other members states. The only notable objection is to adopting the common currency. 27 This
approval of the Union is also evident in their participation in EU elections.

Figure 18. Voter Turnout in EU Elections: Bulgaria, EU and Central and Eastern Europe
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Unfortunately, Eurobarometer 85 highlights what most Bulgarians are concerned over: their
economy. Unemployment and the economic situation in their home country is the largest concern
Bulgarians have by far. Concerns over immigration are half of what they are in other member
states. Fears about terrorism barely register in the study. 29
Economics are problematic for Bulgaria. In many cases, economics cause problems for
developing democracies. In Bulgaria‟s case, the slowly developing democracy caused economic
problems. The “legacy issues” from the early post-communist period, the crisis in 2008 and the
political instability of 2013-14 have hampered the development of Bulgaria‟s fledgling free
market economy.30 This partially accounts for being the poorest country in the European Union
with one of the highest degrees of income inequality. Regionally, only parts of former
Yugoslavia have a lower per capita GDP. 31
The sovereign debt crisis hit Bulgaria very hard. Unemployment rate jumped nearly 30%
from 2009-2010. 32 Both the labor market and the economic structure of the country have
problems. Large numbers of younger people are leaving Bulgaria for other countries. Low labor
participation and skills mismatches are problematic, too. This leads to the problems endemic to
other parts of Europe suffering from “greying”. Large numbers of the disabled and elderly are at
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risk. The healthcare system faces major financial challenges.33 Bulgaria is now the oldest country
in Europe and faces the sharpest decline of in the number of working age persons in the world.34

Figure 19. Per Capita GDP (PPP) by Year, Bulgaria
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Figure 20. GINI Index, by Year, Bulgaria
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The structural problems are few, but large. The Bulgarian financial system is
unpredictable at best and seen as unsupportive to business. There was a domestic banking crisis
in 2014 and there are still few reforms in place. The economy lacks structure and safeguards,
especially in pensions and banking. Companies are leery of entering a marketplace or labor
market with a reputation for corruption like Bulgaria‟s. The legal framework and justice system
are view with skepticism by those with foreign dollars. The lack of speed in instituting reforms
and positive change simply compound the existing problems. There are substantial risks to the
economy of the country despite improvements over the last few years. 37
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There are short term positives results. Today, the unemployment rate sits at 9.2%. This is
lower than the European Union average. This measure improved over the last three years.38
Overall GDP growth increased over the last few years. The European Commission predicts
higher than normal GDP growth in the next few years. 39

Figure 21. GDP Growth by Year, Bulgaria
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Bulgaria saw a 20% increase in foreign direct investment in 2015. So far two large companies
including Coca-Cola opened manufacturing plants in the country in 2016. Chinese companies are
looking to invest, as well.41 Additionally, the country has improved its greenhouse gas emissions.
This enables more energy efficiency and independence. 42 Other projects are simply waiting on
further reforms. Eliminating inefficiency in government and barriers to commerce will enhance
foreign trade. (Four of the top five trading partners are EU members.43) This will foster better
relations with other Union members and increase the integration of Bulgaria to the rest of
Europe.
The supersession of criminal interests over that of the Bulgarian people defines the lack
of democracy in Bulgaria. It is the antithesis of Dahl‟s expanded notion of governmental
responsiveness.44 Sofia experienced this democratic deficiency multiple times. First, there were a
series of anti-mafia protests that turned violent in 2013. While political in nature, the protests
targeted the entire system of graft and corruption instead of particular political parties.45 Little
has changed. Second, attempts by reform forces within the government to end corruption have
stalled in the National Assembly. A report to the European Commission and European
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Parliament points out that legislation to fight corruption and organized crime stalled. Observers
and the people of Bulgaria wait for legislation introduced two years ago.46
Bulgaria fits neither Hasselmann‟s maximalist definition of democracy nor that of
Alvarez and his fellow scholars. A main component of Hasselmann‟s notion is checks and
balances.47 There are no checks and balances when judges are bribed and participating in
corruption. Additionally, there is no separation of powers if the power is resting with a group of
oligarchs that hold sway over large, different parts of the government. This second aspect of the
nature of Bulgarian politics can be applied to Alvarez‟s minimalist notion.48 The people who
make the laws are not acting for the will of the people. They are acting out of self-interest.
An interview with Bulgarian President Plevneliev in April 2016 created the feeling that
Bulgaria is a country in transition. All the forces seem to be at work to create a true liberal
democracy, but it is highly questionable if enough will change in the country to achieve it. The
people are pro-European and look towards closer ties to other European countries through trade
and economic opportunities. The President, who is an independent, seems ready to continue
trying to reform domestic politics in Sofia. The European Union and its member states, as well as
the United States could provide willing partners in democratic development. The question is if
these forces can combine to eliminate the power of organized crime. It stands in the way of
foreign direct investment from the private sector. It earns the country skepticism from
organizations like the EU who have the ability to help. A healthy economy and strong democracy

46

European Commission, On Progress in Bulgaria under the Co-operation and Verification Mechanism, January 28,
2016, 7-8. http://ec.europa.eu/cvm/docs/com_2015_36_en.pdf. Accessed August 13, 2016.
47
Hasselmann, Policy Reform and the Development of Democracy in Eastern Europe, 25.
48
Alvarez, et al, “Classifying Political Regimes,” 4.

208

with liberal rights n stop the exodus of working age Bulgarians and diffuse the octogenarian time
bomb Bulgaria perches on.
History
Bulgaria existed in different forms before the first millennium. The First Bulgarian
Empire was established in 681 by a Bulgar noble named Aspruch. It was the standard medieval
arrangement with boyars occupying councils and an assembly with tribal chiefs.49 Two hundred
years later, one of Aspruch‟s successors, Boris I, sought a national religion. He decided on
Eastern Orthodox.50 This started the Bulgarian tradition of Orthodoxy that exists to this day. In
1018, Byzantine Emperor Basil II incorporated Bulgaria into his empire.51 Tsar Peter II and his
brother defeated Byzantine forces and started the Second Bulgarian Empire.52 This lasted until
the 14th century when the Ottoman Turks defeated the Bulgarians. Turkish rule lasted some 400
years.53 In the 18th century Russia earned the right to protect Orthodox Christians in the Balkans.
For this Bulgaria grew closer to their fellow Orthodox in Russia.54
The 19th century saw a flurry of development in Bulgaria highlighted by their
independence and their first of four constitutions. Early in the century, Bulgarians elected
councils to communicate with the Turks and Greeks. They started schools that taught Bulgarian
language. Bulgarians gained an independent Bulgarian Orthodox Church in 1849.55 In March
1878, Russia and the Ottoman Empire signed the Treaty of San Stefano at the end of the RussoTurkish War. The treaty gave independence to Serbia, Montenegro, Romania and Bulgaria.
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Bulgaria was “intrusted for two years to an Imperial Russian commissioner” until Bulgaria
elected a prince. Turkish troops withdrew from Bulgaria. Russian troops remained until the
Bulgarian militia could stand up.56 The Treaty of Berlin signed shortly thereafter revised San
Stefano and clarified that Bulgaria would be an “autonomous tributary principality” of the
Ottoman Empire.57
This initiated the Third Bulgarian State. Their first order of business under the watch of
Russian Administrator General Prince Aleksander Dondukov-Kosakov was writing a
constitution. The Turnovo Constitution established the Principality of Bulgaria. The Constitution
was written at a Grand National Assembly comprised of 231 delegates. 89 were elected. The
Russian Administrator chose some delegates, as well. Orthodox bishops, the Muslim Chief Mufit
and Grand Jewish Rabbi were included. The rendered Turnovo Constitution was “one of the
most democratic in Europe”. It provided for freedom of speech, press, and assembly. It outlawed
slavery and called for compulsory education for boys and girls. Liberals in the assembly
defeated attempts to establish an upper house. This created a unicameral legislature.58
It was not without weakness. Power was concentrated in the monarchy. The monarch
could dissolve National Assembly and held the legislative prerogative. The Council of Ministers
could legislate by royal order. The judiciary acted on behalf of the monarch.59 The result was that
clashes erupted because the Prince was so strong. Most of the Princes and members of the
executive branch were Russian nobility. The prince eventually used the power to reduce the
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number of members of the National Assembly, curtailed civil liberties and created authoritarian
rule.60
Bulgarian declared its full independence from the Ottoman Empire in 1908 and entered a
period of three different wars: the two Balkan Wars and the First World War. 61

Russia and

Germany courted Bulgaria for their support. Germany paid Bulgaria to join the Central Powers.
Most Bulgarians were pro-Russian. The government used martial law to shutdown newspapers,
retired pro-Russian Generals and started German propaganda. Bulgaria joined the fighting in
1915.62 Opposition to the war led to the birth of the modern Bulgarian communist party. The
Bulgarian “Narrow Socialist” Party joined the Communist international started by Soviet leader
Vladimir Lenin. They changed their name to the Bulgarian Communist Party. In 1919, the party
took 47 of 236 seats in the National Assembly and became the second largest party in Bulgaria.63
The Treaty of Nuilly concluded the First World War between Bulgaria and the victorious
Triple Entente. The results for Bulgaria were similar to that of the other Central Powers. They
lost territory. The treaty limited the size of their military and manufacture of weapons. Bulgaria
acknowledged newly formed Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia as well as the protectorates of
Morocco and Egypt. Bulgaria adopted several of Woodrow Wilson‟s Fourteen Points. These
represented changes to the liberal rights afforded some in the country. It guaranteed religious
freedom, minority rights and equality before the law. Another large change was the obligation to
provide education in languages other than Bulgarian. 64
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The Interwar Period in Bulgaria was a turbulent political period earmarked by coups and
uprisings by democratic factions, socialists, the communist party and members of the military. In
1923, Macedonian radicals captured and executed Prime Minister Aleksander Stamboliiski.65
The communist uprising ended after they bombed a church and killed 100 people.66 The period
was also punctuated by a reeling economy and rampant corruption (illegal drugs, weapons and
embezzlement). The political system was paralyzed to act against it. In 1934, Zveno, a group of
social democrats backed by the military, overthrew the government. They banned political
parties, replaced elected officials with appointees, dissolved the parliament and strengthened the
role of the church.67
In 1937, King Boris III restarted local elections. The following year, elections for the
National Assembly were allowed using new election laws. Communists were banned from
running. This was unenforceable. Political parties were still illegal. There was a literacy
requirement for voting. For the first time, women could vote, but only if they were married or
widowed. The elections were not fair or free. The government selectively used the ban on
political parties to disqualify candidates opposing the government.68 At the same time, Germany
signed the Non-Aggression Pact with the Soviet Union. Due to this and less censorship,
communists had a strong showing in elections the following year. The 1939 elections were
neither fair nor free either. 69
Germany offered Bulgaria restoration of traditional lands the country lost after the First
World War. Unfortunately, anti-Semitic tactics followed from the government in Sofia. The
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National Assembly passed “Law for the Defense of the Nation”. They were Bulgaria‟s version of
the Nuremburg Laws that stripped Jews of many of their basic rights.70 Other laws passed later:
restrictions of movement, special taxes, confining Jews to ghettos. When it came time for
Bulgaria to deport their Jews as part of Hitler‟s Final Solution, there was an outrage led by the
Orthodox clergy and dissenting members of the National Assembly.71 Eventually, Boris II and
the royal family intervened and prevented the 50,000 or so Jews in Bulgaria proper from being
deported to concentration camps.72
The situation became very complicated when Germany attacked the Soviet Union. This
plunged Bulgaria into violence. Communists in Bulgaria organized into bands of partisans. One
of the more popular groups was called the Fatherland Front. They attacked government buildings
and assassinated government figures. They were joined by the Jews. Soon, every anti-Fascist and
anti-German faction was fighting the government as partisans. The Soviet Union and other Allies
sent aid and officers to fight alongside the partisans, too.73 The government collapsed in May of
1944.74 The situation in the streets became more dangerous. Now, Bulgarian soldiers, German
forces and the partisans were all fighting each other.
The Soviets declared war on Bulgaria on September 5, 1944. Four days later there was a
communist coup and the streets of Sofia were drenched in blood. 30,000 Bulgarians were
executed in two months of “spontaneous purge campaigns”. Stalin directed the communist forces
to target politicians, judges and non-communist activists in a “judiciary purge campaign”.75 Half
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the members of the National Assembly were executed.76 In spring of 1945 and other 2,730 death
sentences were summarily carried out.77 Many partisans gained positions in the new government
or the new communist Bulgarian Worker‟s Party after the coup.
The new government attempted to impose an un-Soviet socialism called the “People‟s
Democracy.” It had all of the trappings of a social democracy: party pluralism, a free press and
other basic fundamental freedoms, including private property. Stalin admonished him personally
for it.78 Soon after, the Bulgarian communists took its cues directly from Moscow.79 They
completely ignored the existing constitution. They ruled using decrees, issuing new laws and
amending current ones.80After rigged elections the opposition parties boycotted, the communist
government abolished the monarchy.81 On December 4, 1947, they adopted a new constitution.82
The new constitution was Bulgaria‟s second. It is known as the Dimitrov Constitution,
named for the Chairman of the Central Committee of the Bulgarian Communist Party, Georgi
Dimitrov. The document was modeled after the Soviet Constitution of 1936. It proclaimed the
new People‟s Republic of Bulgaria. It placed much of the economy under state control. It
outlawed public ownership “at the detriment of public interest”. Executive power was exercised
by the Council of Ministers with no judicial oversight. The legislative body was now the
Presidium of the National Assembly. It replaced the Supreme Court of Cassation and Supreme
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Administrative Court with a single Supreme Court. Despite having many rights included in the
document, there was nothing democratic about life in Bulgaria under communism. 83
Communist life in Bulgaria was different than in other Soviet-styled states. Bulgarian
communists operated an oppressive state to be sure. Between 1944 and 1962, 285,000 Bulgarians
were sent to concentration camps.84 Yet, the regime softened after Stalin‟s death. There was
some private property permitted. 80% of households owned their home or apartment. Most farms
were never nationalized. There were healthy expenditures on education. Bulgaria had a large
network of government run hospitals. More than half of Bulgarians enjoyed relatively nice
vacations with their families at beaches or mountain resorts. There was no unemployment.
Furthermore, a “soft socialism” in the 1970s started in the 1960s when the concentration camps
were closed. Much of this was due to robust economic times based on and a steady Soviet market
for Bulgarian exports and cheap Russian oil.85
The history of Bulgaria presents two linked and constant historical antecedents to modern
Bulgarian democracy: the Orthodox Church and Russian influence. At several different points in
history, political figures used the power of religion to their advantage. The Trunovo Constitution
included Orthodox bishops into the Grand National Assembly. Later, Zveno bolstered their
power by incorporating the Orthodox Church into their government system in 1934. This
prominence of The Church still exists today. A related historical phenomenon repetitiously
presents itself throughout Bulgarian history: the Russians.
Russia established strong bonds with its little Orthodox cousin, Bulgaria, very early in its
history. The official declaration of this relationship occurred in the 18th century although it
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already existed and can be found in Tsar Peter II‟s earlier defense of Bulgaria from the western
Orthodoxy of Byzantium. This ecclesiastical based relationship manifested itself in the secular
relationship between the two states over time. Thus, while Bulgaria and Russia shared much in
the way of politics in the past, the true cohesive force was The Church. This presents ample
material to study in terms of the East-West Paradigm for Bulgaria.
The leader of Bulgaria for most of the period of “soft socialism” was Todor Zhivkov.86
His regime introduced Bulgaria‟s third constitution in 1971. It confirmed the single party state. It
ended the separation of powers that the Dimitrov Constitution made allusions about. The
National Assembly combined the executive and legislative power of the government. The State
Council would be a creation of the party and the state. It has a list of liberal democratic rights the
reads like a Western European democracy, yet there are seemingly minor wording differences
that make large differences. Freedoms are guaranteed by the State by “placing the necessary
material conditions for the purpose at the disposal of the citizens.” 87
The 1980s were different in Bulgaria than the rest of the Soviet satellites. It barely started
at all and then it started late. Bulgarian glasnost started in 1987. Bulgaria was different because
of its history and culture. First, Bulgaria never had any uprisings like Prague in 1968. There was
never a cohesive anti-communist opposition. In terms of anti-government activity, “nothing ever
happened”. Second, Bulgarians looked to the Turks and Greeks instead of eastern Europe.
Finally, most Bulgarians did not hate the Russians. Giatzidis wrote that the Bulgarians found
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security in the predictable communist system.88 The economics and lifestyle of post-1960
Bulgaria surely played a part in this.
This changed in 1988 and 1989. Opposition groups started to form. Many were
concerned about apolitical issues like the environment. The stronger challenge to the regime
came from within its own party. In an ill-conceived move to inflame nationalistic feelings,
Zhivkov started forcing ethnic Turks to assimilate. This triggered demonstrations that turned into
a bloody fiasco when police opened fire into groups of protestors. To make matters worse, the
communist leader then facilitated an exodus of ethnic Turks into Turkey. A new generation of
communists had enough. 89
There was an internal coup and the new leaders pledged to forge a new democratic
socialist government. It advocated for political pluralism, the rule of law and to end corruption.90
They entered into round table talks with anti-communist groups. Bulgaria adopted their present
constitution in 1991.91 These groups knew little about politics or elections. The new Bulgarian
Socialist Party (reformed young communists) won the first three elections. One major issue that
emerged in the period was the activities of the old communist elite. They used their old
connections and money to their advantage. This was the origins of the contemporary mafia in
Bulgaria. “Corruption became the rule” in Bulgaria.92 The Socialists were finally voted out of
power in 1997 after disappointing economic policies and allegations of corruption.93
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Culture
Eastern Orthodoxy impacts the quality of democracy in Bulgaria with some of its archaic
beliefs and its concepts about individuals and their rights in relation to government. These
deficiencies are serious in Bulgaria because of the large number of practicing Orthodox in the
country. Today, 80% of all Bulgarians are Eastern Orthodox. 94 It is “an ancient church, newly
charred and chastened by decades of oppression and martyrdom.”95 Unlike other Christians,
Orthodoxy never had a Reformation or a Vatican II. Much of their teachings remain as they have
been for thousands of years. It opposes cremation and abortion, yet does not condemn capital
punishment. It allows for divorce under very strict circumstances. It allows for remarriage
(referred to as a “second” marriage) and “in exceptional cases” a third, but only with the
“appropriate penance”. A fourth marriage is never allowed in the Orthodox Church.96
The church‟s policies in dealing with other religions seem to lack toleration and counter
to religious plurality. Orthodox priests are barred from participating in religious services with
non-Orthodox clergy. They may not “co-celebrate” with them in marriages, baptisms or funerals.
Orthodox congregants are discouraged from attending social events in non-Orthodox religious
settings, particularly non-Christian events. “Mixed marriages” with non-Orthodox are only
permitted as exceptions. The diocesan Bishop must grant permission before hand. The nonOrthodox celebrant must promise and plan to convert to Orthodoxy shortly after the marriage
and the man and woman must sign an agreement that any children from the union be baptized in
94
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the Orthodox Church. These marriages are a major exception as many Orthodox priests refuse to
conduct them at all.
The Orthodox religion does not acknowledge the individual in relation to the
government. The Slavophile approach taken by Eastern Orthodox rejects materialism, liberalism
and individualism. They contrast political freedom with spiritual freedom.97 The church believes
in a separation of the church and state but seeks symphonia. This is the belief that the church and
state are equals; “two parts of an ensemble whose conductor is Christ.”98 This conveys the notion
that both the Church and the State are ordained by God. It allows Orthodox adherents to honor
political leaders as isapostoloi or “equals as apostles.”99 This notion of a government ordained by
God and leaders as the messengers or agents of God is preposterous to most non-Orthodox. It has
no place in the concept of Western liberal democracy.
An important assumption in the belief in symphonia is that the State is a Christian State.
Monarchs of Orthodox kingdoms were deemed messengers of God when welcoming or sending
missionaries and general of the same countries displayed Orthodox icons before battles and
during sieges.100 This accounts for countries with a long Orthodox legacy or large Orthodox
population declaring Orthodoxy as the “state religion” or in Bulgaria‟s case, its traditional
religion. The State, as well as the Church, conduct God‟s will. It is a century old belief
reminiscent of the pre-Vatican II beliefs of Catholicism. They used the motto “God wills it!” as
they marched off to the Crusades.
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Another Orthodox belief is their refusal to acknowledge gay marriage and condemnation
of homosexuality. There is a constitutional ban on gay marriage in Bulgaria. Their beliefs about
homosexuality are commonly held in Bulgaria. “Homosexuals in Bulgaria mostly have to live
their lives in the shadows. Those who come out risk losing their friends and their jobs. The only
freedoms are in the shadows.” Most view homosexuality in religious terms set by the Church:
it‟s a sin.101 The “Don‟t ask, Don‟t tell” attitude of Bulgarians was violated by a Gay Pride
march in 2015. None other than the Church joined anti-gay activists in trying to have it
cancelled. These marches in the past have been met with counterdemonstrations and violence.
The Bulgarian Orthodox Church is in lockstep with its Russian counterpart, referring to any
display that acknowledges the LGBT community as “propaganda of homosexuality”. 102
Members of the LGBT Community are not the only targets of the Church‟s sociopolitical
statements. In 2006 the Church endorsed the activities of ATAKA. In addition to the LGBT
community, they target ethnic minorities, including the Roma population. These groups endure
hate speech and violence. Their living conditions are substandard. Many groups lived in
segregated areas. Their children suffer from a lack of educational opportunities, healthcare and
other services. There are many instances of police harassment and disproportionate prosecution.
Sometimes, they are even targets of physical violence.103There have been some improvement in
the national strategy to integrate the Roma and arrived migrants, but further efforts are needed.
All minority groups, including the LGBT community, would benefit from simple diligent
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application and a fair judicial process.104 Hate speech, which precipitates violence, is on the rise.
Hate speech is rarely punished.105 When these crimes are prosecuted two things usually happen.
They are either treated as “hooliganism”, which bypass the more severe penalties under the
criminal law.106 Sometimes the courts opt to no prosecute hate speech because of exclusions
made for free speech and political platforms.107
Fortunately, not all minority groups deal with the same level of vitriol and hate as the
aforementioned. Women have excelled in Bulgaria since the collapse of communism. This is
despite their second tier status in the Orthodox religion. The World Economic Forum ranks
Bulgaria in the top ½ of the countries in the world for overall quality of life for women. They are
ranked first in the world for the number of women in professional and technical fields versus
male Bulgarians. Educational opportunities and literacy for men and women are almost the exact
same. They have the highest life expectancy versus their male counterparts.108 Opportunities for
women in Bulgaria are improving.
This is especially true in the political arena. In the last five years the gender gap between
men and women in Bulgarian politics dropped by a third. 109 In 2010 Prime Minister Boiko M.
Borisov promoted several women to high levels positions in the government. Women served as
Justice Minister, the Mayor of Sofia and Speaker of the Parliament. There are several reasons
given for the appointment of so many women. Tatyana Kmetova alluded to the gender equality
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found in communism. Under communism Bulgaria had the highest percentage of working
women in the world, represented in a wide variety of sectors of work.110 There reality is that the
increase in political empowerment is due to not only the former communist tradition and high
levels of education, but also the retirement of the initial generation of post-Communist
politicians. In the 21st century, in a Bulgaria open to the world, young educated Bulgarian
women see the possibilities democracy offers.
The rights of linguistic minorities are preserved in the Bulgarian constitution just like the
rights of women. Yet, language is a barrier to many in Bulgaria. Article 36 of the Constitution
guarantees minorities the right to study their mother tongue “alongside” Bulgarian. Article 53 of
the document establishes the right to an education up to the age of 16. However, the language
rights are subject to various obstacles both political and practical. First, there is hesitation to
commit to this politically. Bulgaria is not a signatory to the European Charter for Regional and
Minority Languages.111 There is also the historical antecedent of the Zhivkov regime that tried
ending Turkish identity, including their culture. Practically speaking, there are problems with
establishing the schools and the children attending. Many asylum seekers arriving in Bulgaria
have no education and are not literate in their own language. Some languages are hard to find
instructors for (Kurdish).112 Many Roma parents think that the schools are inhospitable because it
seeks to strip their identity away.
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Geography
An analysis of the effect geography has on democracy in Bulgaria is very challenging to
the paradigm outlined in the methodology section of this work. At the core of the complication is
the established fact that Bulgaria is a state in transition. Looking across the last ten years, there
are a dearth of articles discussing the relations between Bulgaria and the west and Bulgaria and
Russia. Within this period, Bulgaria is reminiscent of a non-aligned state of the Cold War. The
articles are informative and illustrate where Bulgaria sits along the spectrum between Moscow
and Brussels but only in relation to the topic of the article. Not only does Bulgaria vacillate
between the two at different times, but according to geopolitical question. Example: At a
particular moment in time, Bulgaria may seem pro-Western in terms of security, while being proEastern in regards to trade. Yet in a month or two, the exact opposite might be true. The
movement between East and West are based on security issues, democratic issues, larger
economic matters and energy trade.
A scholar will find very obvious Eastern tendencies in Bulgaria in terms of history and
culture. Bulgaria was regarded by some as the Soviet Union‟s most loyal ally. 113Robert A.
Sanders wrote, “Bulgaria… remains a bright spot in the old Eastern Bloc due to its cultural and
linguistic affinities with Russia.” At two different points in their history, Bulgarians sought to
become the sixteenth republic of the Soviet Union.114 Of course, there is the most contemporary
historical observation: Bulgaria remained communist while the rest of the Eastern Bloc
abandoned the system. This highlights another point about the Bulgarian transition out of
113
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communism. There was no anti-Russian fervor. The Bulgarians viewed Russians as historical
allies.
The strong ties to Russia only get stronger when looking at Bulgarian culture. Bulgaria is
80% Orthodox and Russia has the largest Orthodox population in the world. The nature of the
religion illustrates the strength of this connection. It is a relationship you do not see in countries
that share other religions. There are not especially strong ties between Ireland and Poland or
Germany and Switzerland. The sobornost, the willing sacrifice self-benefit for the community,
runs strong.115 Aleksander Solzhenitsyn wrote, “Our ingrained and wretched Russian tradition:
We refuse to learn how to organize from below, and are inclined to wait for instructions from a
monarch, a leader, a spiritual or political authority.”116 This is nothing to say of their shared
written language117 and a shared body of water, the Black Sea.
Perhaps this centuries old exchange of language and religion is an ancient contagion. If
this cultural sharing is considered such, then so is the influence of the Ottomans and the present
day Turkish minority. The Eastern Orthodoxy and Cyrillic alphabet used in Bulgaria today are
popularly, and arguably incorrectly known as, “Russian”. One of the larger political parties in the
National Assembly is made up of Turkish minorities. Cases can be made that the contagions that
effected contemporary Bulgarian democracy are centuries old.
The allure of the west and Bulgaria‟s accession to the EU challenge these historical aspects of
Bulgaria. Their more recent move to democracy not only meant that Bulgaria was further
entrenched into communism and social democracy, but that there was more to be gained in
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turning west. These gains include trade, economics and commerce, but also in democratic
freedoms and rights. While the democratic improvements in Bulgaria may appear
underwhelming to observers, Bulgaria‟s late start and starting point as “Russia‟s most loyal
satellite” should not be disregarded.
Bulgaria‟s accession was a more difficult task than that of its neighbors. Their extended
period of time under communist/social democrat rule left large pieces of their economic structure
and economy farther from the EU directives than other central and east European candidate
states. The voluminous pages dealing with privatization in EC reports evidence it. The reports
lend the notion of Bulgaria being a slower than average track star running to catch up. While
faced with many remedial in changes in terms of democracy and rights, the negotiation process
and Bulgaria‟s accession, in fact, illustrate the transformative power of EU membership.
The negotiations and EU accession process improved the structure of the Bulgarian
judiciary and the nation‟s economic framework. Laws and amendments changed tenures of
judges, provided for the immunity and removal of judges. They clarified rules for selecting judge
and magistrates.118 The penal code was also changed a number of times to reflect EU directives.
Bulgaria adopted the Council of Europe Civil law Convention and the UN Convention against
Corruption. They also ratified the Additional Protocol to the Council of Europe Criminal Law
Convention against Corruption.119
EU accession aided the privatization of the Bulgarian economy and embrace of free
market institutions and ideals. The process is slower than in other countries of the region. It is
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reminiscent of taking an automobile from the 1950s and updating it with all of the trappings of a
21st century sedan. The negotiators were faced with deconstructing a command economy and
assembling one durable and capable of full integration into the EU‟s common market. Private
ownership increased. Noted privatizations were in banking telecommunications and
shipbuilding. The price structures are shifting from administrated to market based. This involves
a quantitative easing of prices. Prices of basic utilities were brought up to cost recovery levels
slowly as the household incomes grew. Eventually, they will be allowed to fluctuate as a free
market sectors develop.120
The process of EU membership provided an opportunity for sweeping human rights
improvements in Bulgaria. Their courts started enforcing the decisions of the European Court of
Human Rights. Their parliament passed comprehensive anti-discrimination legislation. The
Penal Code was changed to provide for equal treatment of the LGBT community. They also
completed a battery of regulations to curb human trafficking.121 The government also addressed
children‟s rights by establishing a National Strategy and program for child protection. 122
The Labor Code was changed to meet EU directives and include protections for workers
found in most other industrialized countries. The government established an unemployment
fund, obligated employers to disclose employment conditions and offered protections to
displaced workers. Work place equality was advanced with the codification of an equal pay
regulation and transposition of EU directives on workplace discrimination. Workplace safety
improved, moving closer towards EU standards. The government also restructured the resources

120

Ibid., 33.
Ibid.,20-1.
122
Ibid., 24.
121

226

for unemployed. Employment Agencies replaced larger Regional Employment Services
facilities.123
Examining the East-West Paradigm in terms of politics and economics finds a more
transient state in Bulgaria. Politically, things have changed a great deal in the 20 years after the
end of communism and social democracy. EU membership, regional security challenges, global
geopolitics have occasionally pulled Bulgaria West. Even now, when they move back towards
Moscow, they are not as close as they once were. The forces that shape Bulgaria now are larger
in number and different. Traditional relationships and history are secondary to economic needs
and national interests. There are forces that might temporarily pull Bulgaria more to the East, but
they are the same forces that will pull it away again in a matter of time. These are largely related
to commerce, especially in the energy sector. 124 This is something that even Russian President
Vladimir Putin accepts.125
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Conclusion
The seeds of the current mafia state in Bulgaria lay in the Russian contagions hidden in
the spread of influence and religion throughout history. Constitutions, elections, voting and
rights are meaningless with corrupt politicians and a judiciary available to the highest bidder.
Most Bulgarians enjoy many of the same rights as their fellow Europeans and EU members.
However, without Dahl‟s responsive government, Alvarez‟s democratic legal structure and
Hasselmann‟s checks on government power there is no real democracy in Bulgaria. The political
leadership of contemporary Bulgaria must continue reforms and eradicate the criminal scourge
from the political landscape if there is to ever be a true democracy based in Sofia.
Bulgaria‟s journey towards liberal democracy continues, half completed to this point. The
work of the Plevneliev regime and recent voter turnout in EU elections gives hope that
Habermas‟ ideas about the positive effect of EU membership.126 Perhaps, a liberal democratic
government system in Bulgaria will be the side effect of a larger idea of European democracy
based on the European Union. Moscow seems to be ready to accept a certain amount of change
in this regard. At least temporarily, the forces that affect the quality of liberal democracy in
Bulgaria seem to be changing.
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V. RESULTS AND FINDINGS
The analysis of the hypotheses from the Methodology section rendered two supported
hypotheses, two unsupported hypotheses and two instances where the case studies were
inconclusive. This is noted in the statement of the results by hypothesis below. There is an
additional section after the statement of results. This section contains findings germane to the
topics of democratic quality in central and eastern Europe, the effect history, culture and
geography have on democracy in the region and observations vital to draw an accurate
conclusion on the subject.
H1: The earlier democracy is achieved historically, the stronger the post-communist
democracy in the region. The case studies support this hypothesis. The three case study
countries share two different starting points for democracy. Two of the states, Poland and
Hungary established the current democratic structures in late 1989. They are in the first
group of states to convert to democracy documented by Bunce. Bulgaria fell into the
“laggards” group.1 Despite the end of the official Bulgarian communist regime in 1991,
the country was led by reformed communists. This government practiced a modified
version of communism commonly referred to as social democracy.2 This party ruled until
1997.3 Only then did Bulgaria really start down the road to democracy. The result was
predictable. Reports from the accession process showed that there were very basic free
changes needed to be a true democracy and EU member. For example, large portions of
the economy were still state-owned in 2002. 4
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H2: The level of former communist oppression does not appear to affect the quality of
liberal rights and democratic quality in the region.
The case studies do not support this hypothesis. The level of communist oppression
reflects an inverse relationship to rights, freedoms and democracy in modern central and
eastern Europe. Poland experienced the harshest documented oppression of any of the
three states included in the case study and they had the highest quality of democracy
before the recent rise of the Law & Justice regime. Soviet troops cracked down on the
Catholic Church, one of the only persistent institutions in Polish society. There were
occasional protests. Sometimes protesters were fired upon.5 Kadar implemented the
relaxed “goulash communism” after he took power following the 1956 revolution.6
Meanwhile, in Bulgaria, post-Stalin life was confortable. They had good schools, no
unemployment, there was a decent amount of private ownership and families even took
vacations.7

H3: Western religions tend to promote a higher quality of democracy in the region. The
results for this hypothesis were inconclusive. Poland is largely Catholic. Most
Hungarians do not claim a religion. Bulgaria has one of the larger Eastern Orthodox
religions in the world. Poland is the only case study to test this hypothesis. Much of the
more recent impact Catholicism has on democracy in Poland is negative. This is an
interesting divergence from the modern history of the country. Pope John Paul II is
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credited with aiding in the end of communism.8 However, the Catholic Church in
Poland is not like the Catholic Church elsewhere. The Catholic Church embraces
religious pluralism and individual rights.9 Yet, the Catholic Church in Poland vehemently
opposes gay marriage10 and abortion.11 This may be attributed to their isolated position
behind the Iron Curtain during the institution of the Second Vatican Council.

H4: Western ethnic heterogeneity has no effect on post-communist democracy in the
region, while the presence of non-Western minorities does. The results for this hypothesis
were inconclusive. The case study countries offer differing results in terms of the effect
ethnicity has on the quality of democracy. The Roma present an example of
discrimination and disenfranchisement based on ethnicity. Yet, the Turkish minority in
Bulgaria shares a comparable quality of democracy with ethnic Bulgarians. Poland
contributes little to the discussion because of the homogeneity. It is tempting to use
ethnicity as a factor in the level of rights and freedoms in the region because of the long
history of strife based on the variable. There were the post-communist Balkan Wars.
Moscow intermittently banters about preserving the rights of Russian minorities.
However, ethnicity as a factor is minor compared to others such as, history, religion and,
even economics.
One might conclude that the idea of an ethnic impact on democracy has a temporal aspect
to it. The Turks in Bulgaria are a long established and integrated minority. Yet, the plight of the
Roma is long and storied. The ethnic strife that plagued the former Yugoslavia was managed by
8
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Tito. In short, the true effect ethnicity has on democratic quality is not the presence of minorities,
but their role in the political landscape. Turks in Bulgaria are political established with their own
party. They have a place in the political establishment. The true damage to the quality of
democracy in the region occurs at the hands of reactionary governments. Fully educated and
integrated minorities could be a threat and at least cause uncertainty to the status quo. This helps
explain the recent more restrictive migration policies of many central and east European states.
These policies can pit the capitals of the region in opposition to Brussels and in the context of
refugees in conflict with international law.
H5: Relations with Russia have little to do with the quality of democracy in the region.
The case studies do not support this hypothesis. Each of the case study countries has a
different relationship and different history with Russia. These relationships can be broken
down into political, economic and social. In short, all three understand that Russia could
be or is presently a threat.12 Yet, Moscow‟s true strength in the East-West Paradigm is
economic for Poland and Hungary. The Russian leadership can use the economic
blackmail of energy availability or price to extort political gains. This is only countered
by the power of the EU. Bulgaria is in a different class altogether. Bulgaria and Russia
have a common religion. Their history shared religion help explain the level of
democratic quality in Bulgaria. The remnants of the secret police who established the
organized criminal activity and current mafia state represent Russia‟s impact on modern
Bulgarian democracy. The European Union and the West offer all three states an
alternative to Russian influence. The tug of war between the EU and Russia, especially in
economic matters, illustrates the East-West paradigm.
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H6: Democracy spread through parts of the region like a contagion, but now this type of
effect is sporadic. The case studies support the hypothesis. The collapse of communism
that started in Poland rolled through the region like a virus. Yet, years later, things have
seemingly changed. This supports Kapstein and Converse, who say that a democracy
matures after six years.13 Most advances in democracy now come from domestic pressure
or international organizations. The domestic pressure is more regular now because the
political system has matured. People know their rights. There are developed parties and
interest groups. International organizations now have power because the countries are
members of organizations like the EU and NATO. The governments have obligations,
even though they might not always meet them. The result is the countries of central and
eastern Europe achieving democratic advancements at different points and times. This is
according to their pressures and priorities.
There are additional findings wrought from the analysis of these three countries. Some
speak to the democracy in the region. Others speak to the effect of history, culture and geography
on democracy in central and eastern Europe. There are a few that address some very salient
points about democracy.
One observation about the status of democracy in central and eastern Europe pertains to
the lack of rights and freedoms in some states and the prospect of a “democratic
rollback”14Democracy, in all its forms, can be ugly, hard work. To say otherwise is to be as
deceived as the Poles who thought Accession would be easy.15 Many highlight that the states of
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central and eastern Europe are longer “young democracies”16. Many of their trials and
tribulations are similar to those of much older democratic states. Use the United States as an
example. The U.S. was not much better at the same point in their statehood. Using 1989 as a
starting point, the oldest of the states is 28 years old. The comparable year in American history
was 1809. At this point, the U.S. had not finished expanding to the West. There were still
tensions with Great Britain. Slavery had not been abolished and still divided the country. One of
the largest debates of the first half of the 19th century was yet to be made: fiscal policy and the
National Bank. Today‟s Superpower was racked with social problems, economic questions and
faced an unsure geopolitical future. Only a few years later, the invading British soldiers burned
the White House to the ground.
They key to states surviving is the resilience of the established systems. This includes the
European Union. There will be disagreements. There could be crises. There is even a remote
chance of armed conflict. This doesn‟t change the progress the states of the region have made.
We have already seen examples of each. The debate over refugees rages on. The debt crisis was
abated for the time being. Europe survived a series of Wars in the Balkans. The countries of
central and eastern Europe still rose from the ashes of communism to become fledgling
democracies with at least a smattering of liberal rights.
Another observation from the case studies is that history should be regarded when
studying the politics and democracy of central and eastern Europe. History can prove to be at
least informative and perhaps, in some cases, predictive. Note the terms “historical antecedent”,
“institutional mimicry”17 and “memory culture”18.While in many cases we speak of the first two
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terms in positive terms: reviving the trappings of democracy, naming the parliaments traditional
names from history, the terms along with the latter can refer to negative phenomena. Just
because something is historical, that does not make it a positive aspect of politics. Think of
Jobbik in their fascist brown shirts with the Arrow Cross symbols. The re-emergence of the dark
chapters of history can be as dangerous as the emergence of revived democratic practices is to be
celebrated.
Another interesting aspect is the study of religion in regards to rights and freedoms. One
of the more recent political science fads is researching the compatibility of Islam with
democracy. The campus library database is awash with articles analyzing the topic any number
of ways. Yet, there are few volumes looking at the other Abrahamic religions. While Woodberry
and Shah correctly point out the “natural affinity” between Protestant Christianity and
democracy,19 Orthodoxy is quite different. In fact, it is rather restrictive when it comes to
individual rights. Most agree that the religion is antithetical to democracy.20 The obvious
observation is that Islam, often maligned for being incompatible with democracy21, and
Orthodoxy, which most reluctantly agree the same, are both eastern religions. However, without
a comparable assessment of Judaism and other non-western religions a conclusion is hazardous
at best.
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VI. CONCLUSION
History, culture and religion contribute to the varying quality of democracy in central and
eastern Europe. The countries of the region emerged from communism in two different waves.
The states were hampered by different problems. Many did not have a political system at all.
Many saw their economies in shambles. The systems and processes created were partially guided
by the past history their culture and the location between the rest of Europe and their former
masters in the Kremlin. The region contradicts many of the established theories and methods of
study. Central and eastern Europe has a very unique history. The states are populated by a very
diverse collection of peoples. They sit in a very unordinary sometime perilous spot on the map.
The area is best studied using a regional approach with a regard for their past identity and
location. More recently, pessimism, xenophobia and a euroscepticsim confront these states.
No other area in the world has a history comparable to central and eastern Europe. Many
states were settled in the first century. Unfortunately, some of the regional rivalries and
grievances are just as old. Through the millennium, the landscape was pockmarked with battles,
claims to sovereignty, invading armies, passing crusaders, attacking armies and communist
domination. The occupants collectively practice all three of the Abrahamic religions. This alone
made peace difficult at times. Many different languages are spoken. Central and eastern Europe
is the home to several different national identities. Additionally, the countries live in the shadow
of their former oppressor, Mother Russia. The region‟s singular history, unique culture and
unusual geography are one of a kind.
Because of this uniqueness, many theories cannot fully explain their democratic quality
and government. Traditional economic based models fail. Poland and Hungary are economically
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stable, but still lack many liberal rights. Social theories that use ethnicity are not adequate either.
Many of the countries are rather ethnically homogenous, but are still democratically deficient.
Poland and Hungary are comprised largely of white Christians Most of these theories and models
based on quantitative measures fail to accurately explain the differences in rights and freedoms
citizens from different countries in the region enjoy. Turks are readily accepted in Bulgaria and
have their own political party. The same Bulgarian Turks would face xenophobia and hate in
Hungary.
Religion plays a large role in the quality of rights and freedoms in many of the states of
central and eastern Europe. This large role in select states can be explained for a variety of
reasons. For example, the Catholic Church remains the only constant in the society. The
establishment of the church in Poland goes back thousands of years. A large part of being Polish
is being Catholic for many Poles. The Catholic Church‟s preponderance of power in modern
Poland is evident in their laws and post-communist constitution. The Church took a large role in
is writing and Catholic dogma is incorporated into it. The Orthodox Church takes a different
attitude towards secular government. It believes that both the Church and the government sit
equals. This harkens back to the period of divine rite monarchs.
The location of the region is important to the politics. As it is the frontier of the western
civilization. They are bordered by non-western countries and Russia. This position grants them
the unenviable role of the object of both western enticements from Brussels and eastern
propositions from Russia. EU membership and a close relationship with other member states to
the west improved the quality of democracy in the region. The participation in the European
common market aided in the stability of their post-communist governments. Russia, who
opposes this close partnership between the EU and its former satellites use both carrot and switch
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to protect its own interests Some states, like Bulgaria, are more inclined than others to work with
Russia due to close cultural ties, namely the Orthodox Church.
The unique past, diverse population and particular geography of central and eastern
Europe help determine the quality of democracy in the states of the region. Other more popular
and traditional factors are still at work, but they are less important in this particular region. A
regional approach is the optimum method for researching the throughputs of government and
democracy in the area. This could be used elsewhere, but definitely not as written here. Few
places have a comparable history. No place has such a differing mix of people with the history.
Even fewer have all of this while pinned between the state that served as the twentieth century
regional hegemon and the twenty-first century supranational state. Central and eastern Europe is
far from just being different. The states are collectively distinct.
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